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Despite heavy municipal spending on solid waste management,
most cities fail to provide efficient, reliable, universal collection
services or environmentally safe disposal - at high costs to
public health and the environment. Bank lending should enipha-
size  strategic  service planning,  better  institutional  arrange-
ments, more efficient management and finances, and environ-
mental protection.
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Municipal solid waste management (MSWM)  upgrading institutional arrangements, including
should protect the environment, safeguard  private sector delivery of services; the financing
health, and improve productivity.  In most  of capital inrvestments  and recurring costs;
developing countries, however, solid waste serv-  pricing for better cost recovery; and environ-
ices consume between 20 and 50 percent of  mentally safe disposal (in, .ading proper man-
operating budgets for municipal services yet are  agement of hazardous wastes).
unreliable, do not reach everyone, and do not
provide safe disposal.  * Components finance plans addressing the
full range of solid waste services and related
The World Bank has financed MSWM im-  management activities.
provements through freestanding solid waste
projects and components in broader projects.  *  The Bank help establish financial interTne-
But the total costs of solid waste components in  diaries (such as municipal development banks)
71 projects during FY74-88 was about $532  to support comprehensive MSWM activities,
million, or only 0.3 percent of Bank lending.  among other urban investments.
And component design and performance have
been largely disappointing.  *  For publicly-provided services, both pri-
mary and secondary collection operatiotns be
The low level of borrowing for the MSWM  supported, with special emphasis on vel,iclc
sector - considering high municipal spending  selection and maintenance.  For low-income
on MSWM - is attributable to the sector's  areas, they recommend supporting low-cost
labor-intensiveness (and relatively low foreigr  community-based technologies.
exchange potential); most cities' failure to
appreciate the true cost of MSWM services; thc  *  Land acquisition - for disposal sites  and
difficulty local governments have getting access  other facilities - should be a condition of loan
to capital; and the failure of many Bank projects  effectiveness.  So should use or only agreed-
to include an MSWM expert.  upon equipment and vehicles.
Early Bank projects provided limited funds  *  Expansion of collection capacity be bal-
to procure collection-related equipment.  They  anced by investments in nonpolluting disposal
had little impact on the quality or efficiency of  facilities.
service delivery.  In the past five years, Bank
lending for MSWM has increased and broad-  *  Appropriate regulations be established-
ened - and the potential for its effective  few in number, transparent, casily understood.
expansion is evident.  equitable, and economically and physically
sensible.
Bartone, Bernstein, and Wright recommend
that:  *  Costs be recovered through mandatory
"benefit taxes" (in residential areas) and variablc  -
The Bank adopt a comprehensive policy  user charges (higher for better scrviccs) Ior conm-
framework for designing solid waste compo-  mercial and industrial firms.
nents or projects that focus more attention on
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Affairs Complex.  An objective  of thc scries  is to get thcsc findings out  quickly, even  if pr._sentations  arc lcss  th.an  fLilly
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and Ned Echeverria.INVESTMENTS  IN  SOLID WASTE  MANAGEMENT:
OPPORTUNITIES  FOR ENVIRONMENTAL  IMPROVEMENT
EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY
i.  A review of 7'.  projects  witLi  municipal  solid waste management (MSWM)
components  revealed  that  the  World  Bank  has  supported  diverse  efforts  to  improve
urban solid  waste services  in member  countries.  At one extreme,  the Bank
financed projects that provide limited funds  to  support procurement of
collection-related  equipment  with little  impact  on the  quality  or  efficiency  of
service  provision.  In Nigeria,  Singapore,  and  Mexico,  by contrast.  the Bank
invested  in  well-designed,  comprehensive  MSWM  components  covering  technological
and  institutional  improvements  in  solid  waste  collectie,n.  transfer,  and  disposal.
The  latter  investments  ranged  between  US$47.5  million  anI  US$111.8  million. In
some  cases,  small  but  well-focused  MSWM  component7s  covering  institutional
improvements  and  equipment  procurement  have  been  fol'.owed  up  by  larger  subsector
investments  in subsequent  projects.
ii.  The total cost of the solid waste components in the 71 Bank projects is
estimated  to  be US$532.0  mIllion,  or 7.8  percent  of total  project  costs; the
average  MSWM  component  cost  is about  US$8.1  million. Further,  the  majority  of
projects  with  solid  waste  components  are  either  urban  development  (75  percent)
or water  and sanitati-n  (13  percent)  projects. In recent  years,  Bank lending
for MSWM activities  nas increased  as the subsector  matures in a number  of
countries.  In the few projects for which MSWM component ERRs have been
calculated,  substantial  returns  have  been  reported.
iii.  Effective  design  of  MSWM  components  appears  to be related  in dart  to the
amount  of time and effort  government  personnel,  Bank staff,  and consultants
allocaLe  to the collection  of baseline  data and the preparation  of specific
project  proposals.  Moreover,  when a sanitary  or municipal  engineer  or other
technical  specialist  with  experience  in  refuse  management  has  been  involved  in
the  identification  and/or  appraisal  missions,  the  resulting  project  designs  have
tended  to provide  detailed  proposals  for  meeting  solid  waste  management  needs
within  the  broader  urban  objectives  in the  project  cities. Nonetheless,  most
of the projects reviewed  have small MSWM components  for the procurement  of
collection  equipment; only half of the  projects  provide  facilities  necessary
for environmentally  safe disposal  and about a third  of the projects  include
technical  assistance  for  strengthening  or  reorganizing  the  local  institutions
responsible  for  MSWM. The  effectiveness  of  such  limited  components  in  achieving
urban  and  environmental  management  objectives  is  questionable.
iv.  The low  level  of borrowing  for  the  MSWM  sector  relative  to the  magnitude
of  municipal  expenditure  for  solid  waste  management  can  be  attributed  to  several
factors. First,  solid  waste  collaction  operations  tend to  be labor  intensive,
and  as  viewed  in  several  past  components,  have relatively  low  foreign  exchange
potential. A related  factor  is that  the  borrowers  gener-.lly  do not recognize
that  MSWM is  a major  consumer  of scarce  municipal  resources; the true  cost of
MSWM  services  may  be  hidden  due  to deficient  municipal  accounting  practices  and
reliance  on central  government  transfers.  Thus, the relative  importance  of- ~.ii  -
achieving  greater  efficiency  in seivice  provision  is not  properly  appreciated.
An  additional  factor  is that local governments  do not have easy access to
capital.  Lastly,  past project  identification  and appraisal  missions  did not
always  include  e  municipal  solid  waste expert  or sanitary  engineer  with MSWM
expertise. Thus,  projects  focussed  on other  problems  or simply  provided  funds
for  the  procurement  of vehicles  and  equipment.
v.  Based  on a limited  review  of implementation,  many  of th  .;SWM  components
can  be  viewed  as  missed  opportunities.  Due  largely  to  inadequacies  in  component
design (e.g., lack of or  insufficient  attention to btiilding  institutional
capacity,  lack of strategic  planning, failure  to provide for safe disposal
facilities),  the  execution  of the components  encountered  extensive  delays  and
failed  to achieve  long-term  improvement  in solid  waste  management  in terms  of
both  efficiency  and  environmental  protection.  Specific  implementation  problems
included  unclear institutional  structure  and responsioilities,  insufficient
technical and  managerial expertise, inappropriate  vehicle specifications,
complicated  procurement  procedures,  failure  to maintain  vehicles  in operating
condition,  inadequate  cost  recovery,  and  difficulties  in  selecting  and  acquiring
sites  for  transfer  stations  and  disposal  facilities.
vi.  To broaden the scope of future investments,  the Bank should adopt a
comprehensive  policy  framework  for  designing  solid  waste  cromponents  that takes
into  account all  physical, technical, legal,  institutional, financial,
environmental,  and sociocultural  aspects  of MSWM in a metropolitan  area.  To
expect  significant  lotig-term  improvzement  in  solid  waste  management,  the  f liowing
recommendations  should  be considered  in the  design  of  MSWM components.
(a)  Strategic  Solid Waste Plans.  The components  should finance  the
development  of  strategic  solid  wa.ste  management  plans  addressing  the
full  range  of  solid  waste  services  and  related  management  activities.
For  large  cities,  the  plan should  focus  on tr,e  requirements  of the
municipality  and  the  surrounding  metropolitan  area;  a  national  plan
is  more appropriate  for  small  and intermediate  cities.
(b)  Collection.  The MSWM components  should  support improvements  in
primary as well as secondary  collection  operations  with vehicle
selections  based  on  analyses  of  solid  waste,  labor,  and  other  local
conditions.  Special  emphasis  should  be  placed  on  setting  up  vehicle
maintenance  garages,  training  staff,  and  ensuring  availability  of
spare  parts.  To provide  greater  coverage  for  low-income  areas  as
well  as to  maximize  the  sustainability  of  improved  MSWM  systems,  the
solid  waste  component  should  support  the  use  or  development  of low-
cost community-based  technologies.  To  achieve efficiency in
collection  operations,  it  is  essential  to  match  vehicle  type  and  size
with  local conditions.  Due  to  the  complexities of  vehicle
specifications  and  procurement,  project  designers  should  insist  on
loan conditions  that require only agreed upon equipment to be
purchased.
(c)  Transfer. Resource  Recovery,  and Disposal.  All investments  in
expanding  collection  capacity  must  be accompanied  by correspondirg
investments  in  non-polluting  disposal  facilities.  In  most  developing- iii  -
country cities, the most appropriate  disposal facilities  will
continue  to be sanitary  landfills,  and  where  a market  for compost
cAn  ra  demonstrated,  composting  plants. Where  incineration  and/or
resource  recovery  is  planned,  facilities  for  safe  disposal  of  rejects
and  ash  are  still  needed. Where  haul  distances  are  greater  than  15
to  20  kilometers  or  travel  times  exceed  30  minutes,  transfer  stations
should  be considered.
(d)  Hazardous  Waste Management.  To maximize  the benefits  of a MSWM
component,  attention  should  be  directed  at  instituting  and  improving
environmental  controls  and  monitoring  to  keep  hazardous  wastes  otlit
of the  municipal  system. If  industrial  wastes  are  collected  by the
municipality,  all potential  sources  of hazardous  waste should  be
identified  and  targeted  for  appropriate  management. Although  laws
controlling  these  wastes  are  enacted  at  the  national  or  state  level,
the municipality  should  play a key role in monitoring  inunicipal
disposal  sites  for  hazardous  wastes,  monitoring  the generation  of
industrial  and  hazardous  waste  in  urban  areas,  identifying  suitable
hazardous  waste sites,  and carrying  out periodic inspections  of
industrial  and  hazardous  waste  collection  and  disposal  operations.
Particular  attention attention should be  given to small-scale
manufacturing  and  cottage  industries.
(e)  Regulatory  Framework.  In  planning  MSWM  improvements,  efforts  should
be directed  at establishing  appropriate  solid  waste-related  lass,
ordina;aces,  regulations,  and  corresponding  inspection  and  enforcement
responsibilities  and procedures  at the  national,  state,  and local
levels.  Effective  enforcement  of national  environmental  controls
will require national and local authority  capacity to monitor
compliance  and apply enforcement  procedures,  procedural  ease in
implementing  regulations, nd broad  public  acceptance. Moreover,
regulations  should  be  few  i. Aumber,  transparent,  unambiguous,  easily
understood,  equitable,  and  considered  to  have significant  positive
physical  and  economic  effects.
(f)  Institutional  Arrangements.  To  improve the execution of MSWM
engineering  components,  considerable  attention  is  needed  in  the  area
of  institutional  development.  In  large  cities, solid waste
institutions  need to  be upgraded  within  the  overall  administrative
hierarchy. The responsibility  for  collecting  waste  and  delivering
it to a disposal  facility  can remain  with the municipalities  or
private  companies. Based  otl  available  data,  private  firms  can  be
more productive and  efficient in carrying out  collection and
transport operations than municipalities.  In  planning MSWM
improvements,  project  designers  should  evaluate  the  potential  for
introducing  or  expanding  private  sector  involvement  through  a  variety
of contractual  arrangements.  To achieve maximum environmental
protection  and  economies  of scale,  it  may  be possible  to  establish
a regional  or metropolitan  autllority  responsible  for solid  waste
disposal. In  small  and  intermediate  cities,  a  national  solid  waste
authority should conduct MSWM planning,  develop standards,  and
provide  technical  and  financial  assistance.  What,.ver  institutional-i,v  -
arrangements  are  establi.shed,  project  designers  need  to  ensure  that
there is a clear organizational  structure,  an ongoing strategic
plar,ning  function,  and effective  budgeting,  cost accounting,  and
management  information  systems  that  include  monitoring  of  collection
performance.
(g)  Financing.  Pricing,  and  Cost  Recoverv. In  planning  MSWM  compone.':
more emphasis  should  be placed  on questions  of financing,  pricing,
and cost recovery.  Tc  finance capital investments,  municipal
governments  have three principal  options:  loans from existing
financial  intermediaries,  special  loan  or  grant  programs  through  the
central  government,  and municipal  sinking  fuxtds. To finance  the
substantial  recurring  costs  of  MSWM,  municipalities  can  obtain  funds
from local taxes,  intergovernmental  transfers,  and user charges.
Although  local  conditions  will  determine  the  means  by  which  the  costs
of MSWM should  be recovered,  project  desi&iiers  should  attempt  to
recover  the  maximum  amount  of  collection  costs  through  user  charges,
which include  benefit taxes (mandatory  solid waste charges)  and
voluntary  fees.  Since  industrial  and commercial  enterprises  view
solid  waste  as a  private  good  and  have  much  variation  in the  level
of service  required,  chey  can  be charged  voluntary  vatiable  fees  to
cover  the full  cost  of providing  the  desired  level  of seivine. By
contrast, municipalities  will normally charge benefit taxes to
residential  beneficiaries  to  recover  all  or  a  portion  of  t.leir  solid
waste collection  costs.  Costs for disposal operations  may be
recovered  largely  through  local  taxes  as well as intergovernmental
transfers  or grants  based  on broader  environmental  objectives. In
addition  to these  financial  considerations,  the  Bank  should  promote
the use of  financial intermediaries  to  increase the level of
borrowing  for  this subsector. To expect  any significant  gains in
MSWM,  however,  solid  waste  components  should  accompany  broader  urban
management  investments  that focus  on improving  municipal  finance,
accounting,  and  budgetary  control.
(h)  Land Acquisition. Project  officers  should  ensure  that there are
environmentally  safe sites  for  new solid  waste  facilities  and that
these  sites  will  be available  for  the  timely  execution  of the  MSWM
improvements.  Accordingly,  project  designers  should  insist  on  making
land  acquisition  a condition  of loan  effectiveness.
(i)  Phasing  of  MSWM Improvements.  MSWM  investments  siiould  be  phased  to
reflect  the  objectives  and  constrai  ts  of  each  project  city. In  most
sitnations,  the first phase of Bank lending  should finance the
development  of a strategic  solid  waste management  plan and the
execution  of key institutional  improvements. The second  phase  of
investment would  provide financing for  collection equipmer.n;
transfer,  recycling,  and disposal  facilities;  and other progran.
elements  such as pilot projects,  public education,  and further
institutional  strengthening.  Subsequent  phases  of  Bank  lending  would
include  support  for  stra-egic  facilities,  expansion  of solid  waste
senvices  to  other  areas,  _nd  the  implementation  of  new  MSWM  programs.vii.  Based  on the  analysis  of World  Bank  experience  in  MSWM,  further  research
is recommended  on:  (i)  the relative  magnitude  of damages  and  benefits  versus
the  cost  of providing  solid  waste  services  to  better  estimate  the  economic  rate
of return  for  MSWM components  as well as to facilitate  the  ranking  of MSWM in
cumparison  to  that  of other  urban  investments;  (ii)  various  pricing  strategies,
separable  demand,  and  intra-urban  cross-subsidies  to  improve  cost  recovery;  (iii)
private  sector  delivery  of solid  waste  services  to  determine  how and  under  what
circumstances  the private  role in the  solid  waste sub-sector  can be expanded;
(iv) the role of APEX institutions  in MSWM to improve  solid waste service
delivery  in large,  intermediate,  and small  cities;  and (v)  strateg.c  planning
approaches  to improve the full range of solid waste services  and related
management  activities  in large,  intermediate,  and  small  cities.INVESTMENTS  IN  SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT:
OPPORTUNI$IES  FOR  ErVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT
I.  1INRODUCTION
1.01  Managing  solid  wastes  is  &  najor  challenge  for  cities  in  the  developing
world.  In the face of rapid urbanization  and industrial  growth, effeccive
municipal  solid  waste  management  (MSWM)  has a critical  role in protecting  the
environment  and  improving  urban  productivity.  In  most  developing  country  cities,
however,  MSWM is a costly  service  that  consumes  between  20 and 50 percent  of
available  operational  budgets  for  municipal  services,  yet serves  no more than
70 percent  of the  urban  inhabitants. Moreover,  unsafe  solid  waste  collection
and  disposal  practices  in  these  cities  threaten  public  health  as  well  as surface
and  ground  water  resources.  To expand  or improve  solid  waste  services  in  urban
areas,  the World Baiik  has financed  MSWM improvements  as part of its overall
lending  operations  1!i  many countries.  In response  to the Bank's increasing
emphasis  on  integrating  environmental  concerns  into  the  Bank's  lending  and  policy
dialogues,  a  study  was  conducted  to  evaluate  the  nature  and  performance  of  these
investments. The resulting  paper  is one  of a series  of papers  that  will form
part of  the Bank's efforts to develop a  policy framework for the urban
environment.
A.  Pur2ose  and  Organization  of the  Paper
1.02  The purpose of this paper is to presenit  the findings  of a brief
evaluation  of World Bank experience  in MSWM and to recommend  approaches  to
improving  future  Bank performance  in this subsector.  The review  covered  free-
standing  solid  waste  projects  as  well  as  components  of  broader  urban  development,
pollution  control,  and  water  supply  and  sewerage  or  sanitation  projects  approved
during the period FY74-88.  The findings reveal the extent of Bank lending for
domestic and industrial solid waste management and provide information on the
design, implementation, and other aspects of MSWM components in Bank projects.
1.03  The paper is presented in four chapters.  The remainder of Chapter I
describes  the methodology  by  which  the MSWM  investments were  reviewed  and
presents  definitions  and  brief  discussion  of  the benefits  of  MSWM  to  the
environment and urban productivity in developing  countries.  Chapter II presents
the  overall  results  relating  to  the  Bank's  total  lending  for  solid waste
management, including the findings of the Regional evaluation of MSWM lending.
Chapter III examines the findings related to the design and implementation of
the Bank's MSWM components and discusses such issues as the size and scope of
investments, borrowing leve'  cost recovery, and private sector participation.
Lastly,  Chapter  IV  presenus  recommendations  for  improving  the  design  and
execution  of future  MSWM  projects  or components.  Annexes  to this  paper  include
a series  of tables  containing  summary  data  on  MSWM components  in  Bank  projects
and  eight  individual  case  studies  highlighting  specific  MSWM  projects  or
components iii  selected countries.-2-
B.  Methodol2y
1.04  Based on an initial  screening  of all urban,  pollution  control,  and
water  supply  and  sanitation  lending  activities  for  the  period  FY74-88,  a subset
of  71  soliJ  waste  components  was identified  for  analysis. The  study  was  limited
to a review  of the principal  project  operational  documents: Staff  Appraisal
Reports  (SARs),  President's  Reports,  Project  Completion  Reports  (PCRs),  Project
Performance  Audit  Reports  (PPARs),  and  Sector  Reports. (The  documents  reviewed
are listed  by Region  in Tables  1.6 to 1.9  in Annex 1).  Upon reviewing  these
documents,  a  summary data sheet was prepared for each project containing:
information  on the  design  of  MSWM components,  including  sector,  institutional,
technical  (if  available)  and financial  information;  a description  of the  MSWM
component  by sub-component;  and  cost  distribution  by sub-component.  Key  project
information  was later  entered  into  an automated  data  base  for  storage  and  future
analyses.
1.05  From the  diverse  set of projects  reviewed,  eight  were selected  for
further  analysis  of the  MSWM component  design,  implementation  status,  and if
completed,  performance.  The  projects  were  chosen  on the  basis  of  both  the  level
of investment  and the  degree  of emphasis  placed  on solid  waste  management. To
provide adaquate  representation  of the breath and scope of Bank-wide  MSWM
operations,  two  projects  w,.:re  included  from  each  of the  four  Bank  Regions. For
these  eight  projects,  the  analysis  involved  interviews  with  project  officers  and
reviews  of project  supervision  reports  as well as the  other  principal  project
documents  mentioned  above.  (Detailed  descriptions  of  these  projects  are  presented
in the  annexes  to this  report.)
1.06  Due to a number  of methodological  limitations,  this paper  does not
provide  a  complete  assessment  of  the  extent  and  impact  of  the  Bank's  involvement
in  MSWM. First,  the  project  documents  for  a  number  of projects  include  only  one
or two  lines  on the  type  of service  provided,  often  accompanied  by unclear  cost
data.  In a  number  of appraisal  and  project  completion  reports,  costs  for  MSWM
could not be disaggregated  from the overall costs of municipal services
technical  'ssistance,  or institutional  strengthening  components  covering  solid
waste management as well as other urban servioes.  Moreover, reviews of
supervision  reports  and interviews  with project  officers  were undertaken  only
for the analysis  of the  eight  projects  included  in the annexes.  For  various
reasons,  however,  cerrain  project  officers  and principal  consultants  who have
the  most  knowledge  about  certain  components  could  not  be  reached  for  interviews.
Thus,  some  of the  data  in  this  report  may  not  be completely  accurate  and  a  small
number of projects that might contain limiter `;WM components  may not be
included.  Nonetheless,  these possible  omissions  dLe unlikely  to affect the
conclusions  and recommendations  of this  paper,
C.  Definitions
1.07  Municipal solid waste can be defined as the wastes arising from
domestic,  commercial,  industrial,  and institutional  activities  in urban  areas.
The wastes  can be solid,  semi-solid,  and  e;en liquid;  generally,  thiey  include
all those  materials  that  are  neither  wastewater  discharges  nor air emissions.
Although waste characteristics  vary by country and even by  city in somecountries,  urban  refuse  in developing  countries  includes  largely  vegetable  and
putresc'  'e matter  as well as varying  amounts  of paper,  metals,  plastics,  and
inert  matter  such as coal ash or sand.  Unlike  municipal  refuse  in developed
countries,  however,  municipal  waste streams  in developing  countries  may also
contain significant  amounts of human faecal  matter  and to various extents,
industrial,  commercial,  and  medical  wastes,  a  portion  of  which  may  be  hazardous.
1.08  Municipal  solid  waste  services  encompass  refuse  storage  and  collection,
street  and drain  cleaning,  solid  waste transfer  and transport,  disposal,  and
resource  recovery.  Other  MSWM  activities  include  vehicle  maintenance  and  repair,
financial  managament,  administrative  activities  (e.g., routing,  scheduling,
r6nordkeeping),  staff  management  and  development,  and strategic  MSWM planning.
Generally,  these  activities  fall  %ithin  the  jurisdiction  of the  municipality;
the  private  sector  often  manages  some  domestic  refuse  and  the  wastes  from  large-
scale  industries,  hospitals,  and large  office  complexes.  In most developing
countries,  however,  the responsibilities  for  refuse  collection,  disposal,  and
vehicle  maintenance  are  assigned  co the  lower  levels  of  municipal  government  or
health departments  staffed by dnqualified  managers and unskilled workers.
Moreover,  the  widespread  absence  of  strategic  planning  and  use  of inappropriate
technology  have led  to serious inefficiencies  in expenditure  and effort.
Consequently,  solid waste services in most developing  country cities are
unreliable,  lack universal  coverage,  and fail to provide a safe method of
disposal. Furthermore,  the  abundance  of improperly  disposed  waste  constrains
urban productivity  and poses significant  threats to public health and the
environment.
D.  Benefits  of  Municipal  Solid  Waste  Management
1.09  The  impacts  of  providing  effective  MSWM  services  are  largely  associated
with the  reduction  or elimination  of health  risks,  environmental  degradation,
and impediments  to urban productivity. Although  accurate  measures  of these
benefits  are not  currer.Lly  available,  the following  paragraphs  highlight  some
of the  most important  benefits  of investing  in  MSWM improvements.
1.10  Improvement  in Adult Health  and Reduction  in Child  Mortality.  In
developing  country  cities,  ineffective  MSWM  systems  cause  health  risks  largely
from direct  and indirect  contact  with waste containing  human faecal  matter.
Children,  refuse  collection  vorkers,  and scavengers  are directly  exposed  to
excreta-related  pathogens  and intestinal  parasites  when they  handle faecally
contaminated  refuse.  Children  are particularly  vulnerable;  excreta-related
diseases  are  responsible  for  one  quarter  to one  half  of the  deaths  of children
under the age or five.!' Important  indirect  health  effects result from the
breeding  of  flies,  rats,  and  othcr  disease  vectors  at  dump  sites  and  open  garbage
heaps  and  drains. Additional  risks  to  public  health  are  associated  with  exposure
to toxic  substances  or hazardous  materials  that  may enter  the  municipal  waste
stream.
1/  Sandra  J.  Cointreau,  "Solid  Waste  Management  in  Developing  Countries,"  in
Proceedings  "Resource  Mobilization  fot  Drinking  Vater and Sanitation  in
Developing  Nations,"  Management  Division  of the  American  Society  for  Civil
Engineers,  San  Juan,  Puerto  Rico,  May 26-29,  1987,  p. 546.-4-
1.11  Improvement  in Water  Quality. Uncontrolled  disposal  of urban  waste
into  water  bodies,  open  dumps,  and  poorly  designed  landfills  is  a  principal  cause
of surface  and ground  water  contamination.  In  many developing  country  cities,
where  local  authorities  lack  adequate  controls  o-er  solid  waste  disposal,  toxic
industrial  or other hazardous  wastes can enter the municipal  waste stream.
Consequently,  leachate  from  open  dumps  or  uncontrolled  landfills  can  cause  large-
scale,  long-.erm  pollution  of  essential  surface  and  ground  water  resources,  many
of  which  are  used for  drinking  or other  economically  important  activities.
1.12  Improvement  in Air Ouality.  Air pollution  occurs largely  through
inefficient  local  open  air  burning  of wastes,  incineration  in  plants  that  lack
effective  treatment  facilities  for gaseous  emissions,  and through  spontaneous
combustion  of  refuse  at  dumps. Spontaneous  combustion  occurs  when  methane  gas,
generated  by the  anaerobic  decomposition  of  organic  waste  materials,  is  ignited;
fires  can  spread  underground  and  continue  to  burn  for  years. Landfill  gas  also
constitutes  a serious  explosion  hazard  for  workers  and  nearby  residents. Other
causes  of air pollution  are the decomposition  of urban  waste, involving  the
vaporization  and  emission  of  chemical  constituents  into  the  atmosphere,  and  the
dispersion  of  air-borne  particulates  from  open  collection  points  and  solid  waste
transport  or transfer  activities.
1.13  Increased  Urban  Productivity.  The impacts  of inadequate  MSWM  systems
on urban productivity  are not well understood,  but the signs are evident
throughout  a city.  For example,  high rates  of worker  illness  and absenteeism
are due to poor  hygienic  conditions  and the  proliferation  of disease-carrying
pests  at  open  dumps.  Moreover,  poorly  located  and  illegal  dumps  consume  valuable
land  that  could  be better  used for  other  purposes. These  unsightly  facilities
also lower  the  value  of land in the  surrounding  area.  Refuse  thrown  into  the
drainage  system  blocks  the flow  of water  which  eventually  causes  flooding  and
consequent  traffic  blockages,  road deterioration,  and property damage.  In
addition,  piles  of uncollected  garbage  and fallen  waste storage  bins on city
streets  exacerbate  already  congested  traffic  conditions  and  impede  necessary  road
improvements  until  the  solid  waste  problem  is  resolved.
1.14  Economic  Development. In  some  instances,  the  lack  of  adequate  public
or  private  solid  waste  services  may  inhibit  industrial  development.  For  example,
small  manufacturing  firms  may  be forced  to locate  in  alternative  locations  due
to the prohibitive  costs of supplying  their  own garbage trucks  and haulers.
Large firms,  by contrast,  may be able to absorb  these  expenditures,  but will
suffer  losses  due to increased  production  costs.  In the  absence  of effective
controls  over  industrial  wastes,  further  costs  may  be imposed  on the  public  and
the natural environment  due to the harmful effects of improperly  disposed
hazardous  materials.
1.15  Given the  health  and  environmental  impacts  of MSWM systems  on urban
populations  as well as its  effects  on municipal  finance,  the World Bank has
financed MSWM  improvements  as part of  its lending for urban, water and
sanitation,  tourism,  and  pollution  control  projects. In  most  of these  projects,
the components  are included  to improve  and safeguard  public  health;  protect
environmental  quality;  expand  access  to  an  acceptable  level  of  service;  introduce
or increase  resource  recovery;  and  build an institutional  framework  that can5-
administer and  perform acceptable  waste  management practices, carry  out
continuous  planning,  and generate  sufficient  revenues  to meet investment  and
recurring  costs. In  some  cases,  solid  waste  components  were included  to  support
the objectives  of other investments.  For example,  refuse collection  will
facilitate  the  cleaning  and  maintenance  of  stormwater  drainage.  MSWM  components
also  were included  in  the  urban  upgrading  components  designed  to  encourage  low-
income  populations  to improve  their  living  conditions  through  the  prov'ision  of
low-cost  loans  and  basic  infrastructure.
1.16  The  remainder  of this  paper  examines  World  Bank  experience  with  solid
waste  components  and recommends  ways to improve  performance  in this  subsector.
The paper focuses largely  on domestic  wastes  since most of the Bank's  MSWM
investments  have not dealt with industrial  or hazardous  wastes.  Moreover,
hazardous  waste  management  is  complex  and  requires  special  management  programs.-6-
II.  IBRD/IDA  FINANCING  FOR  SOLID  WASTE  MANAGEMENT
2.01  In reviewing  past World Bank project  lending  for  MSWM, the lack of
uniformity  in Bank documents  (i.e.,  imprecise  definitions  and quantification
methods  and  the  absence  of  a systematic  approach)  made  it  difficult  to  undertake
rigorous  evaluation,  Nonetheless,  the  review  of  ongoing  and  completed  projects
provided  an indication  of the Bank's overall  involvement,  achievements,  and
shortcomings  in alleviating  MSWM problems  in large  and  medium-sized  cities  in
many developing  countries.
A.  Overview  of Lending  Program
2.02  The  FY74-88  lending  program  for  projects  with  a  solid  waste  management
component  includes  71 projects  with a net commitment  in loans  and credits  of
US$3,166.2  million. The  appraisal  estimate  of  the  projects'  total  costs  reaches
US$6,798.1  million. The total  cost  of the  solid  waste  components  is estimated
to be US$532.0  million,  or 7.8 percent  of total  project  costs.  The foreign
exchange portion of solid waste component costs, as presented in various
appraisal  reports, has ranged from 18 percent to as high as 73 percent.
Typically,  all  of the  foreign  exchange  was  allocated  to  equipment  and technical
assistance.  Several  projects  also received  additional  financing  from other
lending  sources.
2.03  Among  the  projects  identif  ed  as  having  addressed  MSWM,  there  were  two
free-standing  solid  waste  projects  and a large  MSWM component  within  another
project  which  together  accounted  for  US$209.3  million  or  40 percent  of  all  Bank
solid waste  lending.  These were  the  Lagos Solid Waste Management and
StormdrainaLe  Project  in  Nigeria  (US$111.8  million),  the  Solid  Waste  Management
Pilot  Project  in  Mexico  (US$50.0  million),  and  the  Environmental  Control  Project
in  Singapore  (US$47.5  million). Another  68  projects  had  solid  waste  investments
ranging  from less than  1 percent  to nearly  45 percent  of total  project  costs.
The  average  solid  waste  operation  cost  US$8.1  million,  but the  median  was only
US$3.5  million.  Excluding  the three large MSWM projects,  the average  MSWM
component  cost dropped  to  US$5.1  million.
2.04  The majority of projects  with MSWM components  were either urban
development  or  water  and  sanitation  projects,  with  53  projects  (75  percent)  being
uroan  development  projects  involving  solid  waste investments  of over  US$278.0
million.  Water  and sanitation  projects  accounted  for 9 projects  (13  percent)
supporting  solid  waste  activities.  Two  tourism  projects,  two  drainage  projects,
three reconstruction  projects,  and two pollution  control  projects  also have
included  solid waste components.  About 53 percent of the projects  can be
classified  as  poverty-oriented,  specifically  aimed  at improving  services  to  low-
income  urban  groups.
2.05  The  Bank's  first  substantial  involvement  in  solid  waste  operations  was
in  the  context  of  the  First  Calcutta  Urban  Development  Project  approved  in  August
1973.  Since  then,  from  one to eight  projects  with a MSWM component  have  been
approved  annually.  Figure  1 shows  the number  of projects  approved  by fiscalyear in the period FY74-88.  As presented in Figure 2, lending amounts for MSWM
components are highly variable.
Figure  1. MSWM  Projects  Approved  Figure  2.  MSWM  Component  Costs
by  Fiscal Year  by Fl6cal  Year
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2.06  During the  period FY74-88, there  were no clear trends in  MSWM lending.
For the five-year period FY84-88, however, lending increased significantly over
the previous two five-year periods, totalling US$291.2 million (55 percent) of
all MSWM project costs (unadjusted for inflation).  This is due primarily to the
approval in FY86 of the two largest MSWM investments ever financed by the Bank
in Nigeria and Mexico.
2.07  In terms  of Bank lending for the  urban -ector  during the study period,
the solid waste  subsector amounts to 3 2 percent of total lending for urban
development (including  urban transportation prior to FY88) and water supply and
sewerage projects.  Compared to the water and sanitation subsector only,  it
represents 6.4 percent of that subsector's lending.  Similarly, it represents
6.6  percent  of  the  lending  for urban  eevelopment  projects  during  FY74-88.
Overall, solid  waste operations accounted for only 0.3  percent of total IBRD/IDA
lending for the period.  In three of those years, however, MSWM lending ranged
from 0.6 percent to 1.1 percent of the total.  Bank lending, year-by-year, is
summarized in Table 1.1 of Annex 1.
2.08  In recent years, the Bank has made various seed investments in MSWM-
related  technical  assistance  and  subsector  planning  efforts in  several countries.
Thus, there  appears to  be significant  potential for  more large  free-standing  MSWM
projects or sizeable MSWM components in urban projects to be included in the
lending  pipeline.  At the  time  of this  writing, large  solid  waste components were
being planned in Nigeria, Indonesia, and Brazil.
B.  Regional Lending Prozrams
2.09  The four  Bank Regions have executed a total of 71  projects with modest
to large investments for MSWM.  The distribution of these  projects by Region is
shown in  Figure 3; the  Regional distribution of  MSWM component costs is  presented
in Figure 4.  As  indicated, the lending program is not characterized by anydiscernible  pattern.  Further,  given the share of urban population  in each
Region, the projects  are more uniformly  distributed  than might be expected.
Although  EMENA  appears  to  have invested  considerably  less  in  the  subsector  than
the  other  three  Regions,  the  data is somewhat  distorted  by the  fact that  each
of the  other  Regions  has one  large  solid  waste  project  or  component. Excluding
those  three  investments,  the average  cost (US$4.2  million)  of MSWM components
in EMENA  projects  is similar  to the  Bank-wide  average  of US$5.1  million. The
Bank's  MSWM investments  in each  Region  are  described  below.
Figure  3,  Number  of MSWM  Projects  Figure  4.  MSWM  Component  Costs
Dy Region  by Region  (mS)
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2.10  Solid  waste  management  was  first  introduced  in  the  AFRICA  lending
program  in FY75  as a small  component  of the  Lusaka  Sites  and Service  Project.
The  MSWM component  accounted  for  US$300,000  out  of a total  project  investment
of US$41.3  million.  To date, the  Region  has approved  19 projects  with MSWM
components  in 16 countries,  involving  net  loan  commitments  of  US$135.8  million
(see  Table  1).
2.11  The  most  striking  feature  of the  solid  waste  program  in  AFRICA  is  the
overwhelming  share of Nigeria in both the number and size of operations.
Currently,  Nigeria  is executing  the  largest  solid  waste  component  financed  by
the  Bank,  the  Lagos  Solid  Waste  Management  and  Stormdrainage  Project  (described
in  detail  in  Annex  3),  and  is the  only  country  in the  Region  to  undertake  more
than one project  with a MSWM component,  having four in total.  While other
countries  in the  Region  have concentrated  their  efforts  in the  larger  capital
cities,  solid  waste  projects  in  Nigeria  have  also  addressed  the  needs  of  medium-
sized  cities  in  several  states.
2.12  The project in Lagos State represents  over 89 percent of  Bank
commitments  in the  subsector  for  AFRICA.  Excluding  this  project,  the average
cost  of  MSWM  components  drops  from  US$9.5  million  to  US$1.6  million  per  project;
the  average  share  of  MSWM  components  falls  from  21.3  percent  to  only  4.2  percent
of total.  proj.ect  costs.9
TABLE I
Lending  for  MSWM  Projects  in  AFRICA.  FY74-88
TOTAL  MSWM  MSWM  AS
LOAN  PROJECT  COMPONENT  PERCENT
ANOUNT  COST  COST  OF TOTAL
PROJECT  STATUS  AS
COUNTRY  PROJECT  TITLE  (USS  MILLION)  COST  FY  OF 6/30/89
Benin  Cotonou  Water/Sanitary  Eng  Project  5.0  6.3  0.7  10  9%  81  COMPLETED
B. Faso  Urban  Development  Project  (8.2)*  (10.8)*  NA  NA  78  COMPLETED
Burundi  Urban  Development  Project  15.0  16.7  0.4  2.2%  80  COMPLETED
Djibouti  Urban  Development  Project  5.0  15.2  1.0  6.8%  85  ONGOING
Gambia  Urban  Management/Development  Project  (11.5)*  (12.4)*  NA  NA  84  ONGOING
Guinea  Conakry  Urban  Development  Project  15.2  16.4  3.3  20.1%  84  ONGOING
Ivory  Coast  Second  Urban  DeveLopment  Project  (51.0)* (104.0)*  NA  NA  82  COMPLETED
Kenya  Site  and  Service  Project  (16.0)*  (29.4)*  NA  NA  75  COMPLETED
Lesotho  Urban  DeveLopment  Project  6.0  7.1  0.1  1.4%  80  COMPLETED
Liberia  Monrovia  Urban  Development  Project  10.0  13.4  0.6  4.7%  82  COMPLETED
Madagascar Antananarivo  Water  and San  Project  20.5  33.7  3.5  10.4%  80  COMPLETED
Mali  Mali  Urban  Developmert  Project  12.0  15.3  1.4  9.2%  79  COMPLETED
Mauritius  Urb.n  Rehab  & Stormdrainage  Project  15.0  24.5  0.7  2.7%  81  COMPLETED
Nigeria  Urban  Development  Project  17.8  36.6  0.03  0.1%  80  COMPLETED
Nigeria  Anambra  Water/Sanitation  Report  67.0  120.0  5.4  4.5%  82  ONGGING
Nigeria  Lagos  Swm and  Stormdraii.age  Projett  72.0  164.3  111.8  68.0%  86  ONGOING
Nigeria  Infrastructure  Development  Fund  69.5  96.8  3.8  3.9%  88  ONGOING
Uganda  Water  Suppty  & Sanitation  Rehab  28.0  30.8  2.8  9.1%  85  ONGOING
Zambia  Lusaka  Squatter  Upgrade/Site  Service  20.0  41.3  0.3  0.7%  75  COMPLETED
......  ......  --  --  ......
TOTAL  FOR  AFRICA  REGION:  378.0  638.4  135.8 ~~~~~~~~~~....  ..  --  --  ...  ...  . .......
AVERAGE  PER  PROJECT:  25.2  42.6  9.1  21.4%
NOTE:  *  Loan  and Project  Cost  quoted  but not included  in  the totals  due to non-availabitity  of SWM  data.- 10  -
2.13  The  other  MSWM  activities  in  the  AFRICA  Region  can  be grouped  into  two
categories. One group consists  of modest components  with varying levels  of
preparation  and  investment.  These  components  generally  include  two  or  more  solid
waste sub-components  that combine  procurement  of trucks  and cquipment  with
institutional  strengthening  measures. They  typically  entail  efforts  to  improve
collection  services  in the  project  cities,  often  in low-income  areas,  and some
combination  of  training,  studies,  and  other  technical  services.  The  second  group
of projects  include  very small  solid  waste  components  as one-shot  efforts  to
tackle  critical  storage  and collection  service  deficiencies  in the country's
capital  or largest  cities.
ASIA  Rezion
2.14  Having  approved  21  projects  with  MSWM  components  between  FY74  and  FY88,
the ASIA Region  has emerged  as the most frequent  financier  of solid waste
services in  the  Bank, with  total loan commitments  of  US$151.9 million.
Nonetheless,  these solid  waste components  are largely  confined  to only seven
countries,  as  shown  in  Table  2. Among  them,  India  and  Indonesia  lead  the  Pegion
with  eight  and  four  projects,  respectively.  Singapore  is  the  beneficiary  of the
largest  solid  waste investment  in the  Region (US$47.5  million). In addition,
the Bank financed  three solid waste components  in the Philippines  and two
projects  with  MSWM components  in  Sri  Lanka.
2.15  Approved  in  FY74,  the  First  Calcutta  Urban  Development  Proiect  was  the
first  project  in  the  Bank  to include  a  solid  waste  component.  This  project  also
marked the beginning  of the Bank's long involvement  supporting  solid waste
management  in  India. MSWM  has  been  a  significant  component  of the  eight  projects
in India,  by far the largest  number  of MSWM-related  projects  for any single
country  supported  by the  Bank.  Individual  component  costs  have ranged  between
US$1.3  million  and  US$15.0  million. The total  lending  for  MSWM in India  during
FY74-88  is  US$45.6  million.
2.16  The greatest  share  of resources  has been used for  meeting  the  solid
waste  needs  of India's  large  metropolitan  areas. In  Calcutta,  three  successive
urban  development  projects  have  placed  increasing  attention  to  MSWM. The  Second
Calcutta  Urban Development  Project  included  US$11.6  million  to support  solid
waste collection,  development  of improved  methods and facilities  for waste
disposal,  pilot projects,  training,  and studies.  (See  Annex 4 for further
details.)  The solid waste component  of the latest project,  however, is
considered  the  most successful  by the  Country  Department. Three  other  large-
city urban projects  also have contained  solid  waste components:  the Secon
Madras  Urban  Development  Project,  the  Kanpur  Urban  Development  Project,  and  the
Bombay  Urban  Development  Proiect. In addition,  two  projects  have  attempted  to
address  state-wide  solid  waste  needs  through  subsectoral  investments  in  several
medium-sized  cities  in Madhya  Pradesh  and Uttar Pradesh.  The Uttar Pradesh
Urban Development  Proiect  is the largest  and most recent  solid  waste  project
underway  in  India. Approved  in  April  1987,  the  project  is  a  follow-up  to  earlier
solid  waste  investments  in  the  State.TABLE  2
Lending  for  MSWM  Projects  in  ASIA.  FY74-88
TOTAL  MSIM  MSW1  AS
LOAN  PROJECT  COMPONENT  PERCENT
AMOUNT  COST  COST OF TOTAL
PROJECT  STATUS  AS
COUNTRY  PRCJECT  TITLE  (USS MILLION)  COST  FY  OF 6/30/89
Bangladesh  Urban  Developnent  Project  47.6  65.6  9.2  14.02  88  ONGOING
India  Calcutta  Urban  Development  Project  35.0  59.2  2.4  4.0X  74  COMPLETED
India  Second  Calcutta  Urban  Dev Project  87.0  164.4  7.3  4.4X  78  COMPLETED
India  Second Madras  Urban  Dev Project  42.0  87.9  2.7  3.1X  81  COMPLETED
India  Kanpur  Urban  Development  Project  25.0  51.7  1.3  2.5X  82  COMPLETED
India  Third  Calcutta  Urban  Dev Project  147.0  303.1  15.0  4.9X  83  ONGOING
India  Madhya Pradesh  Urban  Dev Project  24.1  50.1  4.5  9.0X  83  ONGOING
India  Bombay Urban  Development  Project  138.0  256.7  2.S  1.1%  85  ONGOING
India  Uttar  Pradesh  Urban  Dev Project  130.0  237.8  9.5  4.0%  87  ONGOING
Indonesia  Jakarta  & Urban  Development  Project  24.2  52.3  0.3  0.6%  75  COMPLETED
Indonesia  Third  Urban  Development  Project  43.6  96.0  20.4  21.32  79  COMPLETED
Indonesia  Fourth  Urban  Development  Project  43.0  85.9  1.5  1.8%  81  COMPLETED
Indonesia  Fifth  Urban  Development  Project  39.3  64.3  5.7  8.9%  84  ONGOING
Philippines  Third  Urban  Development  Project  72.0  120.0  5.0  4.2%  80  COMPLETED
Philippines  Regional  Cities  Development  Project  67.0  114.6  5.5  4.8%  83  ONGOING
Philippines  Municipal  Development  Project  40.0  68.8  1.3  1.92  84  ONGOING
Singapore  Envirornmental  Control  Project  25.0  47.5  47.5  100.02  75  COMPLETED
Sri  Lanka  lqcond  Water  Supply  & Sewerage Project  30.0  94.0  3.3  3.5%  80  COMPLETED
Sri  Lanka  Municipal  Management Project  13.0  20.4  1.8  8.8%  86  ONGOING
Sri  Lanka  Emergency Reconstruction  & Rehab.  Proj.  78.0  111.4  2.0  1.82  88  ONGOING
Thailand  Regional  Cities  Development  Project  27.5  50.9  2.7  5.32  85  ONGOING
......  ....  ..  --  --  . . ....
TOTALS  FOR  ASIA REGION:  1178.2  2202.6  151.9
AVERAGE  PER  PROJECT:  56.1  104.9  7.2  6.9X- 12
2.17  In Indonesia,  there  have been four  projects  that contain  a range  of
MSWM components. For  example,  the  Jakarta  Urban  Development  Project  allocated
US$320,000  for  the  procurement  of refuse  collection  vehicles. By contrast,  the
Third  Urban  Development  Proiect  included  US$20.4  million  for large-scale  MSWM
improvements  (see  Annex  5). Currently,  a  national  MSWM  plan is  being  prepared.
2.18  Within  a  span  of five  years  (1980-84),  the  Bank financed  three  solid
waste projects in the Philippines,  each having about US$5.0 million for
comprehensive  MSWM  activities.  All  three  projects  have  directed  between  35 and
55  percent  of  MSWM  component  costs  toward  improving  services  to the  urban  poor.
2.19  Singapore,  Thailand,  and Bangladesh  have each undertaken  one MSWM
project. Approved  in  June  1975,  the  Singapore  Environmental  Control  Project  was
the  Bank's  first  free-standing  MEWM project.  It provided  for the  collection,
incineration,  and disposal  of solid  wastes in  Singapore's  urban  areas  as part
of a  long-term  program to improve  sanitary  standards.  The project's  main
physical  component  was the construction  of an incineration  plant  with energy
recovery  capability. To date, this plant is the only municipal  solid  waste
incinerator  financed  by the  Bank. In  Thailand,  the  Regional  Cities  Development
P.roiect  allocated  US$2.7  million  to  increase  solid  waste  collection  coverage  and
to provide landfill  disposal  sites in three cities.  The investment  in MSWM
included  collection,  disposal,  and  maintenance  equipment  as well as technical
assistance  to improve  systems  management  and operations. More recently,  the
Banzladesh Urban  Development Project provided US$9.2 million to  finance
institutional  strengthening;  improvements  in  solid  waste  collection  and  disposal,
including  landfill  operations;  and  a pilot  program  involving  the  sale  of solid
waste  to landowners  for  private  landfilling.
EMENA  Region
2.20  Eight  countries  in the  EMENA  Region  have  carried  out  13  projects  with
MSWM components  for  a total  cost  of US$54.0  million  (see  Table 3).  The trend
over time has been towards  increased  involvement  in solid waste activities
through  the  Region's  urban  and  water  and  sanitation  projects. The  share  of  MSWM
activities  in total  project  investments  ranges  from less  than  1  percent  in the
Greater  Cairo  Urban  Development  Project  and the  Jordan  Tourism  Project  to over
35  percent  in the Eevit  11rban  Development  Proiect. The latter  project,  along
with the Lahore  Urban Development  Proiect in Pakistan,  constitute  the most
extensive  Regional efforts in the subsector,  and are included  for further
analysis  in the  annexes  to this report. In 1925,  a free-standing  solid  waste
project  in Egypt  was appraised  (US$57.2  million)  but has  not been negotiated.
As of 1987,  seven  solid  waste  projects  have closed  in  the  Region.
2.21  The Egvpt  Urban DeveloRment  Project  marked  a turning  point in the
Region's  solid  waste  lending  (see  Annex  6).  It was the  first in a series  of
projects  in  several  countries  approved  between  FY78  and  FY83 that  included
significant  MSWM investments.  Approved in FY79, the Second Tunisia Urban
Development  Project  included  a  solid  waste  collection  and  disposal  component  at
an  estimated  cost  of  US$3.5  million. The  component  was  designed  to  provide  low-
cost  solutions  to refuse  collection  and  disposal  problems  in Greater  Tunis.- 13
TABLE 3
Lending  for  MSWM  Projects  in  EMENA.  FY74-88
TOTAL  M1SWM MSWM  AS
LOAN  PROJECT  COMPONENT  PERCENT
AMOUNT  COST  COST OF TOTAL
PROJECT  STATUS  AS
COUNTRY  PROJECT  TITLE  (USS  MILLION)  COST  FY  OF 6/30/89
Afghanistan  Kabul  Water/Sanitation  Project  9.0  11.7  0.2  2.0%  75  COMPLETED
Egypt  Urban  Development  Project  14.0  22.4  7.9  35.1%  78  COMPLETED
Egypt  Greater  Cairo  Urban  Dev  Project  59.0  116.2  0.6  0.5%  82  ONGOING
Jordan  Tourism  Prciect  6.0  19.4  0.1  0.3%  76  COMPLETED
Jordan  Anean  Transp  & Municipal  Dev  Project  30.0  65.6  9.2  14.0%  84  ONGOING
Lebanon  Reconstruction  Project  50.0  83.6  3.0  3.6%  78  COMPLETED
Morocco  Rabat  Urban  DeveLopment  Project  18.0  25.6  1.2  4.7%  78  COMPLETED
Morocco  Second  Urban  Development  Project  36.0  81.0  3.1  3.8%  81  COMPLETED
Pakistan  Lahore  Urban  Development  Project  16.0  24.0  4.7  19.6%  83  ONGOING
Pakistan  Karachi  Special  Development  ProJect  70.0  148.6  8.9  6.0%  86  ONGOING
Tunisia  Second  Urban  Development  Project  19.0  39.4  3.5  8.9%  79  COMPLETED
Turkey  Cukurova  Region  Urban  Eng  Project  9.2  10.7  0.2  1.6%  85  ONGOING
Turkey  Cukurova  Urban  Development  Project  120.0  467.4  11.5  2.5%  87  ONGOING
TOTALS  FOR  EMENA  REGION:  456.2  1115.7  54.0
AVERAGE  PER  PROJECT:  35.1  85.8  4.2  4.8%- 14
2.22  Earlier  project  experience  under  the  Jordan  Tourism  Project,  although
of limited  scale,  provided  the  basis for a significant  follow-up  solid  waste
investment.  The  solid  waste  component  of  Jordan's  Amman  Transport  and  Municipal
Development  Project,  with an estimated  cost of US$9.2  million (14  percent  of
total  project  cost),  aimed  at  strengthening  services  in  Amman  through  investments
in  collection  and  disposal  equipment  and in the  development  of sound  financial
and institutional  arrangements. Component  activities  include  civil  works for
four new sanitary  landfills,  the establishment  of a Solid Waste Management
Department  within the Amman Municipality,  implementation  of cost recovery
mechanisms,  and a study  of means to improve  the productivity  of solid  waste
collection.
2.23  Two  solid  waste  projects  each in Pakistan  and  Turkey  account  for  the
remaining  subsector  investments  in the  Region.  The US$4.7  million  solid  waste
component  of the  Lahore  Urban  Development  Proiect  is  discussed  in  Annex 7.
2.24  EMENA  is the  only  Region  to  carry  out  a major  study  of  the  subsector
(EMENA  Urban Solid  Waste Management: Development  of Strategies,  Green  Cover
Report  No.  4875,  June,  1984). The  report  analyzes  previous  and  ongoing  project
experience,  examines  key  issues  in  the  Region,  and  lays  out  a  set  of  recommended
strategies  for  both the  Bank  and  borrowers. The  study  provides  a good  basis  for
expanding  MSWM activities  in the  Region,  and could  well be emulated  in other
Regions.
LAC  Region
2.25  Although  the LAC  Region's  first  project  containing  a MSWM component
(Baja  California  Tourism  Project,  Mexico)  was  not  approved  until  FY77,  subsequent
project  activities  have  accounted  for  the  largest  share  of  Bank-wide  lending  for
MSWM (overall  36 percent  of total investments). Eighteen  projects  in eight
countries  have  included  MSWM investments  ranging  from  less  than  1  percent  up to
100  percent  of total  project  costs  (see  Table  4).
2.26  Several  projects  in  the  LAC  Region  have  featured  large  investments  in
the subsector.  Three projects  have each involved  MSWM investments  of over
US$30.0  million,  and  almost  half of the  projects  in the  Region  have allocated
at least  10 percent of their total  project  costs to solid  waste operations.
BrazJ1  and  Mexico  have received  the  largest  share  of LAC's  investments  in  MSWM.
Together,  they  account  for  half  of the  solid  waste-related  projects  executed  by
the Region.  Between  FY77 and FY86,  Mexico  has undertaken  four solid waste
projects, the latest  being the ongoing  Mexico Solid  Waste Management  Pilot
Project  which is national  is scope.  Aimed  at developing  investment  plans  for
26  intermediate  cities  and  establishing  a  financial  intermediary  for  solid  waste
lending  to  municipalities,  the  project  has  a total  cost  of  US$50.0  million  (see
Annex  9).  A large  follow-up  investment  is expected  to result  from this  pilot
effort.15  -
TABLE  4
Lending  for  MSWM  Proiects  in  LAC.  FY74-88
TOTAL  MSWM  NSWI  AS
LOAN  PROJECT  COMPONENT  PERCENT
AMCUNT  COST__  COST OF TOTAL
PROJECT  STATUS  AS
COUNTRY  PROJECT  TITLE  (USS  MILLION)  COST  FY  OF 6/30/89
Argentioa  Municipal  Development  Project  120.0  240.0  23.6  9.8%  88  ONGOING
Bahamas  Urban  Development  Project  5.8  24.4  1.5  6.2%  82  COMPLETED
Bolivia  La Paz  Municipal  Develooment  Project  15.0  21.3  2.2  10.3%  88  ONGOING
BoLivia  Urban  Development  Project  17.0  22.5  0.1  0.1%  78  COMPLETED
BraziL  Mediun-Sized  Cities  Project  70.0  200.0  30.0  15.0%  79  COMPLETED
Brazil  Metropolitan  Development  Program  8.9  24.9  1.4  5.6%  83  COMPLETED
Brazil  Water  Munic.&  Low-income  Areas  Project  80.0  190.7  2.8  1.';%  88  ONGOING
Brazil  Recife  Metropolitan  Dev  Project  123.9  347.8  38.5  11.1%  82  ONGOING
Brazil  Rio Flood  Reconstruction  Project  175.0  393.6  6.7  1.7%  88  ONGOING
Colombia  Barranquilla  Water  Supply  Project  24.0  37.2  4.0  10.8%  86  ONGOING
Colombia  Water  and  Sewerage  Sector  Project  150.0  435.0  5.0  1.1%  88  ONGOING
Dom.  Repub.  Sites  and  Services  Project  25.4  41.7  0.6  1.4%  82  CANCELLED
Dom.  Repub.  Santo  Domingo  Tech  Assistance  Project  7.1  17.5  7.6  43.4%  83  COMPLETED
Mexico  Second  Urban  & Regional  Dev Project  164.0  468.0  4.4  0.9%  81  ONGOING
Mexico  Solio  Waste Management Pilot  Project  25.0  50.G  50.0  100.0%  86  ONGOING
Mexico  Pollution  Control  Project  60.0  190.9  2.5  1.3X  82  ONGOING
Mexico  Baja  California  Tourism  Project  (42.0)* (122.2)*  NA  NA  77  COMPLETED
Peru  Lima  Metropolitan  Development  Project  82.5  135.9  9.4  6.9%  84  SUSPENDED
...  ......  ......  -----.  ..  . . -.-.
TOTALS  FOR LAC  REGION:  1153.6  2841.4  190.3
......  --  - - - --..  .
AVERAGE  PER  PROJECT:  64.1  157.9  11.2  7.1%
NOTE:  *  Loan  and  Project  Cost  quoted  but  not  included  in the  totals  due to non-avaiLability  of SWM  data.- 16 -
2.27  Three  of the  five  urban  projects  executed  in Brazil  between  FY78  and
FY83  have  included  significant  investments  for  solid  waste  activities.  The  Bragil
Medium-Sized  Cities  Proiect  includei  US$30.0  million  (15  percent  of  total  project
cost) to upgrade municipal refuse collection  services  and to expand these
services  to poor,  unserved  areas.  The Recife  Metropolitan  Region  DeveloRment
Project,  discussed  in  Annex  8, includes  a  US$38.5  million  solid  waste :omponent
to meet subsector  needs.  Approved  in FY88,  both the  Rio  Flood  Reostruction
lko.2ct  and the  Water Project  for  MuniciDalities  and Low-Income  Arers  contain
significantly  smaller  MSWM  components.
2.28  Bolivia,  the  Dominican  Republic,  and  Colombia  have each  executed  two
solid  waste  projects. In  Bolivia  and the  Dominic2n  Republic,  small  investments
for  MSWM  in initial  urban  projects  were  followed-up  by  comprehensive  solid  waste
components  in  a  second  project. In  Colombia,  however,  a  US$4.0  million  component
to upgrade  collection  services  in the City of Baranquilla  preceded  a similar
level  of investment  (US$5.0  million)  co  carry  out  studies  and  establish  a line
of credit  for  MSWM improvements  in  about ten  cities.  Finally,  Argenitina,  the
Bahamas,  and  Peru  have  each  executed  a  single  project  with  modest  to  large  solid
waste components  that range  between  6 and 11 percent  of total  project  costs.
The latter  project  supports  the development  of a solid  waste parastatal  for
Metropolitan  Lima  as  well  as a  comprehensive  approach  to  solid  waste  management
for  the  city (although  Bank  disbursements  for  the  project  'nave  been suspended,
it continues  with GTZ  cofinancing).- 17 -
III. MSWM  COMPONENTS  IN BANK  PROJECTS
3.01  World  Bank  investments  in  MSWM  range  from  small  components  to  finance
the  procurement of  collection vehicles  and  equipment to  free-standing
comprehensive solid waste  projects covering technical and  institutional
improvements  in  all  aspects  of solid  waste  management  in large  cities  or  groups
of secondary  cities. Most  projects,  however,  include  two  ur three  of the  usual
"engineering"  subcomponents:  (i)  storage  and  collection,  (ii)  transport/transfer,
(iii)  disposal,  and  (iv)  resource  recovery.  More than  half  of  the  projects  also
contain  a technical  assistance  or institutional  development  subcomponent  to
improve  the operations  and/or institutional  capabilities  of local municipal
authorities.  Some of the more comprehensive  components  incorporated  pilot
projects  to test improved  methodologies  prior to full-scale  implementation.
Finally,  about  half of  the  projects  have included  a specific  subcomponent  aimed
at  resolving  solid  waste  collection  problems  in  low-income  neighborhoods.  Table
5 presents  a global  summary  of the  occurrence  of these  subcomponents  in Bank
projects;  Tables  1.2  to 1.5  in  Annex 1 provide  a further  breakdown  by Region.
The remainder  of this  chapter  discusses  the  broad  range  of MSWM investments  in
terms  of component  design  and impler-'ntation  and  other  key  project  issues.
TABLE  5
Distribution  of MSWM  Subcomvonents  by Region
SUBCOMPONENTS
TOTAL  AVERAGE No.
SYST  PRCS  LOW-  No.  OF  OF SUBCOM-
NUMBER  OF  TECH  INST /OPS  STOR  TSPT  LAND  RSRC  INCM  SUBCOM_  PONENTS  PER
REGION  PROJECTS  ASST  STRN  IMPV CLCT  TRSF  FILL  RCVY  FCUS  PONENTS  PROJECT
AFRICA  19  11  6  5  18  3  5  1  7  56  2.9
ASIA  21  11  5  6  17  7  8  6  9  69  3.3
EMENA  13  9  5  5  10  4  6  5  6  50  3.8
LAC  18  9  7  7  13  4  10  4  10  64  3.6
--- ~~..  ....  . ...  ....  ---  --  ---  --  ---  ---  . ....  ...
TOTALS  71  40  23  23  58  18  29  16  32  239  3.4
KEY:  TECH  ASST  =  Technical  Assistance  TSPT  TRSF  = Transport/Transfer
INST  STRN  =  InstitutionaL  Strengthening  LAND  FILL  =  Landfill  Operations
SYST/OPS  IMPV  a  Systems/Operations  Improvements  PRCS  RESC  RCVY  =  Processing/Resource  Recovery
STOR  CLCT  = Storage/Collection  LOW-INCH  FCUS  = Low-income  Focus
A.  Compor.cnt  Design  and  Implementation
3.02  The  MSWM  components in  most  Bank  projects have  not  been
systematically  designed and have a  limited focus.  The majority  of  the
components  supported  the  purchase  of collection  and transport  equipment;  only
about  half  of  these  components  provided  facilities  necessary  for  environmentally- 18 -
safe  disposal. Moreover,  many of the  components  failed  to include  sufficient
attention  to  the  broader  institutional  and  financial  requirements  for  effective
solid  waste  management.  Conse 1uently,  many  of the  MSWM  components  can  be  viewed
as  missed  opportunities.  A limited  review  of project  experience  revealed  that
the  deficiencies  in design  resulted  in extensive  delays  and failure  to achieve
significant  long-term  improvement  in solid  waste management.  The following
sections  describe  in  more detail  the  nature  of the  Bank's  investments  in solid
waste storage and  collection,  transfer and  transport,  disposal, resource
recovery,  industrial  waste  management,  and  institutional  strengthening.
Storage  and  Collection
3.03  The most frequent  feature  of the Bank's  MSWM investments  is the
provision  of collection  vehicles;  66 out of the 71 projects  have collection-
related  components.  Bank  support  for  collection  services  has  ranged  from  a  one-
time  injection cf  funds for  vehicles (e.g., Kenya, Gambia, Sri  Lanka,
Afghanistan,  Lesotho) to comprehensive  efforts addressing  city-wide refuse
collection  needs (e.g., India, Indonesia,  Egypt,  Nigeria, Brazil, Mexico).
Thirty-six  projects  are  aimed  at improving  primary  collection  services  for  low-
income  groups  in  project  cities. In  these  areas,  collection  techniques  typically
include  both traditional  methods  (using  human  or animal-powered  carts)  as  well
as  motorized  vehicles. In  several  Bank  projects  in  India,  Indonesia,  Egypt,  and
the Philippines,  handcarts  are  being used as the principal  mode of house-to-
house  refuse  collectiox.  within  low-income  neighborhoods.
3.04  The  means  by  which  primary  collection  in  low-income  areas  are  linked
to the  overall  secondary  collection  network  vary,  but  often  is  accomplished  by
establishing  neighborhood  bins  or  transfer  points  (i.e.,  mini-transfer  stations)
in  contrast  to  conventional  transfer  stations  discussed  in  the  following  section.
Here, as in many other MSWM issues,  there is no universal  policy regarding
institutional  responsibilities.  In the  planning  of the  Third  Urban  Proiect  in
Indonesia,  for  example,  household  collection  responsibilities  were expected  to
be shifted from local neighborhood  organizations  to the central municipal
authorities.  By contrast, the recommended  MSWM scheme in the Egvot Urban
Development  Project  was to encourage  private  refuse  collectors  and assign  a
limited  role  to the  municipality  in  door-to-door  collection.  Both  projects  are
considered  in greater  detail  in  Annexes  5 and  6, respectively.
3.05  To maximize  efficiency  in  collection  operations,  it  is  essential  to
match  truck  type  and  size  with  local  conditions.  Given  the  predominance  of  truck
procurement  in the projects  analyzed,  however,  there  was disturbingly  little
attention given  to  questions of  truck  selection criteria  or  vehicle
specifications  in the  project  appraisal  reports. Consequently,  the  process  of
selecting  the  most appropriate  solid  waste technology  presented  a significant
constraint  to the  implementation  of a  number  of  MSWM components. In the  Thir
Urban  Proiect  in Indonesia,  for  example,  difficulties  on the  part  of Jakarta's
Cleansing  Department  in determining  the  appropriate  technology  for  solid  waste
transport  posed costly delays in Jakarta.  Although  a Bank consultant  had
recommended  an appropriate  technical  approach  during  project  preparation,  the
local institution,  upon project execution,  experimented  with more highly
mechanized equipment  (e.g., balers,  compactors).  After  testing these- 19 -
technologies,  the local  agency  discovered  that they  were indeed  inappropriate
(i.e.  ,  the  high  moisture  content  .f  the  waste  made  the  compactors  inoperable  and
scavengers  undermined  the  effectiveness  of the  balers)  and  subsequently  accepted
the  original  Bank  recommendations.
3.06  In the execution  of other MSWM components,  the complexities  of
equipment  and  vehicle  specification  and  procurement  caused  further  delays. Under
the  Lagos  project,  internal  and  external  controversy  over  vehicle  specifications
and the  design  and  award  of a US$40.0  million  procurement  package  delayed  the
acquisition  of  garbage  trucks  by almost  four  years. In  other  projects,  failure
to include  spare  parts in the initial  package  meant that  the  project-financed
vehicles,  during  later  stages  of implementation,  would  have to remain  idle  for
considerable  periods  of time  while  the  municipality  procured  replacement  parts.
Further,  many of the Bank-financed  trucks  that eventually  broke down often
remained  out  of  commission  due  to  the  lack  of  adequate  facilities  and  skills  for
maintenance  and  repair. In  Calcutta, vehicles  financed  under  one loan  had to
be replaced  by new  vehicles  funded  under  a subsequent  loan  five  years  later.
Transfer/Transport
3.07  Waste  collected  by  conventional  trucks  from  individual  dwellings  or
community  transfer  points  may  be hauled  either  directly  to the  disposal  site  or
to a transfer  station.  In large,  crowded  cities  such as Calcutta,  Manila,
Jakarta,  Cairo,  Lahore,  and  Karachi,  the  transfer  of solid  waste  is  emerging  as
an important  issue  in  Bank  projects. Overall,  transfer  stations  or depots  have
been incorporated  into the design  of 18 solid  waste components.  They were
generally  included  because  of the  distance  and  travel  time  constraints  on solid
waste  collection.  In large,  spread-out  cities,  the  distance  between  collection
areas and the disposal  site is often greater than the economical  range of
collection  trucks. In  crowded  cities,  where  distance  may  not  be excessive,  road
congestion  on  main  arteries  may  also  tie  up  many  collection  trucks  for  too  long
a time  when the fir.t  priority  of these  vehicles  is to remove  refuse  within
collection  areas  as  efficiently  as  possible. In  these  situations,  the  projects
included  transfer  stations  to  optimize  the  use  of  collection  equipment. In  one
case  where  cost  savings  were  calculated  (Lima),  the  economic  rate  of return  for
transfer  operations  was 156  percent.
DisDosal
3.08  Open dumping  remains  the  prevalent  form  of disposal  practiced  in
developing  countries,  and  was identified  as a serious  environmental  problem  in
numerous  project  cities.  Further,  it is generally  recognized  that  efforts  to
increase  collection  efficiency  without  consideration  of appropriate  disposal
facilities tend  to  aggravate the  disposal problem as  well  as  ensuing
environmental  problems. Nonetheless,  investments  in  disposal  (i.e.,  landfills)
are only included  in about  half of the  Bank's  MSWM  projects,  indicating  a low
priority  for disposal  operations  on the part of municipal  governments. The
AFRICA  and EMENA  Regions  have six projects  each with disposal  subcomponents;
these  are  generally  concentrated  in  the  larger  cities  (e.g.,  Amman,  Cairo,  Lagos,
Lahore,  Karachi). The  LAC  Region  has  made  extensive  efforts  to  address  disposal
issues  in 11 of its 18 Regional  projects,  the  majority  in Brazil  and Mexico.- 20 -
In the  Asia  Region,  disposal  services  have  accompanied  collection  operations  in
nine  projects,  primarily  those  in India,  Indonesia,  and the  Philippines.
3.09  In  the course of  implementation,  difficulties surrounding  the
selection  and  acquisition  of  land  for  landfills  as  well  as  transfer  stations  were
a  major  cause  of  delay. The  problems  encompassed  lack  of institutional  capacity
to  identify environmentally  acceptable  sites, resistance from surrounding
residential  areas,  delays in obtaining  legal  land rights,  and lack of vacant
land. In  Calcutta,  difficulties  in  locating  and  acquiring  land  for  solid  waste
transfer  depots  reduced  the  component's  construction  program  from  80  to 28  ward
depots.  In Nigeria, the process of identifying,  conducting  environmental
investigations,  surveying,  and  obtaining  certificates  of  occupancy  for  transfer
station  and  sanitary  landfill  sites  posed  lengthy  delays  in the  implementation
of  the  Lagos  project.  Although  some  of  the  land  acquisition  problems  experienced
in these  and  other  MSWM components  impede  Bank  projects  in almost  all sectors,
the complexities  of identifying,  evaluating,  and acquiring environmentally
suitable  sites  that  will  be tolerated  by adjacent  neighborhoods  compounded  the
land  problem  for  MSWM.
Resource  Recovery
3.10  Resource  recovery  options  can  be  employed  to  (i)  reduce  refuse  volume
in cities that lack adequate  disposal or landfill  space, and (ii) utilize
resources  in  the  refuse  (reusable  material,  energy  value)  wher.  it  is  economically
and  environmentally  feasible. In Singapore,  the  scarcity  of land  for  disposal
sites was recognized  as a particularly  urgent problem.  Consequently,  the
Singapore Environmental  Control Project financed the  construction of  an
incineration  plant  capable  of receiving  and incinerating  1,200  tons  of refuse
per  day  to generate  a net  of 7.0  MW of  electricity  currently  being  sold.  Scrap
recovery  at the  plant  also  was included,  but it only achieved  about  one-third
of the  expected  amounts,  due largely  to the lower-than-expected  scrap  content
in the  refuse. On average,  however,  the  sale  of electricity  and  scrap  reduces
the  disposal  cost  per  ton  by 25 percent.
3.11  Besides  the  Singapore  project,  17  other  projects  include  provisions
for  resource  recovery. In most  of these  projects,  such  as the  ones in  Mexico,
Brazil,  India,  Tunisia,  Madagascar,  Lebanon,  Egypt,  and the Philippines,  the
resource  recovery  subcomponents  involve the establishment  or improvement  of
composting  facilities.  One project in Mexico includes  resources for the
construction  of a materials  recovery  and recycling  facility. The Bangladesh
project includes land reclamation  through the filling of  low-lying  lands.
Another  project  in  Recife,  Brazil  provided  financing  for  two  sanitary  landfills
equipped  with facilities  for recovering  landfill gas for use  in adjacent
industries.  Due  to  political  reasons,  however,  these  facilities  were  never  built
(see  Annex  8).
3.12  With respect to the implementation  of Bank-financed  composting
facilities,  deficient  institutional  and  technical  capacities  posed  significant
constraints  to  effective  facility  management  and  operations.  As illustrated  by
the  implementation  of the  composting  plant  financed  under  the  Antananarivo  Water
and  Sanitation  Project,  lack  of  local  expertise  in  compost  marketing,  sales,  and- 21 -
quality  control  undermined  the  financial  and  agricultural  benefits  of resource
recovery. In Egypt,  by contrast,  the  composting  plant  in  Alexandria,  financed
under the First Urban Development  Proiect,  was effectively  managed by an
agronomic  engineer  with assistance  from  a technical  expert  who ensured  that  the
plant  was efficiently  operated  and the  compost  properly  marketed,  tested,  and
sold.  Currently,  the  plant is  producing  compost  of regular  consistency,  with
high organic  content,  suitable  for soii  conditioning. It also is recovering
substantial  quantities  of metals,  plastics,  leather,  paper,  and textiles  that
are  sold and  recycled.  Notwithstanding  this experience,  most composting
operations  are  better  carried  out  by  the  private  sector  or  linked  to  agricultural
agencies.
3.13  Apart from project lending,  the Bank also is executing  a UNDP-
financed  global research  and demonstration  project on waste management  and
resource recovery.  The project is evaluating  many resource reco%ery  and
recycling  technologies  and  promoting  the  incorporation  of  promising  options  in
future  investment  projects.
Industrial  Waste  Management
3.14  Unsafe  handling  and  disposal  of  industrial  waste  is  a  growing  problem
for developing  countries.  Nonetheless,  only four of the projects  reviewed
addressed  the  management  of industrial  or  hazardous  solid  wastes. Each  project
allocated  relatively  little  attention  to  this  problem. In  the  Lagos  Solid  Waste
and Stormdrainage  Project,  for example,  the solid waste component  includes
equipment  and vehicles  for upgrading industrial  waste collection;  the SAR
provides  no data  on their  costs  and  very little  information  on  how this  service
will  be  upgraded.  The  incineration  plant  financed  by the  Singapore  Environmental
Control  Proiect  was designed  to incinerate  a certain  amount  of waste  oil and
other  suitable  industrial  solid  wastes  of high calorific  value  in addition  to
domestic  waste. Although  the  municipal  government  normally  is  not responsible
for  the  collection  and  disposal  of  industrial  waste,  local  agencies  have  expanded
their  operations  to  include  these  wastes  in  order  to  recover  additional  revenues.
Lastly,  two  projects  in  Mexico  include  financing  for  industrial  waste  management.
The  Mexico  Pollution  Control  Project  allocates  US$2.5  million  for  studies  related
to  industrial  solid  waste  control. The  studies  encompass  a  comprehensive  study
for characterization  and quantification  of chemical  and hazardous  industrial
wastes  as well  as feasibility  studies  for  industrial  waste  treatment  plants  and
disposal  sites.  As part of the project's  other components,  which provides
loans  to industrial  enterprises  for  undertaking  air  or  water  pollution  control,
*'.e  project includes  support  for a limited  number  of industrial  solid  waste
-isposal  investments.  To  support  the  development  of  industrial  waste  confinement
sites  in three  Mexican  cities,  the  Mexico  Solid  Waste  Management  Pilot  Project
finances  studies  and  assistance  for  preparation  works,  monitoring,  evaluation,
documentation,  and  training. This  project  also includes  the  development  of an
industrial  waste  information  system.
Institutional  Strengthening
3.15  In most developing  country  cities,  the  solid  waste  service  is the
largest  employer  of  municipal  labor  and  transport  and  spends  the  largest  portion- 22 -
of the city's  revenues  for  operations,  yet few cities  have a qualified  senior
officer  employed  exclusively  in  solid  waste  management  operations.  Further,  MSWM
institutions  in most  developing  countries  are  fragmented  and  have little  or  no
capacity  in sanitary  engineering  and  municipal  waste  management. Despite  these
conditions,  however,  only  about  one  third  of  the  projects  reviewed  addressed  the
need to strengthen  or reorganize  the local  institutions  responsible  for solid
waste services.  In these  projects,  MSWM or technical  assistance  components
provided  for  studies,  expert  assistance,  and  training  of  municipal  staff. A few
projects  dealt  with creating  or strengthening  a metropolitan  area solid  waste
agency  (e.g.,  Amman,  Lagos,  La Paz,  Lima,  Monterrey).  With regard  to  component
implementation  in  most  cities,  both  intermediate  and  large,  MSWM  responsibilities
were delegated  to a multi-service  municipal  department. In three  cases,  they
were delegated  to health or sanitation  departments.  Only seven components
incorporated  specific  solid  waste  or urban  cleansing  departments.
3.16  Inadequate  attention  to institutional  issues  in  the  design  of  solid
waste  components  resulted  in poor  component  performance. Moreover,  deficient
institutional  organization  and  capacity  was cited  as the principal  impediment
to  effective  MSWM  component  execution. For  example,  insufficient  and  unskilled
staff,  inadequate  project  management,  and  unclear  organizational  structure  and
responsibilities  undermined  the  execution  of  MSWM  improvements  in  the  Lazos  Solid
Waste and Stormdrainaze  Project.  In this project, a  three-year  delay in
preparing  and formally  adopting  a management  organization  and staffing  plan
posed  a significant  constraint  to  executing  long-term  solid  waste  improvements.
Although  the  delay  was  due  primarily  to the  fact  that  four  different  governors
exerted their influence  on the plan in the course of project preparation,
appraisal,  and  execution,  the  continuing  uncertainties  regarding  organization,
management,  staffing, and trairing severely  impeded critical planning and
coordination  tasks  associated  with the  project.
3.17  In a number of projects, insufficient  technical  and managerial
expertise  impeded  the introduction  of more advanced  levels  of technology  and
service. During  the  implementation  of the  Third  Urban  Project  in  Calcutta,  for
example,  the  Calcutta  Municipal  Corporation  changed  its  methods  of solid  waste
management  more frequently  than  could  be readily  absorbed  by the solid  waste
workers;  the  project  did  not  provide  adequate  training  to  complement  the  changes
in  technology.  As  discussed  earlier,  weak  institutional  capacity  also  undermined
the  efficiency  of Bank-financed  composting  facilities.
3.18  With respect  to institutional  development,  there  were some  notable
accomplishments  in the projects reviewed.  Under the Mexico Solid Waste
Management  Proiect,  for  example,  the  Monterrey  subloan  supported  the  development
of  a state  level  public  company  responsible  for  the  disposal  of the  solid  wastes
of eight  municipalities  within  the  Monterrey  metropolitan  area in the  State  of
Nuevo  Leon.  Controlled  by a Board  of Directors,  the  company  (SIMEPRODE)  will
operate  four  transfer  stations,  a fleet  of 24  transfer  trailers,  and  a sanitary
landfill. Collection  remains  the  responsibility  of each  municipality,  but the
company  provides  technical  assistance. Operations  are expected  to start in
September  1989.- 23 -
3.19  In  Asia,  urban  projects  in  Indonesia  and  India  triggered  additional
institutional  improvements.  As  a  result  of  the  Third  Urban  Project  in  Indonesia,
the city of Surabaya  established  a separate  Cleansing  Department  within the
municipality,  thus increasing  the status  and subsequent  resources  assigned  to
solid  waste  management.  In  Calcutta,  implementation  of the  second  urban  project
resulted in  the reorganiz ion of  the  solid waste  structure within the
municipality,  designation  of a qualified  senior  engineer  to  direct  solid  waste
operations,  and  establishment  of  a  hierarchy  of  positions  and  responsibilities.
The project  also supported  the improvement  of employee  working  conditions  and
the  design  of a  management  system  for  operations  and  maintenance,  Despite  these
accomplishments,  however,  one  project  officer  noted  that  the  failure  to sustain
local  commitment  to solid  waste  management  was an important  factor  inhibiting
long-term  improvement. Solid  waste institutions  have remained  weak and local
governments  have  continued  to  assign  higher  priority  to  other  urban  expenditures.
B.  Proiect  Issues
3.20  To  complement  the  evaluation  of  component  design  and  implementation,
the  review  of World  Bank  MSWM investments  focused  on the  size  and  scope  of the
solid waste investments,  level of borrowing,  financial  considerations,  and
private  sector  participation  in  municipal  solid  waste  services. The following
sections  consider  key findings  related  to these  issues  and  highlight  pertinent
questions  raised  in the  course  of reviewing  MSWM  projects  and  components.
Size  and ScoRe  of Investments
3.21  Notwithstanding  sume  of  the  large, focused MSWM  projects or
components,  the  majority  of  components  had  very  limited  scope  to  provide  vehicles
and  equipment  to  municipal  departments.  Little  attention  was given  to specific
improvements  in the  MSWM subsector. Furthermore,  this  approach  raises  serious
questions about the usefulness  of vehicle procurement  as the main project
subsector  objective  when rudimentary  maintenance  capacity  is  generally  lacking.
For  Bank  lending  to  have  real  impact  on  subsector  performance,  the  project  design
must incorporate  a broader, more comprehensive  approach  as illustrated  by
projects  in  Nigeria,  Indonesia,  and  Mexico  (See  Annexes  3, 5 and  9).
3.22  Based  on an analysis  of MSWM component  size,  many of the  projects
appear  to have included  solid  wastes  as an afterthought  - even though  MSWM is
a  major  budget  item  for  cities. One  fifth  of  the  components  had  a  component  cost
of less than US$1.0 million,  and represented  less than two percent of the
respective  total  project  cost. Moreover,  this  group  of components  was included
largely for procuring  collection  equipment.  The median value of the MSWM
components  was  US$3.4  million;  the  median  share  was  4.5  percent  of  total  project
costs.  By contrast,  about  one third  of the  projects  had sizeable  solid  waste
components  costing  in  excess  of US$5.0  million  and  accounting  for  more than  10
percent  of project  costs.  The cost and size  distribution  of 66 projects  for
which  MSWM component  cost  data  were available  is  shown  in Figures  5 and  6.- 24  .
Filure 5.  Cost Distribution  of MSWM  Figure  6. Size  of MSWM  Components
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3.23  In  addition to the  relatively low level  of investment in  MSWM, the  Bank
has carried out very few sector studies on solid waste management.  In 1982, the
Bank published  Environmental Management  of Urban Solid Wastes  in Developing
Countries:  A Project Guide by Sandra Cointreau  (World Bank Urban Development
Technical Paper Number 5).  The document provides information  and procedures for
planning and implementing solid waste management improvements but is not known
to a surprising number of  project officers questioned.  In  searching through the
Bank's  information systems, only two Regional sector studies were  found that
dealt with solid wastes.  The EMENA Urban Solid Waste Management:  Development
of Strategies report, prepared in 1984, provides an in-depth review of regional
lending and proposes a number of strategies to expand and improve program and
project development.  A 1982 LAC Water SupplV  and Wastes Sector Strategy PaRer
devotes  a brief  section to MSWM,  indicating the growing  importance of  this
subsector in the Region.  The paper emphasizes the need to strengthen Bank and
country capacity for dealing with this urban problem and identifies proposed
activitius  in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico.  Also  in LAC, country water and
wastes sector studies for Brazil (1983) and Columbia (1986) include substantial
analyses and discussions of the solid waste subsector.  A LAC sector study to
be  initiated  in FY89 will  devote more attention  to  this topic.  Given  the
potential growth of lending in this subsector, as reflected in experiences in
Nigeria, Brazil, Mexico, Egypt, Pakistan, India, and Indonesia, the development
of Regional strategies, as carried out in EMENA, is recommended.
Level of Borrowing
3.24  The discussion of MSWM issues to this point raises another important
question:  why  the  relatively  low  borrowing  for  the  subsector?  Several
explanations can be suggested.  First, solid waste collection operations tend
to  be  labor  intensive,  and  as  viewed  in  several  of  the  past  small  loan
components,  have a relatively low foreign  exchange cost,  primarily for  vehicles.- 25 -
The need for  more significant  borrowing  only becomes  apparent  when there  is  a
comprehensive project  or  component  incorporating technical assistance,
operational  planning  and  management,  transfer  operations,  resource  recovery,  and
landfilling.
3.25  Another  reason  for the low level  of borrowing  is that  past project
identification  and  appraisal  missions  did not include  a municipal  solid  waste
expert  or sanitary  engineer  with  MSWM  expertise.  Thus,  project  officers  usually
focussed  on other problems  or simply  provided  funds for the procurement  of
vehicles  and  equipment. Moreover,  MSWM often  fell  into  the  cracks  between  the
urban  and  water  and  sanitation  sectors. Project  officers  in  each  sector  tended
to leave  solid  waste  management  to the  other  sector.
3.26  A third  factor  accounting  for  the  low  level  of  borrowing  is that  the
borrowers  generally  do not recognize  that  MSWM is a major consumer  of scarce
municipal  resources;  the true cost of MSWM services  may be hidden due to
deficient  municipal  accounting  practices  and reliance  on central government
transfers. Thus, the relative  importance  of achieving  greater  efficiency  in
service  provision  is not properly  appreciated. This management  information
problem,  however,  is  more  deeply  rooted  in  overall  municipal  management  capacity,
and can only be effectively  approached  through  urban development  lending  for
improvements  in land information  systems,  local tax systems,  and municipal
budgeting  and  accounting.
3.27  An additional  factor  is  that  local  governments  do  not  have  easy  access
to  capital.  On-lending  through  national  or  state  financial  institutions  to  local
governments  can  be an important  feature  of Bank  lending  to stimulate  increased
borrowing  for comprehensive  MSWM projects.  The on-lending  facilities  can be
linked  to national  or state  solid  waste strategies  that include  provision  of
technical  assistance  to  borrowing  municipalities.  Nonetheless,  only  five  of  the
projects  reviewed  (Nigeria,  Mexico,  Colombia,  Argentina,  and  Brazil)  focused  on
using  existing  financial  intermediaries  to  support  comprehensive  MSWM  activities.
Financial  Considerations
3.28  In  the  project  documents  reviewed,  there  is  a scarcity  of information
on the  present  or estimated  costs  of services,  cost  recovery  arrangements,  and
economic  rates  of  return. With  respect  to the  available  information  on service
costs,  illustrative  data  are:  US$5.20  per capita  per year for refuse  services
in Nigeria,  US$2  per capita  per year in Calcutta,  US$15  per ton in Singapore,
and  US$24  per ton  in Amman.  These  costs,  however,  are unrelated  to levels  of
service. In  many  instances,  financial  analyses  of  solid  wastes  operations  could
not  be carried  out  due  to  a  lack  of accounting  data;  most  municipal  accounts  do
not  break  out  MSWM  costs  from  ot'ler  operating  expenditures.  Without  proper  cost
data,  cost  efficiency  is  not  a  concern  for  many  municipalities,  much  less  a  goal
to  be achieved.
3.29  Cost  recovery  is  another  issue  that  receives  little  attention  in the
project  reports. Many SARs  do not indicate  how the  recurring  costs for  MSWM
would be recovered.  Where this information  was provided, the most common
approach  was  to  assume  that  operating  costs  would  be  recovered  through  municipal- 26 -
or property  taxes. Transfers  from  central  government  were planned  in several
cases.  In 17 projects,  a refuse  fee or tax  was established,  sometimes  as a
surcharge  on  property  taxes  or  on  other  utility  bills. Since  solid  waste  service
charges  in  Lima  (based  on  property  values)  financed  only  about  27  percent  of the
estimated  service  cost,  the  Lima  project  called  for  a gradual  shift  from  solid
waste charges  based  on property  values  to a surcharge  on electricity. In the
case of Merida, householders  were expected  to pay a weekly collection  fee
directly  to  private  or  municipal  haulers. Only  one  SAR  mentions  the  collection
of tipping  fees  as a source  of revenue  for  disposal  operations. The SARs  of
three  projects  describe  cross  subsidies  to finance  services  to the  poor through
user charges  levied  on commercial  or industrial  establishments  or high-income
households.
3.30  In recovering  costs for the Bank-financed  MSWM investments,  the
experience  was  largely disappointing.  Where the municipalities  recovered
operating  costs  through  municipal  or  property  taxes,  collections  were inadequate
to ensure operations and  maintenance,  even when the  project included a
complementary  component  emphasizing  improvement  in  municipal  finance  or  property
tax  collections.  Where  there  was  a  willingness-to-pay  for  solid  waste  services,
however,  more  successful  financial  performance  was  achieved.  Under  the  Singapore
project, for example,  recurring  costs were recovered  through a  tariff for
domestic  wastes  and a disposal  fee for  certain  industrial  wastes.  Unde. the
First  Urban  DeveloDment  Project  in  Egypt,  several  communities  in  Cairo  are  paying
for  solid  waste  collection  services  directly  to the  Zabbaleen  (private  refuse
collectors). By contrast,  the experience  in  Merida,  Mexico  was discouraging;
reportedly,  60 percent  of the  population  did  not  subscribe  to the  paid  service
and simply  dumped  their  garbage  on streets  or empty  lots.
3.31  The calculation  of ERRs  for  solid  waste  components  is complicated  by
the  fact  that  this  service  is  generally  treated  as  a  public  good.  Accordingly,
most of the  project  documents  reviewed  do not report  ERRs for the  solid  waste
components,  citing  methodological  difficulties  in  estimating  them.  Of the  six
projects  that  do  report  ERRs,  most  calculated  the  cost  reductions  resulting  from
improved  operations  as the  basis for evaluation  or attempted  to estimate  the
benefits  of increased  service  coverage. The  few  attempted  calculations  on this
basis showed significant  returns:  Second Calcutta Urban Development (27
percent),  Thailand  Regional  Cities  Development  (14  percent),  Lagos  Solid  Waste
Management  and Stormdrainage  (25  percent),  La Paz Municipal  Development  (44
percent),  Lima Metropolitan  Development  (transfer  station  only,  156 percent),
and  Recife  Metropolitan  Development  (22  percent). Further  information  regarding
the accuracy  of these  calculations  is not currently  available  in the project
documents.  Nonetheless,  when the calculation  is based on improvements  in
operational  efficiency,  the  ERR  on  comprehensive  solid  waste  management  projects
or components  can  be substantial.
Private  Sector  Participation
3.32  The private  sector  has the  potential  to increase  significantly  the
efficiency  of solid waste service delivery (see paragraphs  4.23  - 4.46).
Nonetheless,  private  sector  provision  of services  was referred  to in  only  a few
projects,  usually  for  collection  services  through.municipal  contracts  (e.g.  ,  La- 27 -
Paz, Lagos)  or direct  arrangements  with householders  (e.g.,  Cairo,  Merida,).
For example,  to improve the industrial  waste collection  service,  the Lagos
project  incorporates  participation  by  private  contractors  that  demonstrate  sound
operating  practices  and  have the  potential  to expand  their  operations. Under
the Firjt Urban Development  Proiect  in Egypt,  the successful  integration  of
Zabbaleen  collection  activities  into  the  solid  waste  component  demonstrated  the
potential  for  lowering  costs  and  increasing  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of
services. This experience  also  demonstrated  the  feasibility  of mobilizing  the
informal  s',ctor  productively.  To investigate  further  the  extensive  experience
with  privatization  in Latin  America,  West Africa,  and the  Middle  East,  INU  has
initiated  research  on this  subject.IV.  IMPROVING THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF MSWM COMPONENTS
4.01  MSWM is an integral  part of the broad urban and environnental
management  of  a  city. To  maximize  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  the  Bank's
investments  in  this  sub-sector,  World  Bank  project  designers  need to  address  on
a  systematic  basis the full range of solid waste operations  and related
environmental,  institutional,  and  financial  issues  in  designing  MSWM  components
or projects.  Although project officers generally  are not responsible  for
designing  the technical  aspects  of the specific  MSWM improvements,  they  must
ensure  that  the  components  prepared  by the  borrowers  or solid  waste  management
consultants  provide:  collection  and disposal  of solid  wastes  generated  by all
population  groups  at a level  and cost that can be sustained  locally;  maximum
protection  of the  environment;  systems  appropriate  to  local  climatic,  economic,
physical,  and social  conditions;  and  high equipment  and labor  productivity.
4.02  The remainder  of this  chapter  presents  general  recommendations  for
improving  the  design  and  implementation  of  MSWM  components  in  World  Bank  project.
The  recommendations  cover: design  of  MSWM  sub-components,  regulatory  framework,
institutional  arrangements,  financial  arrangementb  and  pricing,  lanca  acquisition,
and  phasing  of  MSWM  improvements.  For  more  detailed  guidance  in identifying  and
planning  an  improved  solid  waste  management  system,  see  Environmental  Management
of Urban  Wastes  in DeveloDing  Countries: A Project  Guide  by Sandra  Cointreau
(World  Bank  Urban  Development  Technical  Paper  Number  5).
A.  Component  Design
4.03  The design of the MSWM component is a key determinant  of the
effectiveness  of the solid  waste investment. Based  on the lessons  of prior
experience,  the  World  Bank  should  no  longer  invesL  in  solid  waste  components  that
financc  only  the  procurement  of collection  vehicles  and  equipment  in  the  absence
of a MSWM plan.  As discussed  earlier,  these  investments  fail to address  the
broader institutional  and financial  problems  that perpetuate  low levels  of
service  and  consequent  health  effects  and  environmental  degradation.  Moreover,
financing  collection  vehicles  without appropriate  provisions  for maintenance
results  after  a short  time in  vehicle  breakdown  and  abandonment. If the  World
Bank wants to make a more significant  impact on solid waste services in
developing  country  cities  than  it  has  in  the  past,  Bank-financed  projects  should
incorporate  a comprehensive  policy framework that takes into account all
physical, technical, legal,  institutional,  financial, environmental,  and
sociocultural  aspects  of MSWM in a jurisdiction. Future  investments  need not
be free-standing  projects.  They do, however,  need to be well-focused  and
integrated  components  that  may incorporate  the  following  MSWM sub-components.
Strategie  1ISWM  Plan
4.04  At  a  minimum,  the  MSWM  component  should  include  financing  to  support
the  development  of  a  strategic  solid  waste  management  plan  or  phased  action  plan
covering the full range of  solid waste  services and  related management
activities. For  large  cities,  the  plan  should  focus  on the  requirements  of the
municipality  as well as the  surrounding  metropolitan  area.  A national  solid- 29 -
waste  plan  is  more  appropriate  for  ledium-sized  and  small  cities. The  investment
would  cover:  comprehensive  data  collection  and analysis  of local  solid  waste
conditions;  development  of MSWM objectives  and performance  targets;  design  of
the  solid  waste  organizational structure and  staffing with  designated
responsibilities  for  all  categories  of municipal  wastes;  development  of a plan
for improving  waste  operations  ar.d  facilities,  vehicle  maintenance  and  repair,
staff  training,  and  management  practices  and systems;  identification  of sites
for  new  or  improved  transfer  and  disposal  facilities;  development  of  a  financing
scheme for capital investments  and recurring  costs; design of a plan for
relocating  occupants  of sites selected  for solid waste facilities;  and the
development  of a plan for managing  labor  and integrating  organized  scavenger
groups  into  the  municipal  solid  waste  service.
4.05  Since  the  municipal  solid  waste  service  is  often  the  largest  employer
of municipal  labor,  almost  all  planning  decisions  will require  a sensitive  and
enlightened  approach  in dealing  with labor groups.  Solid  waste workers  are
usually  well-organized  and the unions need to be involved  in the planning
process. Moreover,  a representative  of labor  groups  should  be assigned  a role
on the planning  committee.  If the new or upgraded  solid  waste service  will
include  private  sector  participation,  the  plan  will  need  to  delineate  the  process
of  transferring  workers  from  public  to  private  enterprises.  The  plan  also  should
include  measures  for  improving  working  condicions  and  for  eliminating  the  usually
large  number  of unneeded  staff  on  padded  labor  rolls.
4.06  In  addition  to  labor  relations,  the  plan  should  address  interactions
among  the  municipal  government,  MSWM  agencies,  and  organized  scavenger  groups.
In developing  the  plan,  authorities  should  determine: whether  there  is a way
to  involve  organized  scavenger  groups  into  future  solid  waste  activities  and  the
formal  MSWM  structure,  how  to  mitigate  impacts  when these  groups  are  displaced,
how  to  continue  to  recognize  the  value  of  their  contribution  in  recycling  wastes,
and  how to improve  their  living  and  working  conditions.
Storag_  and  Collection
4.07  When planning  MSWM system  improvements,  project  designers  need to
direct  more attention  to primary  as well as secondary  collection  operations
(i.e.,  from waste storage at the household or communal level through the
collection  and  delivery  of these  wastes  to  one  or more  transfer  stations  or the
final disposal site).  Regarding  primary collection,  the components  should
encompass  appropriate  household  bins or containers  and communal  storage  bins
(e.g.,  containers  or bunkers)  as well as vehicles  capable  of negotiating  the
narrow, unpaved twistirg  pathways  common to low-income  neighborhoods.  The
collection  system  should  be designed  so loose  waste  is handled  only  once.  To
provide greater coverage  for low-income  areas as well as to maximize the
sustainability  of improved  systems,  MSWM components  should  support  the  use or
development  of low-cost indigenous  technologies  (e.g.  ,  handcarts, tricycle
rickshaws)  for  collecting  garbage  from  individual  households  and  then  bringing
it  to  collection  points  where  the  waste  can  be transferred  to  collection  trucks.
4.08  With respect  to secondary  collection,  which involves  transporting
waste from a transfer  point or station  to the final  disposal  or processing- 30 -
facility,  the  purchase  of  foreign  vehicles  usually  will  be required. To  achieve
efficiency  in  collection  operations,  it  is  essential  to  match  truck  type  and  size
with local  conditions,  particularly  the  prevailing  solid  waste  characteristics
(density  and  composition),  road  conditions,  maintenance  capacity,  availability
of  spare parts, and  labor rates.  Due  to  the complexities of  vehicle
specifications  and  procurement,  project designers should insist on  loan
conditions  that require  only agreed upon vehicles to be purchased for the
component. Project  designers  should  also stress  appropriate  vehicle  selection
and  direct  attention  to the  size  and  manageability  of the  procurement  packages.
Moreover, the  initial procurement  of  collection vehicles should include
provisions  for  spare  parts  (about  20  percent  of  vehicle  cost)  to  ensure  that  the
Bank-financed  vehicles  will be operable  beyond  the initial  period  of project
implementation.  An effective  MSWM  component  also should  include  workshops  and
training  for  vehicle  maintenance  and  repair. For  useful  information  to  support
vehicle investment  decisions,  see "Refuse  Collection  Vehicles  for Developing
Countries,"  a  recent UNCHS (Habitat)  publication.  In addition,  a  simple
spreadsheet  model  for  analyzing  the  unit  costs  of  alternative  collection  schemes
is available  from  INURD.
Street  Sweeping
4.09  The  cleaning  or sweeping  of streets  is  an important  aspect  of  MSWM.
According  to Flintoff,  many cities  spend  between  a third  and a half of their
solid  waste  budgets  on this activity. Moreover,  the cost of removing  wastes
which  have  been scattered  on the  street  is  considerably  higher  than  the  cost  of
collecting  waste  placed  in  containers.V  In  planning  MSWM  components,  therefore,
project  designers  should  stress  the  provision  of primary  collection  services,
reduction  of street  litter  through  public  education,  as  well  as the  adoption  of
systems  that  incorporate  the  development  and  use  of  effective  tools  and  equipment
that can achieve  high labor  productivity. Transfer  depots  and stations  also
should  be included  for  the  effective  management  of street  sweepers  and  for  the
transfer of waste collected.  As  an  alternative  to transfer stations,
arrangements  can  be made for  collection  vehicles  to  pick  up the  waste  from  the
sweepers  several  times  a day. Nonetheless,  this  approach  does  not obviate  tne
need for transfer  depots  which  provide  parking  areas for  handcarts,  tool a.nd
equipment  storage,  and  hygiene  facilities.
Transfer
4.10  Where  haul distances  from  the  collection  area to the  disposal  site
are greater than 15-20 kilometers  or where vehicle travel times exceed 30
minutes,  transfer  stations  should  be  considered  among  the  MSWM  improvements  and
included in feasibility  studies.  Although most municipalities  give these
facilities  low priority,  transfer  stations  can maximize  the productivity  of
collection  vehicles  and crews  and increase  the  useful  life of the  collection
vehicles. To achieve  economies  of scale,  project  designers  should  ensure  that
V  Frank  Flintoff,  Management  of Solid  Wastes  in Developing  Countries. WHO
Regional  Publications  South-East  Series  no. 1 (New  Delhi:  World  Health
Organization,  1984),  p. 85.- 31 -
the  municipality  incorporates  a system-wide  approach  in locating,  sizing,  and
scheduling  these  facilities,  taking  into account  the location  of present  and
future  disposal  sites. Moreover,  transfer  stations  should  be designed  so  as to
minimize  wasta  handling.
Resource  Recovery  and  Disposal
4.11  All  investments  in  expanding  collection  capacity  must  be  accompanied
by corresponding  investments  in  environmentally  safe  disposal  facilities,  which
may  include  resource  recovery  and  recycling  plants  to  reduce  the  volume  of  waste
and  to recover  value  from  the  discarded  materials. The  selection  of a disposal
system  involves  a consideration  of such  factors  as environmental  impact,  costs
and revenues  from resource  recovery,  capital  and operations  and maintenance
costs,  and  the  cost  and  availability  of land. In  most  developing  country  cities,
however,  the  most appropriate  disposal  facilities  will continue  to be sanitary
landfills  (also  referred  to as controlled  landfills),  and  where a market  for
compost  can  be demonstrated,  composting  plants. In  areas  where  land  is scarce,
calorific  value of waste is high, and institutional/technical  capacity  and
financial  resources  are favorable,  incineration  with energy  recovery  may be
considered.  Whatever  method  is  used,  however,  project  designers  should  explore
the  possibility  of regionalizing  the  disposal  or  resource  recovery  facility  to
maximize  cost efficiency  and enviLonmental  protection.  Moreover,  even when
resource  recovery  or incineration  is  ernployed,  a sanitary  landfill  also  will  be
needed  to  accept  rejects  and  ash. For  guidance  in  planning  sanitary  landfills,
see "Landfilling  Wastes,"  Department  of the Environment  Waste  Management  Paper
No. 26,  1986.  In  addition,  INUWS  is  preparing  a manual  on landfill  management
in developing countries.
Pilot  Projects
4.12  To promote  new technologies  or the development  and production  of
indigenous  tools  and equipment,  MSWM components  should  include  pilot  projects
to test  improved  systems  of solid  waste  collection  and/or  disposal  or resource
recoveiy  that  could  be implemented  on a larger  scale  if proven  efficient  and
acceptable.  This  approach  has  been  effectively  carried  out  in  a  number  of Bank
projects  (e.g.,  Cairo,  Calcutta,  Brazil)  and should  be incorporated  into  the
design  of future  MSWM  components.
Hazardous  Waste  Management
4.13  Ineffective  management  of  hazardous  wastes  threatens  public  health
and the environment  worldwide.  In most developing  countries,  the  problem  is
aggravated by  the  lack of  controls over  pollution and  waste  disposal.
Consequently,  hazardous  wastes  are entering  municipal  waste streams,  causing
surface  and  ground  water  contamination  and  other  long-term  adverse  environmental
and  health  effects.  To  maximize  the  benefits  of  a  MSri  ;component,  more  attention
should  be  directed  at  planning  safe  municipal  disposal  facilities  and  instituting
or improving  environmental  controls  and  monitoring  to  keep  hazardous  wastes  out
of the  municipal  solid  waste  system. If industrial  wastes  are  collected  by the
municipality,  project  designers  should  ensure that all potential  sources  of
hazardous  wastes  are identified  and targeted  for  appropriate  waste  management.- 32 -
Where industrial  wastes  are  collected  by the private  sector,  the  municipality
should  ensure that the private companies that collect  hazardous  waste are
licensed  to do so and that the  waste  is safely  transported  and disposed  of at
designated  disposal  sites.  Although  laws  controlling  hazardous  waste  are  enacted
at the national  or state level, the  municipality  should  play a key role in
monitoring  municipal disposal sites for hazardous wastes; monitoring the
generation  of urban  waste,  especially  the wastes  from small-scale  or cottage
industry; identifying  hazardous waste  sites; and  carrying out  periodic
inspections  of  industrial  and  hazardous  waste  collection  and  disposal  operations.
Further  recommendations  regarding  hazardous  waste  management  goes  beyond the
scope  of this  paper.  For  guidance  on this  subject,  see "The  Safe  Disposal  of
Hazardous  Wastes:  The  Special  Needs  and  Problems  of  Developing  Countries,"  (World
Bank  Technical  Paper  Number  93).
Institutional  Strengthening
4.14  Most  developing countries have  little  or  no  expertise in
environmental/sanitary  engineering  and municipal  waste  management. Moreover,
the  solid  waste  service  in  most  developing  country  cities  lacks  planning,  human
resource  development,  and financial  management  and.  budget  control functions.
Thus, efforts  to improve  MSWM should  include  appropriate  levels  of technical
assistance  and training  in the operational,  financial,  and managerial  aspects
of solid  waste management. To support  the development  of solid  waste  plans,
technical  assistance  can  be  provided  for:  planning  collection  routes;  assessing
available  or proposed equipment;  setting up maintenance  shops and depots;
scheduling  construction  of strategic  disposal  facilities;  and designing  and
siting  transfer,  resource  recovery,  and disposal  facilities. Assistance  is
particularly  needed  in the  siting  and  design  of transfer  stations  and  sanitary
landfills. If  resource  recovery  or recycling  facilities  are  planned,  technical
assistance  usually  will  be needed  to manage  plant  operations  and to advise  on
the most suitable  means for marketing  the recovered  or recycled  materials,
ensuring quality control, and managing sales and delivery of products to
consumers.  Further  assistance  can be provided  to help organize  solid waste
departments,  supervise  project execution  and training,  design  and implement
public information  programs,  design  suitable  cost recovery  schemes,  promote
private  sector  (both  formal  and informal)  or non-governmental  participation  in
MSWM services,  and  advise  on the  design  and  evaluation  of bid  documents.
4.15  With  respect  to  training,  the  MSWM  components  should  provide  on-the-
job as well  as specialized  training  in  municipal  management,  municipal  finance
and  accounting,  public  health,  environmental  protection,  equipment  operation  and
maintenance,  and  solid  waste  operations.  For  middle  and  top  management,  training
may involve  on-the-job  or overseas  training  in  some  of the  subjects  covered  by
technical  assistance,  as discussed  above.  For local  solid  waste staff,  the
component  should  include  on-the-job  or  local  training  in  operating,  maintaining,
and repairing  project-financed  vehicles  and equipment  as well as operating  a
transfer  station,  sanitary  landfill,  or recycling  plant.
4.16  As part of an institutional  strengthening  sub-component,  a MSWM
component  could  provide  further  assistance  in  assessing  the  existing  or  potential
role  of the  private  sector  in  municipal  waste  management. If private  firms  are- 33 -
already  operating  in  higher  income  neighborhoods  or  serving  local  industries  and
institutions,  this  sub-component  should  focus  on expanding  their  participation
in the solid  waste  system. To strengthen  private  sector  skills,  particularly
in the areas of management  and environmental  protection,  project-financed
training  could  be  extended  to  participating  firms  under  certain  conditions.  (See
paragraphs  4.23-4.26  for  more information  on the  private  sector.)
Public  Education
4.17  To  promote  or  improve  public  cooperation  in  solid  waste  improvement,
MSWM  components  should  include  funds  for  educating  the  public  about  local  solid
waste  sorvices. For local  residents,  these  education  programs  should  focus  on
the  services  provided,  the  importance  of MSWM to  health  and the  community,  the
real  costs  of  providing  solid  waste  services  and  how  they  are  paid,  and  what is
expected  of each resident  in participating  in the refuse  management  system.
Basic  information  to be communicated  includes:  schedule  of collection,  storage
requirements,  arrangements  for  special  collection  of  bulky  wastes,  schedule  and
location  of  special  pick-ups  for  recyclables,  fines  and  other  penalties  for  non-
participation  in the system,  and  means for  lodging  complaints  about the local
solid  waste service.  For commercial  and industrial  enterprises,  education
programs  should  provide  further  information  on disposing  of specific  materials
and  any  applicable  national,  state,  or local  laws,  ordinances,  and  regulations,
including  penalties  for  non-compliance. The information  can be disseminated
though  the  media,  leaflets,  pamphlets,  billboards,  and  door-to-door  contacts.
B.  Regulatory  Framework
4.18  In  planning  MSWM  improvements,  project  designers  need  to  direct  more
attention  to the regulatory  framework  for solid waste management.  In most
developing  countries,  existing  laws  and  enforcement  systems  provide  inadequate
protection  of the  environment  and  fail  to  encourage  public  cooperation  with  the
local solid waste management  system.  Thus, efforts should  be directed  at
establishing  appropriate  solid  waste-related  laws,  ordinances,  regulations,  and
corresponding  inspection  and  enforcement  responsibilities  and  procedures  at  the
national,  state,  and local  levels. For  example,  national  or state  legislation
is  needed  to  control  the  disposal  of  hazardous  wastes  as well  as to  protect  air
and  water  resources  from  contamination.  At the  local  level,  laws  and  ordinances
are  needed  to  control  illegal  dumping  and  littering  as  well  as  to  define  citizen
responsibilities  in household storage, payment of  charges, separation  of
recyclable  wastes,  and  other  solid  waste-related  tasks. Reqt.irements  for  siting
sanitary landfills and  other  disposal facilities would  fall under  the
jurisdiction  of  national  as  well as state  and  local  authorities.
4.19  Enforcement  will require  special  attention  since  it is always  the
weakest point  in environmental  control.  Achieving effective enforcement
activities  will depend  on many factors.  Among the most important  are:  the
capacity  of the responsible  local  authority  to monitor  compliance  and apply
enforcement  procedures;  simplicity  in administration  or procedural  ease in
implementing  a regulation;  and  broad  public  acceptance,  achieved  in large  part
by  making  information  on  regulations  widely  available.  Furthermore,  regulations
should  be few  in  number,  transparent,  unambiguous,  easily  understood,  equitable- 34 -
(following  polluter  peys  principle),  and  considered  to  have  significant  positive
physical  and  economic  effects.
C.  Institutional  Arrangements
4.20  The institutional  arrangements  for  service  delivery  is a critical
consideration  in  designing  MSWM  components.  In  planning  these  arrangements,  the
size  and  nature  of the  cities  must  be considered. The  following  addresses
institutional  considerations  in large  and  intermediate  and  small  cities.
.Large  Cities
4.21  In large  cities,  the  optimum  scheme  is to  have all  refuse  management
delegated  to  one  agency  within  the  local  government  hierarchy.  The  agency  should
be  placed  at  a  level  that  corresponds  to  the  financial  importance  and  operational
difficulties  of the service and have a  top level administrator,  mid-level
technical  staffing,  and its own budget.  The designation  of such an agency,
however,  does  not preclude  some  operational  functions  being  delegated  to  other
agencies  of local  jurisdictions  or to the private  sector.  Nonetheless,  one
agency  should  be assigned  the  principal  responsibility  for  strategic  planning,
coordinating  MSWM operations,  contracting  services,  and overseeing  contract
performance.
4.22  Collection  services  in  large  metropolitan  areas  (populations  greater
than  500,000)  may  continue  to  be  provided  by local  jurisdictions  since  there  are
few  economies  of scale in collection  operations  that are labor  intensive  and
require  many discrete  pieces  of equipaz,ent.  As time and  distance  for hauling
increase,  however,  the establishment  of an area-wide  authority  with specific
responsibilities  for transfer,  transport,  and disposal  operations  can provide
an  efficient solution for managing post-collection  tasks, which do  have
significant  economies  of  scale. Further,  the  siting  of  one  or  a  few  well-managed
metropolitan  or  regional  disposal  facilities  maximizes  environmental  protection.
4.23  If  the  public  and  private  sectors  will  share  MSWM responsibilities,
there  are  many  possible  institutional  arrangements.  In  West  Africa,  for  example,
there  has been promising  experience  involving  the  leasing  of government-owned
vehicles  to private  firms  who assume  responsibility  for collection  operations
and  maintenance.  Under  other  public-private  sector  arrangements  in  several  Latin
American  cities,  a  public  agency  authorizes  a contract  or grants  a franchise  to
a  private  firm  which  provides  the  service  using  its  own  assets. Alternatively,
a licensed  or unlicensed  private firm can operate its  own assets  and charge
service  recipients  directly.  In some cases, the public agency  may provide
service  in some areas  of the  city  while  private  firms  operate  in other  areas.
Public  and  private  sector  MSWM  roles  also  may  be divided  according  to  collection
and  disposal  functions.'
i./  For a  fuller discussion  of private solid waste service contractual
arrangements,  see  "Non-Government  Delivery  of  Urban  Solid  Waste  Services,"
draft framework  paper  by Roland  Schertenleib  and Thelma  Triche (INUWS,
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4.24  With regard  to solid  waste  collection,  the  private  sector  has  been
shown  to  be substantially  more  efficient  than  the  municipal  collection  service.
Based  on detailed  nationwide  studies  carried  out in the  United  States,  Canada,
Switzerland,  and  Japan,  as well  as regional  studies  undertaken  in Connecticut,
California,  and the  midwestern  United  States,  contract  collection  is about 35
percent  less  costly  than  municipal  collection  for  comparable  services.y  Taking
into  account  taxes  paid by the  private  supplier,  which support  various  local
services,  the  true  cost to the  resident  for  contract  service  can  be as  much as
58 percent  lower  than  that for  the  municipal  service.5 Further,  a study  in 20
cities  with  similar  urban  conditions  revealed  that  the  cost  of contract  street
sweeping,  with the  same frequency  and quality  of service  in each  city,  was 43
percent  less  per  curb  mile than  the  cost  of  municipal  sweeping.v
4.25  Although  there  are  limited  available  data  on  the  performance  of  private
sector  solid  waste services  in developing  countries,  experience  in Brazil  and
Turkey  corroborates  the findings  in the industrialized  countries.  According
to  one study, 2' for  a comparable  level  of service,  taxpayers  in  Rio de  Janeiro,
where  a  municipal  enterprise  provides  solid  waste  services,  pay at least  twice
the  amount  per  metric  ton  of refuse  collected  as taxpayers  in Sao  Paulo,  where
private firms are contracted  to perform solid  waste services.  The higher
productivity  and  efficiency  of the  private  sector  in  Sao  Paulo  can  be attributed
largely  to the  higher  labor  and  vehicle  use efficiency  of the  private  firms.
Contributing  factors  are the  high cost of maintaining  the ancient  collection
fleet in Rio de Janeiro and the difficulty  in replacing  vehicles  due to a
government  policy restricting  access  to credit  to parastatals  for equipment
renewal. The  three  firms  that  operate  the  street  sweeping  and  refuse  collection
service in Sao Paulo report to the Regional Administrations  (bodies that
administer  the  city's  districts),  which  are  responsible  for  authorizing  payments
and monitoring  contract  performance  in accordance  with measurable  variables.
The  city's  waste  management  department  is  responsible  for  overseeing  competitive
bidding,  hiring  contractors,  and  supervising  the  private  services.  A key  factor
in the success  of this arrangement  is the ability  of the waste management
department  to negociate  contract  conditions  with  private  firms  on the  basis  of
its  broad  knowledge  of unit  costs  and performance  standards.
4.26  In  Adana,  Turkey,  the  municipality  hires  two  private  firms  to  collect
75  percent  of  the  city's  wastes. The  municipality  works  in  one  part  of the  city
while  the  private  contractors  operate  in  a  different  area. Despite  the  reported
ij/  Emanuel  S. Savas,  Privatization. (Chatham,  New Jersey:  Chatham  House
Publishers,  Inc.,  1987),  p. 124.
/  ~Ibid.,  p. 125.
j/  Ibid.,  p. 131.
2/  Luiz  Costa  Leite,  "Private  and Public  Services: Different  Approaches  to
Solid  Waste  Management  in  Sao  Paulo  and  Rio  de  Janeiro,"  unpublished  INURD
paper,  May 1989.- 36 -
constraints  in  the  private  service  (i.e.,  weak interest  and  consequent  lack  of
adequate  competition  in the tendering  process),  the private  sector  costs for
cleansing  services are almost three times lower than the costs of service
provided  by the  municipality;  productivity  of labor  in the  private  firms  is  up
to  four  times  higher  than  that  of  the  municipal  service.  To  motivate  the  private
sector  in Adana,  one case study  reportY  highlights  the  need for  clarification
in the contracts regarding task descriptions  and agreement on appropriate
performance  levels for meeting sanitation  and efficiency  requirements.  To
initiate  privatization  in  general,  contracts  should  be flexible  and  attractive
enough  to the  private  sector  to encourage  competitive  bidding  and thus reduce
prices. Contracts  also  should  be  long  enough  to  allow  a  contractor  to  depreciate
equipment  purchases  for  the  contract's  execution. Further  research  is  required
to determine  the range  of conditions  under  which private  sector  delivery  of
services  is  most feasible.  Nonetheless,  the  objective  always  should  be to  avoid
monopolistic  conditions  and  create  contestable  markets.
Small  and  Intermediate  Cities
4.27  For improving  service  delivery  in small  and intermediate  cities,
where there is no private provision  of services  and weak institutions,  an
appropriate authority at  the  national level  (e.g., Ministry of  Health,
Environment,  or Public Works) should be  assigned responsibility  for MSWM
planning,  developing  standards,  and  providing  technical  and  financial  assistance
to  small  and  medium-sized municipalities.  In  some  cases,  financial
intermediaries,  such  as  municipal  development  banks,  also  can  have  an important
role in supporting  comprehensive  MSWM activities  in cities  that  have no other
opportunities  to obtain  credit. The involvement  of these  national  sectoral  or
financial  institutions  will promote  nationwide  coverage  of MSWM services  and
maximum  protection  of the  environment.
4.28  Whatever institutional  scheme  is adopted for large or small  and
intermediate  cities, project  designers  should  ensure that there is a clear
organizational  structure  with  defined  responsibilities  and  staff,  an  established
means  for  continuous  communication  and  coordination  among  all  solid  waste-related
agencies,  and  the  ability  to  secure  the  necessary  resources  (budget  and  qualified
staff)  to  sustain  operations  and  maintenance.  The institutional  structure  also
must incorporate  an ongoing  planning  function  as well as effective  budgeting,
cost  accounting,  and  management  information  systems  that  include  monitoring  of
collection  performance.  Lastly, if the implementation  of a MSWM component
requires institutional  changes to effectively  execate an  improved refuse
management  system,  project designers  should  insist that these  changes occur
before  any  equipment  is  purchased.
j/  A. Durak  and  K. Sorgun,  "Solid  Waste  Collection:  The Case  of Adana,"  in
Management  Options  for  Urban  Services: Report  on a  Seminar  held  at Cesme.
Turkev  on November  11-20.  1985,  Washington,  D.C.: The  World  Bank,  1986.- 37 -
D.  Financing.  Pricing,  and  Cost  Recovery
4.29  As  mentioned earlier, MSWM is a  costly service that requires
specialized  equipment  and  facilities  and  usually  accounts  for  between  20  and  50
percent of municipal operating  budgets.  In planning  MSWM components,  more
attention  should  be  directed  to  the  problem  of  financing  capital  investment  costs
(i.e.,  facilities,  equipment,  land)  and recurring  costs (i.e.,  operations  and
maintenance,  debt  service)  of  solid  waste  collection  and  disposal.  The  following
sections  discuss  arrangements  for  financing  these  expenditures  as  well  as  pricing
and  cost recovery  implications.
Financing
4.30  In determining  appropriate  financial  mechanisms,  project  designers
should  take  into  account  that  MSWM  activities  are  recurring  cost-intensive.  The
solid waste service involves  large  numbers of municipal  workers as well as
substantial  operations  and  maintenance  costs. Moreover,  the  recurring  costs  of
this  service  encompass  large  expenditures  for  replacing  specialized  collection
equipment  every  seven  to eight  years. Thus,  the  municipal  solid  waste  service
needs  access  to funds  on a  regular  basis  to finance  operations  and  maintenance
as  well  as  the  replacement  of  essential  equipment. In  addition  to  this  funding,
however,  the  service  also  requires  financing  for  the  initial  capital  investments
in resource  recovery  plants,  land for transfer  and disposal  facilites,  and a
fleet  of  new collection  vehicles.
4.31  To finance  the  recurring  costs  of solid  waste  management,  the  solid
waste  service  generally  obtains  funds  from  the  municipality's  current  revenues,
which  include local  taxes and  intergovernmental  transfers, and  in  some
situations,  user charges.  In many developing  countries,  however,  there is
limited  scope  for  collecting  user  charges  for  MSWM (see  section  on pricing  and
cost recovery). Thus,  most recurring  costs  will need to be financed  through
local  taxes  and transfers.
4.32  To  finance the  capital investment costs  of  MSWM,  municipal
governments  have three  principal  options:  making  arrangements  with existing
financial  intermediaries  (e.g.,  municipal  development  banks)  that can extend
loans  to  municipalities  for  this  purpose;  establishing  a special  loan  or grant
program  through  the  central  government  budget  system;  and establishing  sinking
funds  to finance  the  planned  replacement  of collection  vehicles. In  addition,
grants  or loans  from  bilateral  agencies  may  be available  to  finance  the  purchase
of  collection  vehicles. Based  on  prior  experience  in  many  developing  countries,
however,  there  are  risks  associated  with this  latter  type  of  assistance.  Where
there is bilateral support,  municipalities  often encounter problems with
inappropriate  imported  equipment  requiring  high maintenance  costs.  Financing
from municipal revenues  is rarely an option since this source is already
overburdened  by the  large  recurrent  costs  of  MSWM and  other  urban  services.
4.33  In  determining  the  most  effective  arrangements  for  financing  improved
solid  waste services,  from storage  and collection  through  disposal,  project
designers  or  their  consultants  should  analyze  the  local  municipal  finance  system,- 38 -
the system  of lending  for municipal  capital  investment,  and local  demand  for
solid  waste  services. Where  there  is  limited  potential  for  increasing  revenues
through  user  charges  and  inadequate  local  revenues  to  cover  the  costs  of  improved
MSWM  services,  most  MSWM  components  will  need  to  be attached  to  urban  management
projects  that  focus  on improving  local  revenue  generation,  cost  accounting,  and
municipal  budgetary  planning  and  control. To  successfully  estimate  and  recover
the  costs  of  MSWM through  local  revenues,  as well as  user charges,  these  urban
management  projects  should  direct  special  attention  to improving  the  recording
of all  MSWM costs  (i.e.,  equipment,  operations,  maintenance,  depreciation,  and
debt service) in the  responsible  institutions.  Moreover, the financial
arrangements for  MSWM  components should provide for  continuous funding
specifically  for  solid  waste  services.
Pricinj  and  Cost  Recovery
4.34  In  determining  how  to  recover  costs  for  MSWM,  project  designers  must
take into  account  that the  solid  waste  service  is a private  good as well as a
public  good.  Solid  waste  collection  is a private  and  public  good  because it
serves  the  interests  of individual  householders  or enterprises  and  has  positive
impacts  on public  health  and  the  local  environment. Thus,  in  determining  cost
recovery  arrangements  for  solid  waste  collection,  project  designers  should  plan
to recover  some portion  of the costs from the beneficiaries  of the private
benefits;  the  public  benefits  of solid  waste  collection  can  be paid for  by the
municipality. By contrast,  the  provision  of solid  waste  transfer  and disposal
is  largely  a  public  good  because  the  principal  benefits  of these  services  (i.e.,
impacts  on environmental  quality  and public  health)  are external.  Thus, in
principle, the costs for providing this service should be paid for on a
collective  basis.
4.35  In  determining  the  most  appropriate  scheme  for  recovering  the  costs
of municipal  solid  waste services,  there  are two  basic financial  instruments:
(i)  general  municipal  revenues,  which  include  local  taxes  and  intergovernmental
transfers,  and (ii)  user  charges,  which  include  benefit  taxes  (mandatory  solid
waste  charges)  and  voluntary  fees (tariffs)  billed  directly  to che  properties
receiving  the service,  added to oc:her  urban service  billings,  or added as a
surcharge  on  property,  business,  or other  local  taxes. To recover  the  costs  of
MSWM,  more than  one  of these  insLyuments  usually  will  be  needed. The  selection
of each instrument  should  be based largely  on a consideration  of the  type of
service  provided  - collection  or transfer  and  disposal.
4.36  Solid Waste Collection.  To recover the costs of solid waste
collection  operations,  the  most  commonly  used  instruments  are  local  taxes,  user
charges,  or  some  combination  of  local  taxes  and  user  charges.  The  type  and  level
of user charges  to be applied  will depend  on the  beneficiary. For example,
industrial  and  commercial  enterprises  generally  view solid  waste  collection  as
a  private  good  and  have  much  variation  in  the  level  of service  required;  thus,
they can  be charged  variable  tariffs  to cover the full  cost of providing  the
desired  level  of service.  The  charge  for  this  service  can  be based  on:  actual
or  estimated  quantity  and  type  of  waste  collected,  frequency  of  collection,  kind
of business,  and/or  area  of buildings  or  property.- 39 -
4.37  In residential  areas,  municipalities  should  attempt  to recover  all
or  a  portion  of  their  solid  waste  costs  through  mandatory  user  charges  or  benefit
taxes. In  establishing  an  equitable  basis  for  setting  charges,  the  municipality
has two  general  options. One  alternative  is  to charge  a mandatory  fixed  user
charge  based on one or more measures  of service  level,  i.e.,  number  of waste
containers,  frequency  of collection,  distance  from containers  to collection
vehicles,  and type and quantity  of waste.  This scheme  would be applied to
homogeneous  neighborhoods;  higher  income  neighborhoods  would  be  charged  a fixed
fee for a higher service  level than lower income  neighborhoods,  which would
receive  a lower  level  of service  for  a lower  price.  In low--ncome  areas,  the
municipality  should  provide  a basic  level  of service  that is adapted  to local
needs  and traditions  and allows  for  some degree  of payment,  either  in cash or
in kind.  The remainder  of the costs for collection  in these areas can be
subsidized  by local  revenues. In some  cases,  user  charges  from  commercial  and
industrial  enterprises  that  pay  for  high quality  individualized  service  can  be
set  high  enough  to allow  a  municipality  to extend  service  to low-income  areas.
4.38  Where neighborhoods  are not homogeneous,  users can be charged
variable  fees  based  on one or more measures  of household  income  (e.g.,  number
of rooms,  floor  space  of buildings,  and  property  values). In establishing  the
rate  structure  based  on  income,  however,  project  designers  will  need  to  consider
the  reliability,  availability,  and  accessibility  of  property  data. Where  there
are  inadequate  data,  as  is  the  case  in  most  developing  countries,  the  charge  for
solid  waste  collection  should  be based  largely  on service  level.
4.39  As an alternative  to charging  benefit  taxes  to recover  solid  waste
collection  costs,  municipalities  or private  solid  waste services  can collect
residential  user charges  only from those  willing  to pay.  Where there is a
perceived  need to have garbage  removed  and a consequent  fine if the refuse
remains  on or near the property,  residents  can be expected  to pay for the
collection  service  or  haul their  wastes  to  designated  transfer/disposal  sites.
The  generation  of significant  revenues  from  these  beneficiaries,  however,  will
be largely  dependent  on  the  system's  capacity  to  provide  a  high  level  of  service
and  to enforce  anti-dumping  regulations. In some  cases,  it  may  be possible  to
collect user  charges only  from those willing to  pay  for  high  quality
individualized  service;  the  costs  of  providing  a  basic  level  of service  in  other
areas  could  be financed  by local  revenues. Where  there  is an inelastic  demand
for  solid  waste  services,  user  charges  for  high  quality  services  can  be set  high
enough  to subsidize  collection  services  in other  parts  of the city.  Although
the  collection  of  voluntary  user  charges  has-proven  effective  in  many  cities  in
the  United  States,  there  is limited  experience  in  developing  countries. A few
examples  in  Guatamala  and  Mexico  shows  that  there  is  a  problem  of  illegal  dumping
by those  who  choose  not  to  pay  or  cart  their  wastes  to  municipal  disposal  sites.
4.40  Although  project  designers  should  attempt  to  recover  the  recurring
costs  of solid  waste  collection  to the  maximum  extent  possible,  there  will be
situations  where  the  application  of  user  charges  will  not  be feasible. In  these
situations,  municipalities  will need to continue to pay  for solid waste
collection  entirely  out  of local  taxes. Normally,  the  cost  will be recovered
through  the  property  tax.- 40 -
4.41  The mode of billing for solid waste collection  services (i.e.
separate  charge,  addition  to other  urban service  bills,  or surcharge  on local
taxes)  will have an effect  on the  cost of collection  as well as the ease of
enforcement. For  example,  a separate  charge  billed  directly  to the  consumer  is
the  most  expensive  approach. The  administrative  cost  of  billing  and  collecting
charges  will increase  significantly  the  overall  cost of MSWM.  In the United
States,  for  example,  this  increase  has  been estimated  to  be as  high  as 10  to 15
percent  of the  cost  of refuse  collection.9'  Moreover,  separate  user  charges  are
the  most difficult  to collect.  In the absence  of a legal  basis for imposing
fines or other penalties for non-payment,  or if the enforcement  of  these
penalties  is  deficient,  some  service  recipients  will  have  no incentive  to pay.
In  most  cases,  the  municipality  will  continue  to  collect  refuse  from  non-paying
beneficiaries  to  prevent  unsanitary  neighborhood  conditions.
4.42  The more  effective  approach  to  billing  for  solid  waste  services  is
attaching  solid  waste  fees  to  existing  water,  electricity,  or  other  urban  service
bills.  This system is less costly to administer  (generally,  three to five
percent  of collection  costs  based on experience  in the  United States)  ,2  and
easier to enforce.  If the solid waste charges  are not paid, the water or
electricity  service can be withheld.  The effectiveness  of this approach,
however,  will depend  on the  cooperation  of the  corresponding  service  agency  as
well  as the  coverage  and  collection  performance  of the  billing  qystem. In some
situations,  a  private  collection  agent  can  be  contracted  to  pert  .D joint  billing
operations  for  several  municipal  services.
4.43  Incorporating  solid  waste charges into  the property  tax or other
local  tax  bill,  either  as a separate  line item or combined  within the  entire
property  tax bill, is the least expensive  mode of billing for solid  waste
collection. Since  the tax  will be ccllected  whether  or not it finances  solid
waste services,  there is no additional  cost for collecting  the solid  waste
charge. Tax collection  performance,  however,  will depend  on the  coverage  and
effectiveness  of the  local  tax  system.
4.44  Solid  Waste  Transfer  and  Disposal. Since  solid  waste  transfer  and
disposal  impart  only public  benefits,  the recurring  costs  of these  operations
should  be  recovered  largely  through  local  taxes  and  intergovernmental  transfers.
If solid  waste  collection  is  privately  financed  or executed  by an entity  other
than  the  one  carrying  out transfer  and  disposal  operations,  however,  the  costs
for  transfer  and  disposal  may  be recovered  through  tipping  fees,  a  direct  charge
for  recovering  the  costs  of operating  a transfer  or disposal  facility.
4.45  Tipping fees are based on volumc,  weight,  and sometimes  type of
waste;  they  can  be used  most successfully  where  there  is  a shortage  of landfill
sites, public and government  concern for protecting the environment,  and
2/  E.S. Savas,  Daniel  Baumol  and William  A. Wells, "Financing  Solid  Waste
Collection,"  in  The  Organization  and  Efficiency  of  Solid  Waste  Collection,
E.S. Savas  (Lexington:  Lexington  Books,  1977),  p. 87.
1Q/  Ibid  .- 41 -
effective enforcement  of  anti-dumping  regulations.  Nonetheless, in most
developing  countries,  where these conditions  do not exist, the charging  of
separate  disposal  fees  may  encourage  uncontrolled  dumping.  Where  there  is  broad-
based local public concern for environmental  protection,  however, all or a
portion  of the  costs  for  safe  disposal  facilities  could  be financed  through  the
ueer fees  normally  charged  for  collection  services.
4.46  Based  on the  review  of  World  Bank  lending  for  MSWM,  there  is  little
experience  in charging  fees  for  disposal. Moreover,  most residents  and local
governments  are  concerned  only  about  having  their  wastes  removed  and  assign  low
priority  to  how  the  wastes  are  disposed  of. Thus,  a  substantial  portion  of  costs
for  transfer  and  environmentally  safe  disposal  may  need to  be recovered  through
special  intergovernmental  transfers.  In  planning  the  financial  arrangements  for
regional disposal facilities,  project designers should make  a  realistic
assessment  of how much the  participating  municipalities  can and  will share  in
the  costs  of safe  disposal  and then  estimate  transfer  needs. The  use  of these
transfers  in  financing  regional  disposal  facilities  may  be  justified  on  the  basis
of meeting  national  environmental  objectives.
E.  Land  Acquisition
4.47  The availability  and accessibility  of environmentally  acceptable
sites  for transfer  stations,  landfills,  recycling  facilities,  and  other  solid
waste-related  facilities  is another aspect of MSWM that requires  priority
attention. To improve  the  implementation  of  MSWM components,  project  designers
should  ensure  that  there  are  appropriate  sites  for the  planned  facilities  and
that  these  sites  will  be available  for  the  timely  execution  of the  solid  waste
management  improvements.  (For information  on selecting  suitable  sites for
landfills,  see "Landfilling  Wastes:  A Technical  Memorandum  for the  Disposal  of
Waste," Department of  the  Environment Waste  Management Paper  no.  26.)
Accordingly,  nroject designers  should insist  on making land acquisition  a
condition  of loan effectiveness. To meet this requirement,  the process  of
selecting  and  acquiring  sites  could  take  place  as part  of an earlier  project  in
the  same  country,  _inanced  by project  preparation  funds.
F.  Phasing  of  MSWM Improvements
4.48  Future  Bank investments  in  MSWM should  be phased  so as to reflect
the objectives  arid  constraints  of each project  city or larger  planning  area.
Unless  there  is  an existing  solid  waste  plan,  however,  the  first  phase  of Bank
involvement  will  consist  of  financing  for  the  preparation  of  the  strategic  solid
waste plan and execution  of key institutional  improvements.  If there are
critical  collection  equipment  shortages  in a city, the first  phase also may
include  financing  for  a limited  number  of replacement  vehicles,  including  spare
parts.  The second  stage  of investment  would  occur  after  the  solid  waste  plan
is formally  adopted  and important  institutional  adjustments  are accomplished.
At this time, the Bank could finance  foreign  equipment  and construction  of
maintenance  shops,  transfer  stations,  and  non-polluting  disposal  facilities  to
expand  citywide  solid  waste  setvices. Other  program  elements  may  include  pilot
projects,  public  educational  activities,  and  further  institutional  strengthening.
Subsequent  phases  of World  Bank investment  could  finance  solid  waste  services42 -
in  other  jurisdictions;  finance  construction  of  strategic  facilities;  or  support
the  implementation  of new solid  waste  programs.
C.  Research  Needs
4.49  Several  areas  for research  on MSWM can  be identified  based  on the
above analysis and discussion.  In order of priority, the following items
summarize  the  recommended  topics  for  investigation:
(a)  Relative  Magnitude  of Damages and Benefits  Versus Cost of
Providing  Strvice.  If  improvements  are  to  be  achieved  in  MSWM,
particularly  in  providing  safer  disposal,  it  is  essential  that
the  environmental  and  public health benefits be  better
quantified.  Although it may not be  possible to obtain
sufficient  information  for  detailed  cost-benefit  evaluations,
a  broader  understanding  of  the  relative  magnitude  of  the  costs
and benefits of upgraded services  would permit a better
approximation  of  the  economic  rate  of return  of  MSWM  projects.
It also  would  facilitate  the  ranking  of solid  waste  projects
in  comparison  to  that  of other  investments  in  urban  services.
(b)  Pricing  Strategies  for  Improved  Cost  Recovery. As discussed
in  the  sec-ion  on  pricing  and  cost  recovery,  the  objective  in
setting  prices  for  solid  waste  services  should  be to recover
as  much  of the  cost  of  providing  the  service  as  possible  given
local demand characteristics. To better evaluate  pricing
strategies,  research  should  focus  on discriminatory  pricing
approaches  (e.g.,  charges  based  on  quantity  and  type  of  wastes
collected  for  commercial  or  industrial  consumers;  charges  based
on  the  quality  of  services provided  in  upper-income
neighborhoods);  separable  demand  approaches  (e.g.,  charge  for
collection  services  where  there  is  relatively  inelastic  demand,
use local taxes or intergovernmental  transfers  to pay for
disposal); and  intra-urban  cross-subsidies  (e.g., charge
commercial  and  upper  income  residential  customers  sufficiently
for  high  quality  services  so  that  minimum  acceptable  collection
services  can  be extended  to low-income  peri-urban  areas).
(c)  Private  Sector  Delivery  of Solid  Waste Services. Given the
poor track  record  of public  solid  waste  services,  there  is  a
need  to  look  to  the  private  sector  to  achieve  efficiency  gains.
Since  an examination  of Bank  experience  to date  revealed  few
concrete  examples,  further  investigation  of  private  solid  waste
service  arrangements  in  developing  countries  should  be  carried
out  to  develop  guidelines  for  determining  how,  where,  and  under
what  circumstances  the  role  of the  private  sector  in  this  sub-
sector  can  be expanded.- 43 -
(d)  APEX Institutions  for  MSWM.  Institutional  strengthening  is
a  prerequisite  to  improved  solid  waste  service  delivery. Even
if the  private  sector  assumes  a larger  role,  there  still  will
be a  need  for  a  metropolitan  area-wide  institution  to  conduct
comprehensive  planning  and  to contract  and  oversee  services.
At the  country  level,  a  national  solid  waste  authority  may  be
needed  to  plan,  develop  standards,  and  provide  technical  and
financial  assistance  to municipalities.  To determine the
effectiveness of  different  approaches  in  centralizing
normative,  planning,  and  technical  assistance  responsibilities
while  decentralizing  investment  decisions  and  operations,  an
evaluation  of the various  approaches  (e.g.,  national  solid
waste  authority,  municipal  development  banks)  supported  by  Bank
projects  should  be performed.
(e)  Strategic  Planning  ADDrcaches, A strategic  MSWM  plan should
be  a  prerequisite  to  all  significant  investments  in  solid  waste
management. To improve  the  planning  of solid  waste  services
and related  management  activities  in large  as well as small
and  intermediate  cities,  research  is  needed  on the  framework
and methodologies  for developing  strategic  MSWM plans (as
described in paragraph 4.04).  The  use  of  interactive
microcomputer  models  to assist  in the  planning  process  also
should  be investigated.
The  INU  research  plan  currently  includes  studies  on  health  impacts  of inadequate
waste  disposal,  private  sector  service  delivery,  and  strategic  planning.- 44  -
ANNEX  I
ADDITIONAL  TABLESTABLE  1.1 -
LENDING  FOR SOLID  WASTES  CO0PARED  TO URBAN  AND TOTAL  LENDING.  FY74-88
FISCAL YEAR
URBAN SUBSECTORS  - TOTALS
FY74  FY75  FY76  FY77  FY78  FY79  FY80  FY81  FY82  FY83  FY84  FY85  FY86  FY87  FY88
Urban  Development  (million  USS)  113  93  80  158  369  310  349  501  315  554  500  385  1,118  1,469  1,716  8,088
Water  SuppLy  4  Sewerage  (million  USS)  174  145  335  301  375  1,019  631  535  441  811  641  7U1  605  969  535  8,297
Urban  Subtotat  (million  USS)  287  238  414  459  744  1,328  980  1,036  816  1,365 1,141  1,165  1,722  2,439  2,252  16,385
NSW. Subconponents  (million  USS)  2  48  0  0  19  55  12  13  51  39  29  10  177  21  55  532
NSWM  as Percent  of  Urban  (%)  0.8  20.3  0.0  0.0  2.6  4.2  1.3  1.3  6.3  2.8  2.5  0.8  10.2  0.9  2.5  3.2 0%
Total  Bank Lending  (billion  USS)  4.3  5.9  6.6  7.1  8.4  10.0  11.5  12.3  13.0  14.5  15.5  14.4  16.3  17.7  19.2  176.7
Urban  as  Percent  of  Total  (X)  6.6  4.0  6.2  6.5  8.8  13.3  8.5  8.4  6.3  9.4  7.3  8.1  10.6  13.8  11.7  9.3
NSWM  as  Percent  of  Total  (X)  0.06  0.82  0.00  0.00  0.23  0.55  0.11  0.11  0.39  0.27  0.16  0.07  1.08  0.12  0.29  0.30TABLE  1.2
SOLID  WASTE  MANAGEMENT  SUBCOMPONENTS  FOR  PROJECTS  IN  AFRICA
SYST  PRCS  LOW- No.  OF
TECH  INST  /OPS  STOR TSPT LAND RSRC  INCH  SUBCOM-
COUNTRY  PROJECT  TITLE  ASST  STRN  IMPY  CLCT  TRSF  FILL  RCYY  FCUS PONENTS  COMPONENT  DESCRIPTION
Benin  Cotonou  Water/Sanitary  Eng  Project  (X)  X  X  3  SOLID AND  SLUDGE  TRUCKS,  STWDIES
Burk.Faso  Urban  Development  Project  X  X  2  TRUCKS,  TRAINING, AND  OPERATIONS  START-UP
Burundi  Urban Development  Project  (X)  X  X  X  X  5  TRUCKS/EQUIPMENT/DISCHARGE  PNT IMPROVENENT
Djibouti  Urban  Development  Project  X  X  X  3  TRUCKS/EQUIPMENT  AND  TRAINING
Gambia  Urban  Management/DeveLopment  Project  X  1  COLLECTION  POINTS
Guinea  Conakry  Urban  Development  Project  X  X  X  X  4  TRUCKS/EQUIPHENT,  RAINT,  TECH  ASST,  TRAINING
Ivory  Coast  Second Urban  Project  X  1  TRUCKS
Kenya  Site  and  Service  Project  X  1  HARDSTANDINGS  PROVIDED
Lesotho  Urban  Development  Project  X  X  2  COLLECTION  EQUIPMENT
Liberia  Monrovia  Urban  Development  Project  (X)  X  X  3  COLLECTION  POINTS,  VEHICLES,  EQNNT,  STUDY
Madagascar  Antananarivo  Water  and  San  Project  X  X  X  X  4  COLLECTION  BINS,  EQUIPMENT  AND  COMPOSTING
Mali  Mali  Urban Development  Project  X  X  X  X  4  TRUCKS  AND  ASSISTANCE
Mauritius  Urban  Rehab & Stormdrainage  Project  X  X  X  X  4  EQUIPMENT  AND  TRAINING
Nigeria  Urban  Development  Project  X  X  2  TRUCKS  AND BINS
Nigeria  Anambra  Water/Sanitation  Report  X  X  X  X  X  5  TRUCKS,  COLLECTION,  CIVILS,  TECH  ASSISTANCE
Nigeria  Lagos  SWI and  Stormdrainage  Project  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  7  EQWNT,  TRANSFERS,  BINS,  DEMO,  TECH  ASSISTANCE
Nigeria  Infrastructure  Development  Fund  X  X  X  X  X  5  MSWN IMPROVEMENTS  AND  EQUIPMENT  FOR  3  STATES
Uganda  Water  Supply  & Sanitation  Rehab  (X)  X  X  3  EQUIPMENT  ,TECHNICAL  ASSISTANCE
Zambia  Lusaka  Squatter  Upgrade/Site  Service  X  X  2  TRUCKS  AND  EQUIPMENT
TOTAL  FOR  AFRICA  REGION:  12  7  6  19  3  6  1  7  61
SUBCOMPONENT  INCLUSION  CX)  63  37  32  100  19  38  6  44
KEY:  TECH  ASST  x  Technical  Assistance  TSPT  TRSF  =  Transport/Transfer  X  = Significant  Component
INST  STRN  =  Institutional  Strengthening  LAND  FILL  =  Land  Fill  Operations  (X)  =  Minor  Component
SYST/OPS  IMPV  =  Systems/Operations  Improvement  PRCS  RESC  RCVY  = Processing/Resource  Recovery  (eg.  Study  Only)
STOR  CLCT  =  Storage/Collection  LOW-INCH  FCUS =  Low-income  FocusTABLE 1.3
SOLID WASTE  MANAGENENI  SUSCOMPONENTS  FOR  PROJECTS  IN  ASIA
SYST  PRCS LOU-  No.  OF
TECH  INST  /OPS  STOR TSPT  LAND  RSRC INCH  SUBCOM-
COUNTRY  PROJECT  TITLE  ASST  STRN  IMPV  CLCT  TRSF  FILL  RCVY FCUS PONENTS  COMPONENT  DESCRIPTION
Bangladesh  Urban  Development  Project  X  X  X  x  X  5  COLLECTION,  LANDFILLING,  PILOT  LAND  RECLAMATION
India  Calcutta  Urban  Development  Project  X  X  2  SUPPORT  OPERATIONS
India  Second  Calcutta  Urban  Dev  Project  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  8  COMPREHENSIVE  IMPROVEMENT  SCHEMES  AND  PILOT
India  Second  Madras  Urban  Dev Project  (X)  (X)  2  COLLECTION  AND  TRANSPORT  PLANNING
India  Kanpur  Urban  Development  Project  X  X  X  X  X  5  EQUIPMENT,  UORKSHOP  AND  DEPOT
India  Third  Calcutta  Urban  Dev  Project  X  X  X  X  X  X  6  COLLECTION,  TRANSFER,  DISPOSAL,  PROCESSING
India  Madhya  Pradesh  Urban  Dev Project  X  X  2  TECHNICAL  SUPPORT
India  BaoTbay  Urban  Development  Project  X  X  2  COLLECTION  EQUIPMENT,  BINS,  WORKSHOPS
India  Ut,ar  Pradesh Urban  Dev Project  X  X  X  3  GENERAL  IMPROVEMENTS  ON EXISTING  COMPOST
Irdonesia  Jakarta  &  Urban Development  Project  X  X  2  IMPROVENENT  OF SW1 IN  LOU INCOME  AREAS
Indonesia  Third  Urban Development  Project  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  7  HANDCARTS,  EQUIPMENT,  TRANSFER  STN, PILOT
Indonesia  Fourth  Urban  Development  Project  X  X  X  3  TECHNICAL  SUPPORT
Indonesia  Fifth  Urban  Development  Project  X  X  X  X  X  K  6  COMPREHENSIVE  EXPANSION  s
Philippines Third  Urban  Development  Project  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  7  TRUCXS,  CARTS,  TRANSFERS  AND  SORTING  YARDS
Philippines  Regional  Cities  Development  Project  X  X  X  X  4  EQUIPMENT  AND  TECHNICAL  ASSISTANCE
Philippines  Municipal  Development  Project  X  X  X  3  DUMP  SITES  AND  EQUIPMENT
Singapore  Envirormental  Control  Project  X  X  X  3  INCINERATOR  AND  VEHICLES
Sri  Lanka  Second Water  Sply  & Sew Project  (X)  1  SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT  STUDY  FOR  COLOMBO
Sri  Lanka  Municipal  Management  Project  (x)  I  INITIAL  SOLID WASTE  MANAGEMENT  IMPROVEMENTS
Sri  Lanka  Emergency Recons.  & Rehab.  Project  X  X  2  VEHICLES  FOR  7 TOWNS  (56  TRUCXS,  400  HANDCARTS)
Thailand  Regional  Cities  Development  Project  X  X  X  X  4  EQUIPMENT  AND  TECHNICAL  ASSISTANCE
TOTALS  FOR  ASIA  REGION:  11  6  7  20  7  9  7  11  78
SUBCOMPONENT  INCLUSION  X):  53  29  33  95  33  43  33  53
KEY:  TECH  ASST  =  Technical  Assistance  TSPT  TRSF  =  Transport/Transfer  X  = Significant  Corponent
INST  STRN  =  Institutional  Strengthening  LAND  FILL  = Land  Fill  Operations  (X)  = Minor  Component
SYST/OPS  IMPV  =  Systems/Operations  Improvement  PRCS  RESC  RCVY  = Processing/Resource  Recovery  (eg.  Study  Only)
STOR  CLCT  =  Storage/Collection  LOW-INCH  FCUS = Low-Income  FocusTABLE 1.4
SOLID  WASTE  MANAGEMENT  SUBCLOW!  ENTS  FOR  PROJECTS  IN  ENEMA
SYST  PRCS LOU-  No.  OF
TECH  INST  /OPS  STOR TSPT  LAND RSRC  INCH  SUBCON-
COUNTRY  PROJECT  TITLE  ASST  STRN  IMPV  CLCT  TRSF  FILL  RCVY FCUS PONENTS  COMPONENT  DESCRIPTION
Afghanistan  Kabul  Water/Sanitation  Project  X  (X)  2  LATRINES  AND NIGHT  SOIL  COLLECTION
Egypt  Urban  Development  Project  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  7  COMPOST,  WORKSHOPS,  DEPOTS,  VEHICLES,  TECH  ASST
Egypt  Greater  Cairo  Urban  Dev  Project  X  X  2  CONSULTANT  SERVICES  AND PILOT PROJECT
Jordan  Tourism  Project  X  X  2  EQUIPMENT  FOR  SANITARY  LANDFILL, VEHICLES
Jordan  Amman  Transp  I  Municipal  Dev Project  XX  X  X  5  VEHICLES,  EQUIPMENT  FOR  4  LANDFILLS,  STUDY
Lebanon  Reconstruction  Project  X  I  REHAB  OF SOLID UASTE  TREATMENT  PLANT  (BILAT)
Morocco  Rabat Urban  Development  Project  X  X  X  3  LOW INCOME  INFRASTRUCTURE
Morocco  Second Urban Development  Project  X  X  2  COLLECTION  EQUIPMENT  AND  VEHICLE  DEPOT
Pakistan  Lahore  Urban Development  Project  (X)  X  X  X  X  X  X  7  BINS,  EOPMNT,  UORKSHOPS,  TRANSFERS,  TECH  ASST
Pakistan  Karachi  Special  Development  Project  X  X  X  X  4  VEHICLES,  EQUIPMENT,  WORKSHOPS,  LANDFILL  SITES
Tunisia  Second Urban Development  Project  X  X  X  X  X  X  (X)  X  a  LOW  COST  SWN, TRANSFER  SINS,  PILOT COWUST
Turkey  Cukurova  Region Urban  Eng Project  (X)  1  STUDIES
Turkey  Cukurova Urban  Development  Project  X  X  X  X  X  X  6  COLLECTION,  DISPOSAL  WITH  CONMPOSTING  PLANT
---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  -- _-ND
TOTALS  FOR  ENENA  REGION:  9  5  5  10  4  6  5  6  50
SUBCOMPONENT  INCLUSION  6X)  69  38  38  77  31  46  38  46
KEY:  TECH  ASST  - Technical  Assistance  TSPT TRSF  - Transport/Transfer  X  - Significant  Component
INST  STRN  - Institutional  Strengthening  LAND  FILL  - Land  FiLl  Operations  (X)  - Minor  Component
SYSTIOPS  IMPV  - Systams/OperatLons  Improvement  PRCS  RESC  RCVY  - Processing/Resource  Recovery  (eg.  Study  Only)
STOR CLCT  - Storage/Collection  LOW-INCM  FCUS  - Lou-Income  FocusTABLE 1.5
SOLID WASTE  MANAGEMENT  SUBCOMPONENTS  FOR  PROJECTS  IN  LAC
SYST  PRCS LOU-  No.  OF
TECH  INST  /OPS  STOR TSPT  LAND RSRC  INCH  SUBCOM-
COUITRY  PROJECT  TITLE  ASST  STRN  IMPV  CLCT  TRSF  FILL  RCVY  FCUS PONENTS COMPONENT  DESCRIPTION
Argentina  MRmicipal  Developent  Project  X  X  2  EQUIPMENT
Bahamas  Urban  Development  Project  X  X  X  3  EOUIPMENT,  SHREDDERS,  DISPOSAL  SITES
8otivia  Urban  Development  Project  X  X  X  3  FLEET  MANAGEMENT,  NON-CONVENTIONAL  COLLECTION
Brazil  La  Paz Municipal  Development  Project  X  X  X  X  X  5  COMPREHENSIVE  COMPONENT,  PRIVATIZATION
Brazil  Medium-Sized  Cities  Project  X  X  X  X  X  5  COMPREHENSIVE  Sil  UPGRADING  FOR  3 CITIES
Brazil  Recife  Metropolitan  Dev.  Project  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  8  ESTABLISHMENT  OF COMPREHENSIVE  Sil  AGENCY
Brazil  Metropolitan  Development  Program  X  X  X  X  4  PILOT STUDY
Brazil  Rio  Flood  Reconstruction  Project  X  X  X  3  TRUCKS,  COMPOST  PLANTS
Brazil  Water  for  Mun.  & Low-income  Areas  X  X  2  UPCRADING  COLLECTION  IN  LOU-INCOME  AREAS
Colombia  Barrangquilla  Water  Supply  Project  X  X  X  X  X  5  UPGRADING  COLLECTION  SERVICE
Colombia  Water  *  Sewerage Sector  Project  X  X  2  STtIDIES, LINE OF CREDIT
Dom. Repub.  Sites  nd  Services  Project  X  1  TRASH  COLLECTION  ASSISTANCE
Dom.  Repub.  Santo  Domingo Tech Assce Project  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  7  COMPREHENSIVE  ASSISTANCE  PACKAGE  AND  PILOT  0
Mexico  Baja  California  Tourism  Project  X  X  X  3  TRLUCKS  AND  LANDFILL  EQUIPNENT
Mexico  Second Urban  & Regional  Dev Project  X  X  X  3  LANDFILL  SITES,  EaLIPMENT, TECH  ASSISTANCE
Mexico  Pollution  Control  Project  X  X  2  LANDFILL FOR  INIDUSTRIAL  SUIl, STUDIES
Mexico  Solid  Waste Management  Pilot  Project  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  8  STUDIES,  LINE Of  CREDIT, PILOT PROJECTS
Peru  Lima Metropolitan  Dev.  Project  X  X  X  X  K  K  K  7  COMPREHENSIVE  SUN  COMPONENT  AND  PILOT
TOTALS  FOR  LAC  REGION  10  8  7  16  4  11  5  12  73
SUBCOMPONENT  INCLUSION  (X)  :  56  44  39  89  22  61  28  67
KEY:  TECH  ASST  =  Technical  Assistance  TSPT  TRSF  = Transport/Transfer  X  = Significant  Component
INST STRN  =  Institutional  Strengthening  LAND  FILL  = Land  Fill  Operations  (X)  = Mlinor  Component
SYST/OPS  IMPV  Systems/Operations  Improvement  PRCS  RESC  RCVY  = Processing/Resource  Recovery  (eg.  Study  Only)
STOR  CLCT  - Storage/Collection  LOU-INCH  FCUS =  Low-Income FocusTABLE  1.6
DOCUMENTATION  FOR  SOLID  WASTE  MANAGEMENT  PROJECTS  IN  AFRICA
PROJECT  INFORKATION:  FINANCE  INFORMATION:  SOURCE  DOCUMENTS:
PROJECT  SiU
CREDIT/LOAN  APPROVAL  CLOSING  APPRAISAL  REPORT  COMPLETION  REPORT  WORKING
COUNTRY  PROJECT  TITLE  NUMBER  DATE  DATE  NUMBER  DATE  NUMBER  DATE  PAPERS?
Benin  Cotonou  Water/Sanitary  Eng  Project  CR 1171-BEN  JUN 25 81  JUN 30 87  3083-BEN  JUN 05  81  NO
Burkina  Faso  Urban  Development  Project  CR  766-BUR  JAN 03  78  DEC  31 85  1660a-WN  JAN 03  78  7032  DEC  01  87  NO
Burundi  Urban  Development  Project  CR 1049-BU  JUN 24 80  DEC  31 87  2854-BU  JUN 02  80  NO
Djibouti  Urban  Development  Project  CR 1518-DJI  SEP  11  84  JUN  30  91  5005-OJI  AUG 20 84  YES
Gambia  Urban  Management/Development  Project CR 1443-GM  MAR 06  84  DEC  03 91  4628-Gh  FEB 07  84  NO
Guinea  Conakry  Urban  Development  Project  CR 1466-GUI  MAY 01  84  DEC  31 90  47M7-GUI  APR 12 84  YES
Ivory  Coast  Second Urban  Project  LN 2048-IVC  AUG 25 81  DEC  31  87  3236a-IVC JUL 07  81  NO
Kenya  Site  and Service  Project  LN 1105-KE  APR 29 75  DEC  31 82  607A-KE  APR 14  75  NO
Lesotho  Urban  Development  Project  CR 1036-LSO  JUN  30  80  JUN  30 87  2640-LSO  APR 28  80  YES
Liberia  Monrovia  Urban  Development  Project  CR 1223-LR  APR 01  82  JUN  30 87  3384-LBR  NOV  30  81  NO
Madagascar  Antananarivo  Water and San  Project  CR 1002-MAG  APR 01 80  JUN  30 86  2266A-MAG  JAN 25  80  YES
Mali  Mali  Urban  Development  Project  CR  943-MLI  JUN  26 79  DEC  31 80  2444-MLI  MAY 29 79  YES
Mauritius  Urban  Rehab  & Stormdrainage  Project  LN 1926-MAS  DEC 09 80  DEC  31 86  3100-MAS  NOV 10  80  YES
Nigeria  Urban  Development  Project  LN 1767-UNI  NOV  13 79  JUN  30 86  2412-UNI  SEP 10 79  NO
Nigeria  Anambra  Water/Sanitation  Report  LN 2036-UNI  JUL  07 d1  SEP  30 88  3036-UNI  APR 28  81  YES
Nigeria  Lagos  SUN and  Stormdrainage  Project  LN 2620-UNI  SEP 19  85  DEC  31 90  4452-UNI  AUG 26  85  YES
Nigeria  Infrastructure  Development  Fund  LN 2925-UNT  MAR  29 88  DEC  31 94  6391-UNI  NOV 20  87  NO
Uganda  Water  Supply  & Sanitation  Rehab  CR 1510-UG  JUL 19  84  SEP  30 89  4968-UG  JUN  25  84  YES
Zambia  Lusaka  Squatter  Upgrade/Site  Service LN 1057-ZA  JUL  05 74  DEC  31 81  420a-ZA  JUN  24 74  YESTABLE  1.7
DOCUMENTATION  FOR  SOLID  UASTE  MANAGEMENT  PROJECTS  IN  ASIA
PROJECT  INFORMATION:  FINANCE  INFORMATION:  SCURCE  DOCUMENTS:
PROJECT  SUM
CREDIT/LOAN  APPROVAL  CLOSING  APPRAISAL  REPORT  COMPLETION  REPORT  WORKING
COUNTRY  PROJECT  TITLE  NLMBER  DATE  DATE  NUNBER  DATE  ULMER  DATE  PAPERS?
Bangladesh  Urban  Development  Project  CR 1930-BD  JUN 21  88  JUN 30 97  6287-BD  JUN 1  8  YES
India  Catcutta  Urban  Development  Project  CR  427-IN  AUG 14 73  DEC 31  79  159a-IN  JUL  27 73  4023  JUN  30  82  YES
India  Second  Calcutta  Urban  Dev  Project  CR  756-IN  DEC 13 77  AUG 08  84  1662a-IN  SEP 23  77  6970  SEP  30 87  NO
India  Second Madras Urban  Dev Project  CR 1082-IN  DEC 16 80  MAR  31  88  2893A-IN  NOV  26  80  NO
India  Kanpur Urban  Development  Project  CR 1185-IN  OCT 27 81  JUN 30  87  3504-IN  SEP 25  81  YES
India  Third  Calcutta  Urban  Dev Project  CR 1369-IN  MAY 19  83  MAR  31 89  4310-IN  MAR  30 83  YES
India  Madhya Pradesh  Urban  Dev Project  LN  2329-IN  JUN  28  83  JUN  30 89  4359-IN  JUN  08 83  YES
India  Bombay  Urban  Development  Project  CR 1544-IN  JAN 29  85  SEP 30  90  4794-IN  JAN 04  85  YES
India  Uttar  Pradesh  Urban  Dev Project  LN 2797-IN  APR  21  87  MAR  03  96  6458-IN  APR  02  87  YES
Indonesia  Jakarta  & Urban  Development  Project  LN  040-IND  SEP  17  74  DEC  31 80  475a-IND  AUG  30 74  4620  JUN  30 83  NO
Indonesia  Third  Urban  Devetopment  Project  LN 1653-IND  JAN  16  79  DEC  31 86  2211a-IlD  DEC 12  78  YES
Indonesia  Fourth  Urban Development  Project  LN 1972-IND  APR 21 81  SEP 30  87  3132a-IND  MAR  16 81  YES
Indonesia  Fifth  Urban  Development  Project  LN 2408-IND  MAY 08 84  DEC  31  90  4887-IND  APR 12 84  YES
Philippines  Third  Urban  Devetopment  Project  LN 1821-PH  MAR 25  80  DEC  31  87  2703-PH  FEB  26  80  NO
Philippines  Regional  Cities  Development  Project  LN 2257-PH  MAR 31  83  DEC  31 89  4094-PH  OCT  03 83  YES
Philippines  Municipal  Devetopment  Project  LN 2435-PH  JUN  05  84  JUN  30  91  5027-PH  MAY 10  84  YES
Singapore  Environnental  Control  Project  LN 1137-SI  JUN  19 75  SEP  30 79  772-Sl  MAY  29 75  3235  DEC 16  80  YES
Sri Lanka  Second  Water  Sply  & Sewerage  Project CR 1041-CE  JUN  10  80  SEP  30 86  2904b-CE  MAY 15  80  YES.
Sri Lanka  municipat  Management  Project  CR 1697-CE  MAY  13 86  JUN  30  94  P-4224-CE  APR  24 86  YES
Sri Lanka  Emergency  Reconst.  & Rehab.  Proj  CR 1883-CE  MAR  15 88  DEC  31 91  P-4705-CE FEB  24 88  NO
Thailand  Regional  Cities  Development  Project  LN 2520-TH  APR  23 85  MAR  31 91  4673-TH  MAR  08 85  YESTABLE 1.8
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Afghanistan  Kaabul  Uater/Sanitation  Project  CR  563-AF  JUN 05  75  DEC 31 82  746-AF  NAY  22  75  YES
Egypt  Urban Development  Project  CR  831-EGT  JUN 23  78  DEC 31 84  1976-EGT  JUN  06  78  6561  DEC 19 86  YES
Egypt  Greater  Cairo  Urban  Dev Project  LN 2176-EGT  JUN 10  82  DEC 31 89  3327-ECT  MAY 14 82  YES
Jordan  Tourism  Project  CR  639-JO  JUN  08  76  MAR  31 83  1069A-JO  MAY 10 76  5729  JUN 21 85  NO
Jordan  Auman  Transp  4  NunicipaI  Dev Project  LN 2334-JO  JUL 07  83  JUN 30 89  4413-JO  MAY 17 83  YES
Lebanon  Reconstruction  Project  LN 1476-LE  JUL 05 77  JUN 30  85  2113-LE  juN  15 77  NO
Norocco  Rabat  Urban Development  Project  LN 1528-MOR  FEB  28  78  MAR  31  84  1800-NOR  FEB  03  78  6184  MAY 12 86  YES  Un
Morocco  Second Urban Development  Project  LN 1944-NOR  JAN 22  81  JUL 31  88  3118-NOR  DEC 15 80  YES  w
Pakistan  Lahore  Urban Development  Project  CR 1348-PAK  APR 19 83  JUN 30  88  3584-PAK  MAR  25 83  YES
Pakistan  Karachi  Special  Development  Project  CR 1652-PAK  JAN 14 86  SEP 30  92  5772-PAK  NOV  27 85  YES
Tunisia  Second Urban Development  Project  LN 1705-TUN  MAY  22  79  DEC  31  85  2372a-TUN  MAY 08  79  6750  APR  22  87  YES
Turkey  Cukurova Region Urban  Eng Project  LN 2537-TU  MAY  09  85  JUN 30  89  P-3935  APR 18 85  NO
Turkey  Cukurova Urban  Development  Project  LN 2819-TU  MAY 21 87  JUN 30  85  6657-TU  APR 17 87  YESTable  1.9
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Argentina  Mtmicipal  Development  Project  LN 2920-AR  MAR  22 88  JUN 30  95  7093-AR  FEB  26  88  NO
Bahamas  Urban  Development  Project  LN  2089-BN  FEB  16  82  DEC  31 87  3498b-BN  DEC  20 81  YES
Bolivia  Urban  Development  Project  LN 1489-BO  OCT  04 77  JUN  30 86  1625a-BO  SEP  09 77  NO
Bolivia  La Paz  Municipal  Development  Project CR 1842-BO  AUG  04  87  JUN  30 95  6769-BO  JUL  08 87  NO
Brazil  Medium-Sized  Cities  Project  LN 1720-BR  JUN  07 79  DEC  31 86  2361-BR  MAY 21  79  YES
Brazil  Recife  Metropolitan  Dev Project  LN  2170-BR  JUN  03  82  DEC  31 88  3863b-BR  MAY 12  82  YES
Brazil  Metropolitan  Development  Program  LN  2196-BR  AUG  03 82  JUN  30 85  3291-BR  JUL  22  82  NO
Brazil  Rio Flood  Reconstruction  Project  LN  2975-BR  JUN  24 88  MAR  31 91  P-4833-BR JUN  10  88  NO
Brazil  Water  for  Minic.  & Low-income  Areas  LN 2983-BR  JUN  29 88  JUN  30 94  7083-BR  JUN  10  a8  NO
Colombia  Barranquilla  Water  Supply  Project  LN 2637-CO  NOV  26  85  DEC 31  81  5613-CO  NOV  8  85  NO
Colombia  Uater  and  Sewerage  Sector  Project  LN 2061-CO  JUN  16  88  DEC 31  94  7120-CO  MAY 26  88  NO
Dom.  Repub.  Sites  and  Services  Project  LK 2104-DO  MAR  23  82  JUN  30  87  3639c-DO  MAR  01  82  NO
Dom.  Repub.  Santo  Domingo  Tech  Assistnce  Project  LN 2292-DO  MAY  26 83  JAN 01 86  P-3496  MAY  09 83  NO
Mexico  Baja  California  Tourism  Project  LN 1420-HE  MAY  10  77  JUN  30  81  1483-ME  APR  18 77  5848  SEP 12  85  NO
Mexico  Second Urban  &  Regional  Dev  Project  LN 1990-ME  MAY  12 81  DEC 31 88  2937-ME  APR  04 81  YES
Mexico  Pollution  Control  Project  LN 2154-HE  MAY  25 82  DEC 31 88  3186b-4E  APR  28 82  YES
Mexico  Solid  Waste  Management  Pilot  Project LU 2669-ME  MAR  25  86  JUN 30 94  5952-ME  MAR  05 86  YES
Peru  Lima  Metropolitan  Development  Project  LN 2451-PE  JIJN  21  84  DEC 31  91  4781b-PE  MAY  29  84  YES- 55 -
ANNEX  2
ANTANANARIVO  WATER  AND SANITATION  PROJECT,  MADAGASCAR
(CR  1002-MAG)
2.1  Proiect  Background/Obiectives
During  the  years  1971  to 1975,  UNDP (with  WHO as executing  agency)
financed  a  master  plan  and  feasibility  studies  for  che  water  supply  and  sewerage
sector in Antananarivo,  Madagascar.  In 1971, the Bank expressed "special
interest"  in the  UNsP-financed  studies  and  a  number  of  missions  to  Antananarivo
assisted  in their implementation. In December  1976,  the Government  formally
requested  the Bank to include  the Antananarivo  water supply  and sanitation
project  in  its  lending  program. Due  to  the  time  required  to  reorganize  the  local
authorities  and  to complete  the  project  preparation,  however,  the  Bank  delayed
field  appraisal  of the  project  until  July 1978.
The Antananarivo  Water and Sanitation  Proiect (Cr 1002-MAG)  was
approved  in  April  1980  for  a  credit  of  US$20.5  million. The  project  was  designed
to: (i)  improve  and develop  the existing  water  supply,  sewerage,  drainage  and
solid  waste  facilities in  the  Antananarivo area;  (ii)  strengthen the
institutions,  especially-in  the  sanitation  subsector,  in  order  to  attain  proper
standards  of  operation  and  maintenance;  (iii)  assist  the  Government  in  developing
appropriate  cost  recovery  policies;  and  (iv)  help  the  Government  prepare  a  long-
term development  program for urban water supply.  The project contained six
components:  water  supply  (new  production  facilities,  transmission  lines,  supply
to  suburban  communities,  and  extension  and  strengthening  of  existing  distribution
facilities),  sewerage,  solid  waste,  training  of  water  supply  staff,  and  training
of sanitation  staff. At appraisal,  the  solid  waste  component  consisted  of the
construction  of collective  dumping  containers,  supply  of collecticn  trucks  and
heavy  equipment  for  the  existing  dumping  site,  and  the  improvement  of  an  existing
composting  facility. The  total  project  cost  was  estimated  at  US$33.7  million,
of which US$3.5 million (10.4 percent)  was  allocated to the solid waste
component.
2.2  Solid  Waste  Conditions
At the  time  of  project  appraisal,  the  World  Bank  mission  judged  the
existing  system  of collection  and  disposal  to  be adequate  in terms  of quantity
collected,  but  inadequate  in terms  of collection  conditions  and  disposal. With
respect  to  collections,  households  used  three  types  of solid  wastes  containers:
private  bins, collective  bins,  and fixed  concrete  containers. The collective
bins were often stolen, however, and the concrete containers  were poorly
designed. Consequently,  wastes  often  were  dumped  carelessly  outside  collective
bins,  drainage  canals,  and  other  uncontrolled  or illegal  dumping  areas.
The  Municipality  collected  solid  wastes  at  820  locations  spread  over
14 districts. Each  district,  which included  two  collection  routes,  was served
by one  vehicle  (standard  6 to  8 ton  truck  running  about  50 to  70  kilometers  per56 -
day  and  manned  by 2 teams  in  shifts). At the  end  of each  route,  the  collection
truck was full.  In total, there  were only about 16 operating trucks  that
'--ilected  waste  at night  and used  during  the  day for  maintaining  the sewerage
system. Maintenance  workshops  were  poorly  equipped,  however,  and  the  maintenance
budget  was inadequate. Nonetheless,  a total  of about  160 tons  of solid  waste
were collected  each  day,  about  38,000  tons  per  year. This  service  met  about  90
percent  of the  city's  needs. All  urban  areas  with  a  population  density  over  25
inhabitants  per  hectare  were served.
After collection,  the trucks  dumped  the  solid  wastes  9 kilometers
from  the  city  on an  area  covering  15  hectares. The  landfilling  process  was  not
carried  out  properly  since  wastes  were frequently  left  uncovered. On a regular
basis,  however,  burning,  disinfestation,  grading,  and  compaction  were  performed.
In  addition,  small  quantities  of  waste  were  composted.  The  composting  facilities
included  handling  equipment,  a hammermill,  and a composting  area where  refuse
stacked in heaps was periodically  turned over until the putrescibles  were
degraded. Although,  theoretically,  the hammermill  had a capacity  of 10 tons
per day,  lack of pre-sorting, screening, and handling equipment limited
production  to  600-800  tons  per  year  instead  of a  possible  10,000  tons  per  year.
Moreover,  the quality  of the compost  was  poor due to the lack of pre-sorting
equipment  and  resulting  presence  of dangerous  debris  in the  compost.
2.3  Solid  Waste  ComRonent
In  designing  the  solid  waste  component,  the  project  team  estimated
that  by 1984 the city  would  need tc collect  180 tons of solid  waste  per day,
implying a  total capacity of  garbage containers of  400  cubic  meters.
Accordingly,  the  project  provided  the  following:  (i)  construction  of  additional
containers  for  the  city (80  containers  of 600  liter  capacity  and  480  containers
of 300  liter  capacity);  (ii) supply  of 19 collection  trucks  of 6 to 8 ton
capacity  to reinforce  and  partially  renew  the  fleet  of  vehicles  used to  collect
the city's solid waste;  (iii) supply  of heavy equipment (2 bulldozers,  3
loaders,  1 weigh  bridge,  and  4 trucks)  to transform  and maintain  the existing
dump site as a "controlled"  sanitary  landfill;  and (iv) improvement  of the
existing  composting  facility  so as to  produce  10,000  tons/year  of good  quality
compost  that  could  be purchased  for  fertilizer. 11
The  appraisal  team  selected  sanitary  controlled  dumping  as  the  basic
method  of  solid  waste  disposal  because  it  was  considered  the  least-cost  solution.
The  project  included  upgrading  of  a  small  composting  facility  for  processing  part
of  the  wastes  in  order  to  acquire  practical  information  (e.g.  ,  investment  costs,
operating and  maintenance costs, customer willingness-to-pay)  about  the
composting  method  in the  Antananarivo  context.
Compost  is  generally  considered  co  be an  excellent  soil  conditioner  with
low,  but significant,  fertilizer  value.- 57 -
By  increasing  the number of collective  bins and by  improving
collections,  the solid waste component was expected to benefit the whole
population,  especially  the  poor since  these  improvements  were provided  mainly
in  the  poor  areas  of the  city. The  Antananarivo  Municipality  (Fivondronana)  was
directly  responsible  for  implementing  the  solid  waste  component.
2.4  ImDlementation
Despite  delays  in  procurement,  the  implementation  of  the  solid  waste
component  was carried  out largely  as planned.  One exception  related  to the
upgrading  of the  composting  plant. After  consultation  with  the  supplier  of the
original  composting  plant  and the project  consultant,  it was agreed  that the
plant  could  not  be upgraded;  a new  composting  plant  would  be constructed. The
Municipality  would finance  the civil works; the Bank would finance  the new
equipment  (from  the same  supplier). Implementation  was slow,  however,  due to
long  delays  in  preparing  bid  documents,  tender  evaluation  reports,  and  the  final
award  of  contracts. For  example,  after  one  year  of indecision,  the  Municipality
selected  a  consultant  (SOMEAH)  to  carry  out  a  detailed  design  of the  composting
plant. After  another  two  years,  the  contract  design  study  was finalized.
Currently,  the  plant  is  operating,  but  poorly  managed.  The  municipal
employees  who operate  the  plant  process  the  solid  waste,  but pay  no attention
to the  quality  of the  compost. They are  unconcerned  about  how to ensure  that
the  compost  is  acceptable  for  agricultural  use. Moreover,  they  store  the  compost
on  vacant  land  on the  plant  tremises. Farmers  from the surrounding  areas  may
take  the compost  free  of charge  if they  are  able to get to the  plant  and haul
the compost away.  To improve this operation  and maximize the benefits  of
composting,  technical  assistance  is needed  to determine  the appropriate  means
for compost  quality  control,  sales,  and delivery.  According to one project
officer,  private  firms  should  take  over  plant  operations  and  compost  management.
Under one contract,  one firm would be responsible  for operating the plant;
another  firm  would  manage  and  market  the  compost.
Another  implementation  problem  concerned  the  supply  and  maintenance
of garbage  trucks,  the  number  of  which  was increased  to 23 collection  vehicles
(19  garbage  collection  trucks  and  4 trucks  for  the  sanitary  landfill).  The  Bank
financed  the  equipment,  but the  Government  never agreed  to import  the trucks
without  duties  and  taxes.  Consequently,  the  supplier  absorbed  this  added  expense
and delivered  the  trucks  in 1984.  During  the  next several  years,  however,  the
company refused to supply spare parts for truck maintenance  ur.cil  it was
reimbursed  for the  taxes  and  duties. The  project  closed  on June 30,  1986 (one
year after the original  appraisal  closing  date),  and in 1987, a supervision
mission  reported  that  11  out  of the  23  domestic  waste  collection  trucks  financed
under  the  credit  were  out  of  service  due  to  a  lack  of  spare  parts. In  1988,  when
the  Municipality  was finally  able to pay the company,  it received  its spare
parts. Reportedly,  the  trucks  are  now in full  cperation.- 58  -
ANNEX  3
LAGOS  SOLID  WASTE  AND STORMDRAINAGE  PROJECT,  NIGERIA
(LN  2620-UNI)
3.1  Project  Background/Objectivei
In 1982, the Federal Government  of Nigeria and the Lagos State
Government  (LSG)  requested  Bank  assistance  in  financing  a five-year  solid  waste
management  and  stormdrainage  project  for  Lagos  Metropolitan  Area.  The project
was identified  by LSG and a Bank  urban  sector  mission  in March 1982;  it was
prepared  by the  Lagos  State  Waste  Disposal  Board  (LSWDB)  and  the  then  Lagos  State
Ministry  of  Works  and  Housing  (MOW),  with  the  assistance  of  consultancy  services
financed  in part  by project  preparation  funds  available  from  the Bank's  first
urban project in Nigeria (Bauchi).  The project  was appraised in November/
December  1982  and  revised  in 1984  to  reflect  discussions  with the  new  Military
Government  of Lagos  State.  In September  1985, the  Bank approved  the US$72.0
million  loan  (Loan  2620-UNI),  which  is  the  largest  Bank  loan  approved  for  a  solid
waste  management  project  to date.
The  Lagos  Solid  Waste  and  Stormdrainaze  Project  is  the  third  project
in  Nigeria  to include  a  MSWM component  and  the  first  urban  development  project
in Nigeria  focusing  on citywide  infrastructure  services  and management. The
project's  overall  objectives  are to:
(a)  strengthen the  administrative,  technical, and  financial
capacity  of key Lagos  State  institutions  and reorient  their
existing  programs  toward  larger  scale  provision  of
infrastructure  and  maintenance;
(b)  support the ongoing solid waste operations of LSWDB and
stormwater  drainage  of the  Drainage  Division  by expanding  and
improving  services  rendered  by both  agencies,  which  would in
turn lead to better  functioning  of the city and increased
productivity;  and
(c)  assist  LSG in  mobilizing  the  additional  resources  needed  to
provide  future  infrastructure,  services,  and maintenance  to
Metropolitan  Lagos  by revising  and reactivating  the rating
system  for  proparty  valuation.
Aimed  at  these objectives,  the  ptoject includes three major
components:  (i)  improvement  and  expansion  of  solid  waste  collection  and  disposal
services  (ii)  expansion  and  rehabilitation  of  the  primary  stormdrainage  network;
and (iii)  assistance  to LSG in the establishment  of a Lagos State  Valuation
Office (LSVO).  The project  also includes  institutional  support for project
coordination;  futu-.e  project  preparation;  and improvement  in local  government
administration,  financial  management,  and  maintenance  operations.- 59
With  base  costs  calculated  in  January  1983  and  updated  in  March  1984,  the  total
cost of the project was estimated  at US$164.3  million (including  taxes and
contingencies).
The  solid  waste  component,  estimated  to  cost  approximately  US$111.8
million, accounts for  68 percent of  total project costs. The  component
encompasses  equipment,  new  maintenance  and  depot  facilities,  and  related  civil
works to enable  LSWDB to improve  all aspects  of its  operations  (domestic  and
industrial  waste collections,  disposal, abandoned vehicle management, and
secondary  and tertiary  stormdrainage  network  cleaning  and  maintenance).
3.2  Solid  Waste  Conditions
In Metropolitan  Lagos,  inefficient  collection  of solid  wastes  has
had  a direct  affect  on the  functioning  of  other  urban  services,  infrastructure,
and  productive  activities.  Uncollected  garbage  a-ad  abandoned  vehicles  on  streets
impeded  traffic; refuse  thrown  in  st'rmwater  drains  (also  used  as  a  rudimentary
sewerage  system  for  vast  parts  of  .- *  city)  caused  flooding  by  blocking  the  flow
of water.  To compound  these pro 'ems, extremely  dense population,  traffic
congestion,  poor  road'conditions,  anu  heavy  rainfall,  as  well  as  the  accelerating
population  growth  and  urban  sprawl  in  Metropolitan  Lagos,  made it  impossible  for
local  authorities  to  provide  adequate  waste  collection  and  disposal  services.
In 1977,  the  Lagos  State  Refuse  Disposal  Board (later  renamed  the
Lagos  State  Solid  Waste  Disposal  Board)  was  established  to  deal  with  the  mounting
accumulation  of garbage  and abandoned  vehicles  on the streets.  It was given
broad powers to plan and operate  a citywide  refuse  collection  system  which
includes  a workshop,  depots,  tip  sites,  and refuse  vehicle  operations. After
the Board was established,  it procured  new vehicles  and engaged expatriate
technical  assistance  to  manage  LSWDB  operations.  As a  result  of  LSWDB's  initial
success in street cleaning,  LSG pressured the new Board to broaden its
activities.  By 1981,  the  Board  expanded  its  responsibilities  to  commercial  and
industrial  waste  management,  stormdrain  cleaning,  and  collection  and disposal
of abandoned  vehicles.  LSWDB's solid waste removal and drain maintenance
services  were  successful  in  reducing  flooding  in  parts  of the  city,  particularly
in  the  cerntral  business  district,  but  the  Board  was  not  equipped  to  sustain  this
effort  on a  citywide  basis  due  to its  erratic  and  limited  budget,  based  largely
on grants  from  LSG.
In December  1984,  the  contract  with the foreign  expert  assistance
was  not renewed  and  Nigerians  took  over the  full  management  of the  LSWDB. They
had limited capacity in civil engineering;  moreover, there were very few
engineers  in  Nigeria  who  had  any  expertise  in  designing  and  managing  solid  waste
facilities.  Due to limited funding,  staffing,  and equipment,  the Board's
operations  consisted  largely  of crisis  management  or.  a  day-to-day  basis; there
was  no  long-term  planning  for  development  and  expanded  and  improved  operations.- 60 -
Further,  the Board's  overall  ability  to carry out its full  responsibilities
declined.
At appraisal,  it  was estimated  that  only one-half  of the  domestic
refuse  generated  daily  in  Metropolitan  Lagos  was  being  collected. Large  areas
within  the  city  and  almost  one  third  of the  population  had  no refuse  collection
service. Lven  within  the  serviced  areas,  only  a  portion  of the  generated  refuse
was being  collected. The most  pressing  problems  of solid  waste  management  in
the  Lagos  Metropolitan  Area included:
(a)  lack  of adequate  street  storage  containers  for  refuse;
(b)  inadequate  disposal  sites  and management  of landfill
operations;
(c)  shortage  of  refuse  collection  equipment  and  vehicle  maintenance
facilities;
(d)  inefficiencies  caused  by physical  and  climatic
conditions;  and
(e)  staffing and  funding shortages and  weak  administrative
procedures  of LSWDB.
The main deficiency  of the  existing  LSWDB  program  was its limited
scope  of  service.  It  was  estimated  that  within  the  servi,.ed  areas,  wi-h  existing
LSWDB  capacity  and  resources,  the  percentage  of  waste  collected  as  a proportion
of  waste  generated  would  decline  from  55  percent  in  1984  to 38  percent  in  1988.
With respect  to the  total  metropolitan  area,  the  percentages  would  be about  46
percent  and 33 percent,  respectively. Further,  only about 18 percent  of the
industrial  and commercial  premises  were being served.  In addition,  LSWDB
provided  inadequate  removal  of abandoned  vehicles.  In 1983, there were an
estimated  15,000  abandoned  vehicles  on  vacant  land,  footpaths,  road  shoulders,
and medians.  The existing  landfills,  badly located  within densely  built-up
areas,  were  reaching  capacity. Moreover,  they  contained  industrial  as well  as
municipal  waste,  which  sometimes  burned  uncontrollably,  and  were unsanitary  as
well  as inefficient  because  funds  for  the  purchase  of  ash,  lime,  and  topg.Oil  for
cover  were  not  available.  Thus,  the  appraisal  mission  identified  an  urgent  need
for  corrective  action  to  prevent  the  total  collapse  of solid  waste  services.
3.3  Solid  Waste .omponent
According  to the SAR, the solid waste component  was designed  to
provide:61
(a)  more efficient  removal  of solid  waste  from currently  served
areas,  increased  service  levels  in  these  areas,  and  extension
of this  service  to unserved  areas;
(b)  control  of flooding  caused  by blockage  of drains  with solid
waste;
(c)  strengthening  of institutional  capacity  for  solid  waste
management, including financial management and  revenue
generation;  and
(d)  assistance  in  strengthening  local  governments'capabilities.
To meet these  objectives.  the  component  includes: (i)  specialized
equipment  for  refuse  collection  and  disposal  (US$63.7  million);  (ii)  construction
of  ransfer  stations  (US$7.8  million);  (iii)  civil  works  for  new and  existing
concrolled  sanitary landfill  sites and new vehicle depots and maintenance
workshops (US$22.5  million);  (iv)  bulk  bin  hardstandings  for  refuse  containers
throughout  the -ity (US$2.3  million);  and (v)  funds  to support  implementation
of  small  demonstration  projects,  a  study  to  facilitate  the  transfer  of  secondary
stormdrain  maintenance  to  local  governments,  advisory  services  for  training  LSWDB
staff, improvement  of the LSWDB financial  complex,  establishment  of proper
financial  accounting  systems  and a comprehensive  specialized  staff training
program,  and  the  establishment  of  a  research  and  development  group  for  long-term
programming  of its  operations  (US$15.5  m1llion).
The project  includes  collection  of industrial  wastes  by providing
the equipment  and vehicles  required  to extend the existing  coverage  of 369
premises  to an  additional  1,500  premises  over  a four-year  period. By  expanding
the  service  level,  it  was  anticipated  that  revenues  from  the  existing  industrial
waste  collection  service  would  increase  from  N  3.4  million  (approximately  US$4.5
million,  at then  current  exchange  rates)  to N 12.4  million  (US$16.2  million).
Ar part of the industrial  waste  collection  service,  the project  incorporates
participation  by private  contracto-s  that demonstrate  sound  and satisfactory
operating  practices  and  have  the  potential  to  efficiently  expand  their
operations. Based on a detailed  analysis  of private  sector  capability,  only
about  two  or three  private  contractors  could  be considered.  Most  of the  private
firms  lack  the  satisfactory  management  capacity  to  increase  operations  and  have
been  involved  in  improper  operating  practices  and  disposal  at  unauthorized  sites.
In addition to the above sub-components, the project includes loan
conditions  requiring  LSWDB  to  formally  adopt  a  management  staffing  plan
satisfactory  to the Bank; assign sufficient staff; reorganize and strengthen
its project execution capabiliti.s; and meet other financial obligations.- 62 -
Given the  city-wide  scope of the  project,  it was not possible  to
quantify  the  direct  benefits  to the  poor. Nonetheless,  it  is the  poorest  areas
which suffer  most from lack  of drainage  and inadequate  or non-existent  solid
waste  services. A conservative  estimate  indicates  that some two  and one-half
million people were expected  to benefit directly  from the solid waste and
stormdrainage  components  which together  account  for 90 percent of the total
project  costs.
3.4  Im2lementation
In  the  course  of  project  implementation,  progress  in  the  solid  waste
component  has been impeded  by a number  of difficulties,  among  them:  repeated
changes in LSG staff,  delays  in preparing  and adoptir.g  the LSWDB  management
organization  and staffing  plan,  delays in tendering  and awarding  LSWDB civil
works and equipment  contracts,  delays in selecting  and acquiring  sites for
transfer  stations  and landfills  as well as completing  preliminary  designs  for
those sites, problems  maintaining  appropriate  insurance  for newly acquired
equipment  and  vehicles  financed  under  this  project,  and  problems  ensuring  proper
maintenance  of equipment  and facilities.
The  three-year delay  in  adopting an  acceptable management,
organization,  and staffing  plan was due to the complex  political  environment
surrounding  the  project. In the  course  of project  preparation,  appraisal,  and
implementation,  four  different  governors  of  Lagos  State  meant  that  a  new  strategy
had  to  be prepared  with  each  new  administration.  LSG  was  never  fully  committed
to  using  external  technical  assistance  to administer  the  LSWDB  or the  project.
The LSWDB  was to do the  job if operations  could  be improved  and  expanded  just
by acquiring  more equipment.  Elements  of t.ne  now completed  plan include
recommendations  for  the  Board's  organization  and  staffing,  training  strategy  and
methods,  waste  management  master  plan  covering  three  phases  of  system  development
and  operation,  and  management  systems  including  those  for  management  information
and  preventive  maintenance. Although  it  was finally  approved  in  May 1989,  the
long delay in completing  and adopting  the plan impeded  the execution  of key
management,  planning, and coordinating  tasks associated  with the project.
According  to  one  project  officer,  the  completion  and  formal  adoption  of the  plan
should  have  been a condition  of loan  effectiveness.
The  procurement of  600  collection vehicles  in  one  package
(approximately  $40.0  million)  presented  another  serious  implementation  problem,
delaying  some  key  elements  of  the  project  by almost  four  years. The  difficulties
centered  on the  technical  aspects  of equipment  specifications,  preparing  tender
documents,  and  evaluating  bids. Complicated  local  procurement  procedures  further
impeded  the  process. By June 1989,  the  contracts  for the  garbage  trucks  were
finally  approved. Due to  devaluation,  however,  the  actual  local  currency  cost
of the  vehicles  is  eight  to  nine times  higher  than  originally  estimated.- 63 -
Problems  surrounding  the selection  and acquisition  of sites for
transfer  stations  and landfills  posed  further  impediments  to the  execution  of
the  solid  waste  component.  The  major  causes  were  the  Board's  inability  to  carry
out  appropriate  environmental  investigations  and  secure  Certificates  of  Occupancy
for  sites  that  would  not  be resisted  by the  surrounding  community  or refused  by
the Planning  Department. To facilitate  this process,  the  World Bank  hired a
solid  waste  management  consultant  to review  sites  and advise  on the  selection
process. At the time  of this  writing,  the sites  had been identified  and  were
undergoing  analyses  of soil  and  hydrogeological  conditions.
The project  was scheduled  to be executed  over a five-year  period
(rY86-FY91)  and is currently  ongoing. To complete  substantial  implementation
cf the  major  components,  it  is  expected  that  at least  a two-year  extension  will
be required. According  to the draft  SAR for  a new project  in Oyo State,  the
lessons  of the  Lagos  project  already  have  been incorporated  into the  design  of
another  solid  waste management  investment  (US$11.6  million)  in Nigeria.  One
condition  of effectiveness  rfquires  completion  of land acquisition  for the
sanitary  landfill  as well as other  solid  waste facilities  (transfer  station,
central  offices,  and  workshop).- 64 -
ANNEX 4
SECOND  CALCUTTA  URBAN  DEVELOPMENT  PROJECT,  INDIA
(CR  756-IN)
4.1  Prolect  Background/Objectives
The Bank first  became  actively  involved  in Calcutta's  development
in 1973  with the approval  of a US$35  million  loan (CR  427-IN)  to support  the
Calcutta  Metropolitan  Development  Authority (CMDA)  and its program  of urban
reconstruction  and  development.  In  1977,  the  Bank  followed  up  with  a  second  loan
of US$87.0  million (CR  756-IN)  for  a larger  and  more ambitious  project.  This
was followed  by a third,  still  larger  project  in 1983 (CR  1369-IN,  US$147.0
million). This annex  deals  with the  second  project  of this  series.
As indicated  in the  PCR,  the  Bank  and  CMDA  invested  a.  great  deal  of
effort  into  preparing  the  Second  Calcutta  Urban  Development  Project  (CUDP  II).
During  project  preparation  and  appraisal  (July  1976  - August  1977),  the  Bank  sent
six missions to Calcutta.  The resulting  project  was large, ambitious,  and
complex.  CUDP II consisted  of 54 sub-projects  in 11 sectors,  plus consultant
services,  technical  assistance,  and  training,  all  drawn  from  a  five-year  rolling
investment  program. At the  investment  program  level,  the  allocations  for  water
supply,  sewerage/drainage,  and  transport  accounted  for  a  much  smaller  proportion
of the total than in CUDP I.  By contrast,  the proportion  of CUDP II funds
allocated  to area development  and solid  waste  management  was greater  than in
the  previous  project.  In CUDP I, the  solid  waste  component  included  two  sub-
projects in  Calcutta involving small-scale  works  procurement of  related
equipment. The  MSWM  component  of  CUDP  II  consisted  of  the  rehabilitation  of  the
existing  systems  of solid  waste  collection,  street  cleansing,  and night soil
collection,  as  well  as  pilot  projects  and  studies  to  develop  long-term  solutions
to  solid  waste  management.  This  US$11.63  million  component  accounted  for  about
6 percent  of the  estimated  total  project  cost of US$183.71  million,  including
taxes  and  contingencies  (1977  prices).
4.2  Solid  Waste  Conditions
In  1985,  the  total  population  in  Calcutta  (about  10  million)  produced
between  4,000  and 6,000 tons of solid  waste per day and large  quantities  of
sludge  from  nightsoil  collection,  open  drains,  and  sewer  cleaning. None  of the
wastes,  however,  were  disposed  of  efficiently.  Except  in  the  case  of  nightsoil
collection,  there  was  no system  for  the  collection  of wastes  directly  from  the
source. Most  wastes  were  thrown  into  the  street,  picked  up,  transported  to  vats
by  hand  carts,  loaded  in  lorries,  and  off  loaded  (mainly  by  hand)  at the  tipping
sites. Serious  health  hazards  arose  from  deficiencies  in  handling  night  soil;
the  practice  of  open  dumping  polluted  the  surrounding  areas  and  reduced  property
values as well.- 65 -
At the time of appraisal,  the rate of expenditure  or,  solid  waste
management  by  Calcutta  Corporation  (CC)  was  over  Rs  6  crores  annually  (equivalent
to almost  US$2 per inhabitant  per year in 1977  dollars)  which is adequate  to
finance a  first class  service.  Nonetheless, lack of  adequate physical
infrastructure,  shortage  of  key  equipment  items,  failure  to  effectively  control
the labor  force  of over 14,500  untrained  employees,  insufficient  vehicles  and
inadequate  vehicle  maintenance,  lack  of  a  vehicle  renewal  fund,  and  an  unsuitable
management  structure  resulted  in  a  wasteful  and  inefficient  system.  Expenditures
in  the  remainder  of  the  CMD  approached  US$.70  per  person  per  year,  less  than  half
the  amount  required  to  provide  a  basic  level  of service.
4.3  Solid  Waste  Component
The  solid  waste  management  component  was  designed  to  achieve  reliable
operation  of the  existing  systems  within  CC in the  short  term  and to develop  a
solid  waste management  system  with metropolitan  area-wide  application.  The
specific  objectives  of the  component  were to:  (i)  overcome  the  shortcomings  of
services  by increasing  the  number  of  equipment;  (ii)  improve  the  facilities  for
maintenance  of  vehicles  plant  and  equipment;  (iii)  construct  a  network  of  depots
throughout  the  city for  future  control  of services;  (iv)  introduce  better  solid
waste systems through  development  of indigenous  technology;  and (v) improve
management  structure,  quality,  and training  facilities.
In  physical  terms,  the  component  provided  for  construction  of  80  ward
depots,  400  masonry  vats,  and  10  trailer  sites;  purchase  of 8,000  handcarts,  81
tipping  trucks,  12 tractors  and trailers,  2 cesspool  emptiers,  and 26 tanker
lorries;  renovation  of existing  nightsoil  disposal  areas and construction  of
additional discharge points; improvement  of  existing vehicle maintenance
facilities  including  purchase  of vehicles  and equipment;  repair  of garages;
construction  of access roads; and purchase  of bulldozers  and equipment to
organize  additional  landfill  sites.  In  addition,  the  component  provided  funds
for  training,  studies,  and  pilot  projects  to  test  alternative  methods  of  storage,
collection,  and disposal  of solid  wastes.
4.4  ImDlementition
At the start  of project  imple  aentation,  the  solid  waste component
supported  the  purchase  of collection  vehicles  to remove  the  mounting  piles  of
garbage  in Calcutta. The component  also  set  in  motion  fundamental  solid  waste
institutional  changes  which  included:  reorganizing  the  structure  of solid  waste
service  within the municipality  of Calcutta,  designating  a qualified  senior
engineer  to take  charge  of  CMC's  solid  waste  services,  establishing  a  hierarchy
of  jobs  and  responsibilities,  improving  the  working  conditions  of the  solid  waste
staff,  and  designing  a management  system  for  operations  and  maintenance. From
the perspective  of one project  officer,  these  actions  represented  a dramatic
change  in the  manner  in  which  CMC  operated  its  solid  waste  collection  services- 66 -
and  the  first  critical  step  in implementing  a  solid  waste  strategy  that  covered
collection,  transport/transfer,  and  disposal  in  sanitary  landfills.
At the  end  of the  project  period,  the  procurement  of equipment  was
practically  complete. According  to the  PPAR,  the  component  also accomplished
significant  improvements  in the  system's  repair  of vehicles. Moreover,  these
improvements  helped CMC  eliminate the need  to hire  trucks from private
contractors.
Despite  the  above  accomplishments  in  institutional  strengthening  and
equipment  procurement  and maintenance,  several  factors  constrained  the longer
term effectiveness  of the solid waste component.  First,  the delay in land
acquisition  was a significant  problem  that impeded  the progress  of the civil
works,  particularly  in the construction  of the  ward depots.  Due largely  to
difficulties  in locating  available  vacant  land  in  each  ward.  the  number  of  ward
depots  to be constructed  was reduced  from  80 zo  28.  Moreover,  the  acquisition
of sites  for  those  28  ward  deports  was  not  completed  by the  end  of the  project
period.
Other  implementation  constraints  were institutional.  According  to
the PPAR, the Calcuta  Municipal Corporation  had changed its solid waste
methlodologies  more frequently  than  could  be readily  absorbed  by its  staff,  who
were ill-prepared  to deal with increasing  levels  of technology. Additional
institutional  constraints  were the lack  of continuity  among  middle  management
solid  waste staff  and the problem  of sustaining  the  momentum  of solid  waste
improvements  among  competing  urban  service  needs.
Lastly,  the  expendizures  .or  the  improved  solid  waste  services  were
not  recovered  and the  costs  for  operations  and  maintenance  rose steadily. In
1977/78,  the  costs  for  operations  and  maintenance  was  Rs 7  crores;  in 1982/83,
the  cost soared  to Rs 9.5  crores  (excluding  the  bustees).  At the  end  of the
project  period,  about 50 percent  of the total  component  expenditure  remained
unspent. The actual  cost  of che  component  came  to US$7.31  million.
The  remainder  of the  component  works  was  carried  out  under  the  Third
Calcutta  Urban  Development  Project  (CUDP  III,  CR  1369-IN),  approved  in  May  1983.
Based  on  the  recommendations  of  a  pilot  study  carried  out  under  the  second  urban
project,  CUDP III  was intended  to continue  and  consolidate  the  efforts  set in
motion  during the two previous  projects.  The prcject  also was directed  at
improving urban  management in  the  Calcutta Metropolitan Area  through a
comprehensive  approach  that  combined  institutional  and financial  reforms  with
physical  improvements.  The  total  project  cost  was  estimated  at  US$303.0  million.
The IDA  credit  of US$147.0  million  financed  50  per:ent  of total  project  costs.
The  solid  waste  component,  with  an  estimated  cost  of US$15.0  million  (including
contingencies)  consisted of provisions for collection  equipment, transfer
stations for primary collection,  equipment for  final disposal, and pilot
composting  plants.- 67 -
ANNEX 5
THIRD  URBAN  DEVELOPMENT  PROJECT,  INDONESIA
(LN  1653-IND)
5.1  PrAJect  Backzround/Cbiectives
Indonesia's  urban  areas  are  characterized  by severe  deficiencies  in
housing  and essential  infrastructure. In tackling  its  urban  problems  through
national  and local  policies,  the  Government  of Indonesia  was supported  by a
series of  Bank-assisted  urban development projects.  The  Jakarta Urban
Development  Project  (LN  1040-IND)  was the  first  slum  upgrading  project  financed
by the  Bank. The  project  provided  for  minimum  basic  services,  including  refuse
collection,  to  about  2,000  hectares  of  densely  populated  "kampungs"  in  Jakarta.
The Second  Urban DeveloRment  Proiect (LN 1336-IND)  was approved  in 1976 to
finance  a three-year  extension  of the Kampung Improvement  Program (KIP) in
Jakarta,  an additional  3,000  hectares  of unserviced  kampungs,  and the  extension
of the  program  to  Surabaya. In 1979,  the  World  Bank  approved  a  US$43.6  million
loan to support the Third Urban Development  Project (LN 1.653-IND),  which
continued  the  Covernment's  initiative  in  kampung  improvement.
The  project  had  two  principal  objectives:  first,  to  provide  further
support  to the  Government's  efforts  to supply  essential  services  to low-income
neighborhoods  (kampungs)  in Jakarta  and Surabaya  and  to extend  the  program  to
three  additional  secondary  cities  (U4ung  Pandang,  Semarang,  and  Surakarta);  and
second,  to expand the scope of the project to include  investments  aimed at
improving  general  public  hea'lth.  To meet the second  objective,  the project
financed  improvements  in solid waste management (in Jakarta and Surabaya),
drainage,  and community  health  services. Other project  components  included:
Kampung  Improvement  Program,  land registration,  and technical  assistance. At
appraisal,  the  total  project  cost  was  estimated  at  US$96.0  million  (1978  dollars)
with  a  foreign  exchange  component  of  US$32.0  million.  According  to  the  PCR,  cost
estirmates  for  the  solid  waste  component  amounted  to  US$22.8  million  (24  percent
of total  project  cost).  The  actual  cost of the  component  was US$11.2  million
or 12  percent  of the  total  (US$90.5  million)  21 due  to  a  high  rupiah devaluation
during  project  implementation.
5.2  Solid  Waste  Conditions
The absence  of adequate  physical  and planning  facilities,  coupled
with fragmentation  of management  responsibilities  among  several  agencies,  has
been a deterrent  to the formulation  of a city-wide  comprehensive  solid  waste
management  program  in  both  Jakarta  and Surabaya. At appraisal,  only about  40
to  50  percent  of  the  wastes  generated  (about  3,600  tons/day  in  Jakarta  and  1,000
I/  These costs do not coincide  with those  in Table 2 of the main report
because  the  PCR  was  not  received  by the  authors  by the  end  of FY89.- 68 -
tons/day  in Surabaya)  was collected;  the remainder  was disposed  of by partial
burning  or dumping  at random  locations  in  canals  or drains  or  along  roads,  with
consequent  health,  pollution,  and drainage  problems.
The responsibility  for solid  waste management  in both cities  was
split  between  the  Cleansing Department and  a  number  of  neighborhood
organizations. The function  of the Cleansing  Department  was limited  to the
transfer, transport,  and  disposal of wastes from  the local neighborhood
(keluharan)  dumps and the cleansing  of main streets.  Each keluharan was
responsible  for  organizing  household  collection  of  wastes  at  central  collection
points. Poor coordination  between  the  neighborhood  collection  system  and the
Cleansing  Department  hindered timely collection  of wastes and thus caused
substantial  over-spilling  of  storage facilities.  This  fragmentation  of
responsibility  was identified  at appraisal  as the  principal  cause  for  the  worst
subsector  problem  in the  two cities. Other  key  problems  included  the lack  of
adequate  transfer  depots and transport  vehicles  and unsatisfactory  landfill
operations.
5.3  Solid  Waste  Component
The  proposed  solid  waste  management  program  for  Jakarta  and  Surabaya
was aimed  at improving  waste  collection,  street/drain  cleaning,  and transport
and  disposal  of wastes,  as well  as unifying  control  of all  solid  waste-related
operations  under a central  agency (Cleansing  Department)  in each city.  The
project  would  provide the required  infrastructure  and transport  and disposal
facilities  for  the  first  phase  of  a  long-term  program  in  the  two  cities. A  pilot
program  covering  two  or three  kampungs  was  included  to  test  and  assess  improved
methods or  facilities  for  collection,  storage, transfer, route planning,
transport  and sanitary  disposal. The emphasis  of the program  was to collect
wastes  on a door-to-door  basis,  especially  in low-income  areas  which  have the
most serious collection  and transfer  problems.  Infrastructure  provisions
included  depots, offices,  workshops,  and related transfer  facilities.  The
results  of the  pilot  study  would  be extended  to the  actual  service  areas  over
the  three-year  project  period.
The  key element  of the  proposed  program  consisted  of decentralized
control  of physical  operations  at the  then existing  three  levels  of political
structure. The basic  operating  unit would  be at the kelurahan  (ward)  level.
Each  kelurahan  would  have  a depot  consisting  of an  office,  toilet,  and  transfer
facility  (trailer  and cart parking). Control  of transportation,  time tables,
and supervision  of kelurahan  depots  would  be the responsibility  of kecamatan
(district)  offices  Carage  and servicing  facilities  would  be provided  at the
Wilayah  (region)  level. At appraisal,  the  project's  provisions  included: 108
kelurahan  depots,  16 kelurahan  offices  and three  garages  for Jakarta;  and 27
kelurahan  depots  and one garage  for Surabaya.  In both cities, the program
included  a phased replacement  of existing  vehicles  and additional  vehicles;
about  93  vehicles  for  Jakarta  and 60 tractors  with 180  trailers  for  Surabaya.- 69
In addition,  the  project  would provide  handcarts  for  household  collection  and
street-sweeping.  Finally,  the  project  would  establish  sanitary  landfills  as
the  primary  means  of solid  waste  disposal  in the  two  cities.
Under  the  technical  assistance  and training  component,  the  project
financed one  advisor to  assist Jakarta and  Surabaya in  the  design and
implementation  of the  pilot  solid  waste  program  and  its  evaluation  and  extension
to other areas of the city; supervision  of sanitary  landfill  projects,  and
development  of an  appropriate  organizational  structure for  the Cleansing
Departments  in both cities.  In addition,  the  project  financed  six  man-months
of engineering  services  to assist  in the  design  of the sanitary  landfills.
Under the  project,  the  Cleansing  Department  in each city  would  be
organized to assume responsibility  for all solid waste services down to
individual  dwellings  and for the cleansing  of all roads,  footpaths,  and open
drains. Initially,  this  arrangement  would  be attempted  on a  pilot  scale; over
time,  it would be extended  to the entire  city through  a phased  program.  In
Jakarta,  there  was a separate  Cleansing  Department  that  provided  decentralized
control  of operations  at three levels  based on the political  structure.  In
Surabaya, however, where  there was  the same general structure for waste
collection  and disposal  as Jakarta,  cleansing  services  were controlled  by a
third-tier  section  in the  Public  Works  Department  and  received  very low  status.
Thus, during negotiations,  assurances  were given by the Government that a
Cleansing  Department  wo-uld  be established  in  Surabaya.
At  the  time  of  appraisal,  the  municipal  governments  did  not  levy  any
direct  charges  for  residential  solid  waste  collection,  since  municipal  services
were limited  to the  transportation  of  wastes  from  collection  points  to  disposal
sites.  With the  primary  collection  responsibility  shifting  under  the  project
to  the  municipalities,  a study  was  also  included  to  assess  the  most  appropriate
mechanism  of charging  for  solid  waste  services.
5.4  Implementation
In  the  course  of  implementation,  the  solid  waste  component
encountered  a number  of impediments.  According  to one  project  officer,  one  of
the  main problems  related  to difficulties  on the  part of Jakarta's  Cleansing
Department  in determining  the  proper  mix of vehicles  and equipment. Although
a World  Bank solid  waste  consultant  made recommendations  regarding  appropriate
technology,  the Cleansing  Department  favored  more mechanized  systems.  When
approached  by  a number of manufacturers  and  representatives  of bilateral
agencies,  each  stressing  a  different  kind  of  equipment,  the  Cleansing  Department,
with its  lack  of technical  expertise,  responded  to  this  pressure. Before  making
a decision,  the  Department  experimented  unsuccessfully  with  different  types  of
vehicles. For  example,  the  compactor  trucks  proved  to  be infeasible  because  of
trhe  high  water  content  (40  to  50  percent)  of  the  waste. The  baling  machines  also
were  not feasible  because  scavengers  pulled  apart  the  waste. Moreover,  the- 70 -
Department  wanted  incinerators  and  mechanical  compactors,  also technically  and
financially  inappropriate. Ultimately,  the Cleansing  Department  bought the
tipping  trucks  and  constructed  sanitary  landfills,  as originally  planned.
Institutional  deficiencies  presented  further  constraints  to  project
implementation.  They  included lack of  adequate project management and
supervision,  insufficient  staff  resources  (employees  involved  in solid  waste
services  held concurrent  jobs  in  other  agencies),  need  to  replace  the  technical
advisor  three  times  in  the  course  of  project  execution,  and  delays  in  designing
and  evaluating  the  pilot  study  so that  the  results  could  be applied  to the  rest
of  Jakarta  in  a timely  fashion. The  Cleansing  Department's  lack  of farailiarity
with ICB  procurement  procedures  caused  furthe.  delays.
Difficulties  in acquiring  suitable  sites for the transfer  depots
posed  additional constraints to successful project implementation.  The
difficulties  were  due  to  high  land  prices,  lack  of  vacant  land,  and  neighborhood
resistance. Consequently,  in  many  kelurahans,  the  transfer  depot  was replaced
by a transito,  an area  at the  edge  of the  road  where  a six  to eight  cubic  meter
arm  roll  container  could  be placed.
Insufficient fi.nancing  for  solid  waste  services was  another
impediment  to project  succ.ess.  To cover  the  costs  for transport  and  disposal,
the  Bank suggested that every  neighborhood pay a monthly charge to the Cleansing
Department.  As  customary  in the kampungs,  each neighborhood  unit would be
responsible for collecting a fee from each household.  Nonetheless, all of the
revenues were not passed on to the  municipality.  Consequently, the municipality
received insufficient revenues to cover the costs of transport and disposal.
Moreover, the  municipality lacked  a separate  accounting system identifying  costs
and revenues  attributed to  the solid  waste  operations.  Unless the  cost recovery
mechanisms are rationalized and improved,  the PCR indicates that significant
subsidies from general revenues  will be required to  sustain, improve, and expand
solid  waste  services  in  Jakarta.
Despite  the  various  difficulties  encountered  in  the  course  of
implementation,  the project accomplished the reorganization of the Cleansing
Department  in Jakarta.  It also strengthened the Department  in terms of its
technical  and  operational capacities.  Solid  waste service levels  in  Jakarta rose
from 48 percent to 86 percent of the total population.  The actual population
served (1,812,275) exceeded the target uf 1.5 million.  Moreover, the project
introduced a cost recovery system for the residential neighborhoods to meet at
least a portion of the  municipality's solid  waste transport and disposal costs.
In  addition  to  these  achievements,  the  project  also  demonstrated  the
effectiveness of community involvement in primary solid waste collection.  D.zirg
implementation, it  became obvious that the  responsibility for  primary collection
should  remain  with the  local  neighborhood  groups,  rather  than  be taken  over  by- 71 -
existing neighborhood arrangements for  household collections would  have
undermined  community  spirit.
In Surabaya,  the  solid  waste  component  was implemented  as planned.
A notable  achievement  was the  establishment  of a separate  Cleansing  Department
within  the  municipality  which  increased  its  status  and  resulting  budgetary  and
manpower  resources. Moreover,  the Surabaya  Cleansing  Department  accepted  the
Bank's  strategy  of  using  simple  technology,  thus  avoiding  the  costly  and  lengthy
delays  encountered  in  Jakarta. Nonetheless,  a  report  on the  results  of follow-
up investments  in  Surabaya's  solid  waste  services  supported  by the  Fifth  Urban
Develo2ment  Project  (Loan  2408)  indicate  problems  in  the  areas  of  operations  and
maintenance,  staff  resources,  financing,  and  disposal.72 -
ANNEX  6
FIRST  URBAN  DEVELOPMENT  PROJECT,  EGYPT
(CR  831-EGT)
6.1  Project  Background/Objectives
The EgvDt Urban Development  Project was the first urban sector
operation  assisted  by the  Bank in  Egypt. The  project  was  intended  to introduce
low-cost technological  innovations  for the provision of shelter and urban
services  on a pilot  scale.  It was appraised  in  November  1977  and  approved  in
June  1978. The  IDA  credit  for  US$14.0  million  to  the  Arab  Republic  of Egypt  was
to finance  67 percent  of total  project  cost  estimated  at  US$21.0  million.
The  project was  designed to  meet  Egypt's urban  problems by
demonstrating  the  viability  of:  (i)  providing  non-subsidized  services  to  existing
settlements  in Cairo; (ii) introducing  sites and  services development  in
Alexandria  and  Assiut;  (iii)  experimenting  with  low-cost  solutions  to  solid  waste
problems  in Cairo  and  Alexandria;  and (iv)  expanding  employment  opportunities.
Ceneral  institution  building  in  the  sector  was to  be provided  through  technical
assistance. The project's  components  included  shelter  provision,  employment
promotion  services,  rehabilitation  of water supply  and sewerage  systems in
Assiut,  technical  assistance  and  project  management,  and  solid  waste  services.
The  objectives  of the  solid  waste  collection  and  disposal  component
were to:  (i)  introduce  low-cost  intermediate  technology  waste  disposal  systems,
and  (ii)  improve  waste  collection,  particularly  in  low-income  areas,  by  expanding
the  role  of  small  private  contractors.  In  addition,  the  consultant  and  advisory
services  component  of the  project  allocated  US$0.17  million  for  the  preparation
and implementation  of schemes  to improve  solid  waste collection  and disposal
systems  in  Cairo  and  Alexandria.  At  appraisal,  the  total  cost  of  the  solid  waste
component  was  estimnated  to  be about  US$3.3  million,  or 16  percent  of the  total
project  cost.  Due to  changes  in the  project  design  during  implementation,  the
actual  expenditure  rose to approximately  US$7.9  million  or 35 percent  of the
total  project  cost.
6.2  Solid  Waste  Conditions
At appraisal,  solid  waste  collection  in Egypt  was not  considered  a
public  service.  When  provided,  it  was  normally  concentrated  in  high-income  areas
where private collectors  could realize higher salvage values.  In Cairo,
accumulation.  of refuse  on the  streets  had  become  a  serious  health  hazard  and  was
ranked  by residents  as the  most  pressing  neighborhood  problem.
The Governorates'  responsibility  for  refuse  collection  was limited
to street  cleansing.  House to house collection  was left to small privare
contractors,  called  Zabbaleen,  who  pay  fees  to  middlemen  for  the  right  to  collect
wastes  from  designated  buildings.  Zabbaleen  are  usually  squatters  earning  their- 73
living  by sorting  the refuse  at their settlements  and selling  all reusable
matter. The  Zabbaleen  also  feed  organic  waste  to the  pigs  which  they  raise  and
then sell to supplement  their income.  In addition,  part of this waste is
composted  and  sold  to farmers  as fertilizer.
Since  it  is  more  profitable  for  the  Zabbaleen  to  collect  refuse  from
the  wealthy  neighborhoods,  poor neighborhoods  were neglected.  In Cairo,  for
instance,  the  Zabbaleen  collect  by  donkey  cart  about  45 percent  of  all  household
waste (1,800  tons  per  day)  at no cost - the  Governorate. This  comprises  most
of the  waste from  the  high and  middle-income  areas,  about  half the  waste from
lower middle income areas, and none from the  low-income  districts,  In
Alexandria,  the  Zabbaleen  collect  about  50  percent  of the  city's  domestic  waste.
In  both cities,  uncollected  waste is thrown  onto the  streets,  where a portion
is  subsequently  removed  by the  Governorates'  street  cleansing  departments.  The
appraisal  mission identified  the accumulation  of waste on the streets  as a
serious  health  hazard,  particularly  in the  poorer  areas.
6.3  Solid  Waste  Component
The  solid waste management componenc was  designed to improve
collection  and  disposal  services  through  the  construction  of composting  plants
and  improved  collection  arrangements. In Cairo,  a pilot  composting  plant  with
a  capacity  of  about  ten  tons/day  was  planned  at the  Shoubra  disposal  site  to  test
the  composition  of wastes  being  collected  and  the  quality  and  marketability  of
the  resulting  compost. The  plant  also  was  to  provide  a  basis  for  developing  the
appropriate  design  and operating  procedures  for  a larger  plant.  After  a test
period of about one year, a larger  plant with increased  capacity  would be
designed  and implemented. To assist  in the  design,  testing,  and operation  of
the  plants,  the  component  also  provided  consultant  services.
For the city of Alexandria,  the component included:  a pilot
"windrow-type"  composting  plant  with  a  10-ton  per  hour  capaci;.y,  300  donkey  carts
for  waste  collection,  600  hand  carts  and  40  depots  for  street  cleaning,  2  sorting
depots for disposal, 2 workshcps  for repairing  refuse collection  vehicles,
equipment  for  4 garages,  and  4 jeeps for  supervision. Consultant  services  to
help implement  this  scheme  also  were included.
6.4  Imrlementation
According  to  the  PPAR,  the  solid  waste  component  was  one  of the  most
successful  components  of the  project  Oje to  careful  preparation  by consultants
and the fact that the investments  responded to a priority.  Although the
expansion  of Zabbaleen  collection  activities  remained  limited  to  only  a few  low-
income areas, the project effectively  demonstrated  the feasibility  of the
approach,  possibly  providing  the basis for larger  scale development  of this
service.  By contrast,  several  elements  (handcarts,  depots,  workshops,  garage
equipment,  supervision  vehicles)  intended  to  improve  refuse  collection  and  street- 74 -
cleaning  operations  in  Alexandria  were  cancelled  because  AID  made  funds  available
for the same purpose on a grant  basis.  In addition,  the donkey  carts  were
cancelled  because  private  refuse  collectors  and the  City Council  rejected  the
idea.
In  Cairo,  most  sub-components  were implemented  as  planned.  Overall,
the  cost  overruns  in  the  implementation  *  the  solid  waste  component  (actual  cost
reached nearly US$8.0 million,  an estimated  123 percent increase  over the
appraisal  costs)  resulted  from  the inclusion  of a 160  ton/day  composting  plant
at  Alexandria  to  substitute  for  the  originally  envisaged  shelter  component.  Both
composting  plants  were  operational  by the  proiect's  cLosing  date. In  addition,
funds  were used for  the  preparation  of a free-standing  solid  waste  management
proiaect.
As a result  of the  project,  refuse  collection  in  Cairo  was  extended
to approximately  18,500  low-income  households  on a self-financing,  private-
service  provision  basis,  thus  establishing  a  model  which  might  be applicable  to
city-wide  expansion. In addition,  the  administration  of street  clearsing  and
solid  waste  processing  services  by the  Governorates  of  Cairo  and  Alexandria  was
improved  by the construction  of the two 160 ton/day  composting  plants  and by
measures  taken  to ensure  that the  plants  continue  to be properly  operated  and
maintained.  Both  composting  plants  were  completed  on time,  and  as  of  1985,  were
producing  compost  of regular  consistency  with a high organic  content  suitable
for soil conditioning  for purposes cf  land reclamation,  agriculture,  and
landscaping  by both the  public  and  private  sectors.
The  conaposting  plant  in  Alexandria  proved  to  be the  more  successful
of the two composting  facilities  because of efficient  plant mar,gement  and
effective  compost  marketing. The plant  manager  was an agronomic  engineer  who
supervised  a staff  of  committed  workers  and  maintained  excellent  records  on  all
composting  operations  and  sales. By  contrast,  the  Cairo  facility  was  operated
by underpaid,  dissatisfied  civil  servants  with no expertisa  in composting.  By
1985, most of  the  workers left the plant  and  facility operations  were
deteriorating.
Overall,  the  project  demonstrated  the  effectiveness  of  a least-cost
approach  to  improvement  in  public  sector  waste  management  and  provided  the  basis
for  larger  future  projects. To follow-up  the  First  Urban  Development  Droicct,
for example,  a solid  waste component  was built into the Greater  Cairo  Urban
Development  Proiect  (LN  2176-EGT)  approved  in  June  1982. The  component  included
US$600,000  for  40 man-months  of consulting  services  to  develop  a detailed  MSWM
program for Cairo.  A  free-standing  solid waste project  was appraised in
February  1985  to extend  the  systems  established  under  CR 831-EGT  in the  cities
of AlexandIria  and Giza.  As of this writing, this project has not been
negotiated.- 75 -
ANNEX  7
LAHOBE  JRBAN  DEVELOPMENT  PROJECT,  PAKISTAN
(CR  1348-PAK)
7.1  Proiect  Background/Obiectives
The  Laho&e  Urban  Development  Project  (CR  1348-PAK)  was approved  in
April 1983 for  a credit  of US$16.0  million  to support  urban  sector  operations
in  Lahore,  Pakistan.  The  project  resulted  from  the  recognition  that  Lahore  faced
a substantial  and growing shortage  of housing and infrastructure  services,
particularly  for the low-income  groups.  Some 25 to 30 percent  of the total
population  lived  in  Katchi  Abadis,  where  insecurity  of tenure,  overcrowding,  and
limited  acce.s  to infrastructure  and  public  services  are  the  main features. A
further  25 percent  of the  population  lived  in the  Walled  City  and  adjacent  old
parts of the city 'n  conditions  of severe  overcrowding,  decaying  houses,  and
inadequate  urban  services.
The basic objectives  of this first  urban development  project in
Pakistan  were to strengthen  the capacity  of local  institutions  to prepare  and
implement  integrated  urban  development  programs,  improve  municipal  services,  and
develop strategies  to cope with continuing  urban growth, particularly  the
delivery  of  services  and  shelter  to  the  urban  poor. To  achieve  these  objectives,
the  project included:  (i)  upgrading  in Walled  City low-income  areas (US$4.6
million);  (ii)  sites-ard-services  in  the  Gujjarpura  Area (U$14.5  million);  (iii)
improvements  in  solid  waste  collection  and  municipal  management  and  maintenaace
(US$4.7  million);  and (iv)  studies  for  the  preparation  of  a  second  urban  project
(US$0.?  million).  The total project  cost was estimated  at US$24.0 million
(including  contingencies),  of  which  about  20  percent  was  allocated  to the  solid
waste  management.
7.2  Solid  Waste  Component
At the time  of project  appraisal,  solid  waste  collection  in  Lahore
cove  'J  nearly  70 percent of the city's area on an  intermittent basis,  but
reac, J  less  than  half  of the  population  since  it  mainly  served  the  low  density
middl..  and  upper  income  areas. Estimated  daily  production  of  solid  waste  in  the
city  was  approximately  2,200  tons. Some  40  percent  of  the  total  wastes  generated
was collected  by the  Lahore  Municipa'  Corporation  (LMC) with an additional  40
percent  collected  by farmers  in the  dry season  for  use  as soil conditioner  or
for  land  reclamation  by dumping. In addition,  there  were insufficient  communal
dustbins;  wastes  were constantly  overflowing  at collection  points  and "filth
depots"  (transfer  stations). Disposal  was  carried  out  by crude  dumping  on any
available  site  where  the  landowner's  permission  could  be  obtained.  Large  amounts
of solid  waste  were  also  dumped  in  open  drains  by residents,  causing  the  drains
to  block  and  create  additional  health  hazards  from  stagnant  sewage.- 76 -
At the  time  of  appraisal,  LMC's  garbage  collection  fleet  encompassed
160  bullock  carts,  43 tractor/trailer  units,  and  65 trucks,  of  which  48  were in
service  at any one time.  Vehicles  were poorly  maintained,  insufficient  in
number,  and  poorly  utilized. Further,  productivity  of  the  6,000  workers  employed
in the  service  was low  due to inadequate  equipment  and  limited  supervision.
The  project  initially  sought  to  provide  solid  waste  services  to  those
areas  of the city not yet served  and to improve  the level  of service  to the
poorest  and  most densely  populated  areas  where  the level  of service  was low.
Concurrently,  small  scale  demonstrations  of  improved  waste  storage  and  collection
systems  were t,  be implemented  in  pilot  areas  of  the  Walled  City  and  in  a  modern
colony.  These demonstrations  wozild  assist in preparing  proposals for the
extension  of  modes  found  most  suitable  to  cover  all  of the  Walled  City  and  other
areas  of  Lahore. Consultants  were  appointed  to  augmert  the  data  already  in  LMC's
possession,  examine  the  problems  and  deficiencies  in  solid  waste  management,  and
propose  detailed  solutions  to  these  problems.
Provisions  were  made for  the  supply  of about  50 tipping  trucks  and
eight front-end  loaders  for the collection,  transportation,  and disposal  of
wastes.  In addition,  the  project  provided  15  vans/jeeps  and 100  bicycles  for
transporting  supervisory  staff and 2,000 handcarts, improved  brushes, and
miscellaneous  equipment  for  sweepers.  The  project  also  included  civil  works  for:
upgrading  vehicle  workshops  to improve  maintenance;  three  zonal  vehicle  parks
with first  line  servicing  equipment  to improve  vehicle  utilization;  six large
transfer  stations  so  that  wastes  collected  by sweepers,  bullock  carts,  and  other
short  haul vehicles  could  be bulk loaded  to more distant  landfill  sites;  and
control  points  and access  roads at the transfer  station sites.  Additional
storage  containers,  both fixed  and  portable,  were also  provided.
LMC  was responsible  for the implementation  of the solid  waste and
municipal  management  components. Consultants  were  hired to assist  LMC in its
efforts to improve the organization  and management  of its solid waste and
maintenance  operations.  The  implementation  of  recommendations  arising  from  this
study  were to  be completed  during  execution  of the  project.
It was expected  that  the  quality  of the  city  environment  would  be
significantly  improved  by the  extended  and  improved  garbage  collection  service
envisioned  under the  project.  Although  the  component  would  benefit the  city
population  at large  by improving  nealth  conditions,  it  would  mainly  benefit  the
poorer  sections  of the  community  since  extensions  of service  would  be located
primarily in  lower income neighborhoods.  The  total number of  component
beneficiaries  was  estimated  to  be 1.5  million  (about  half  of the  city);  of this
amount,  65 percent  belonged  to the  urban  poverty  group.- 77 -
7.3  Implementation
During  project implementation,  the execution  of the solid waste
management component lagged significantly  behind  the  original schedule.
Generally,  the impediments  to the  component's  progress  have included: unclear
institutional  arrangements;  slow  procurement  of  solid  waste  equipment,  collection
vehicles,  transfer  station,  and  workshop  (issues  concerned  bidders'  requirements,
need  for  agreement  on specifications,  and  lack  of  mobilization  bond  equipment);
time  required  to determine  suitable  sitcs  for  landfills  and long-term  tipping
sites  (issues  concerned  proximity  to  city  center,  need  to  survey  site  boundaries
and access  roads,  and lack of information  regarding  risks of pollution  from
leachate);  and  delays  in the  local  manufacture  and  delivery  of refuse  skips  and
containers.
To  assist  the  LMC  (presently  the  Metropolitan  Corporation  of  Lahore)
in  resolving  some  of the  difficulties  encountered  in the  course  of implementing
this component,  the Credit  financed  the hiring  of an experienced  solid  waste
management  advisor  for  a period  of 12  onths.  Project  completion  is expected
by the  end  of December  1989,  two  years  later  than  planned  at appraisal.- 78 -
ANNEX 8
RECIFE  METROPOLITAN  REGION  DEVELOPMENT  PROJECT,  BRAZIL
(LN  2170-BR)
8.1  Project  Background/Obiectives
The  Recife  Metropolitan  Region  DeveloRment  Proiect  (LN  2170-BR)  was
appraised  in  May 1982,  and a loan  commitment  of US$123.9  million  was approved
by the  Bank in June 1982.  The project  is  part of an ongoing  national  program
to tackle  the  severe  economic  and  social  problems  created  by rapid  urban  growth
in  Brazil's  metropolitan  areas. It  was  recognized  by  the  appraisal  mission  staff
that  despite  efforts  to  provide  jobs  and  services,  severe  deficiencies  remained
not  only  in  the  physical  provision  of  urban  infrastructure  and  sarvtIces,  but  also
in the  planning,  management,  and financing  of such services.  Thus, the loan
would finance  programs  and projects  designed  to alleviate  problems  of urban
growth  through  more  efficient  and  economic  provision  of  urban  infrastructure  and
services,  and the strengthening  of metropolitan  planning  and adm.inistrative
capabilities.  Building  on the  experier.-e  gained  under  the  Brazil  Medium-Sized
Cities  Project (LN 1720-BR),  the project focuses  on the Recife  Metropolitan
Region  (RMR)  which  consists  of nine municipalities  with a total  population  in
1980  of 2.4  million.
The Recife  MetroDolitan  Region  Development  Project  was designed  to
support  the national  policy  objectives  of strengthening  metropolitan  regional
planning  and administration,  providing  urban infrastructure  and services,  and
consolidating  the  development  of  metropolitan  regions  other  than  Rio  de  Janeiro
and  Sao  Paulo. Within  the  context  of these  metropolitan-'.evel  objectives,  the
project  has four  specific  objectives:  (i)  provision  of improvements  to  existing
housing  and  urban  infrastructure;  (ii) provision of  metropolitan-scale
infrastructure  and  services; (iii) generation and enhancement  of  income,
especially for  the  urban poor;  and  (iv) strengthening the  institetions
responsible  for  the  planning,  administration,  and  financial  management  assooiated
with urban and  metropolitan  region  development. As part of the Metropolitan
Infrastructure  Subproject,  the  solid  waste  component  is  designed  to  support  the
municipalities  in  their  traditional  collection  activities  and  to  ensure  adequate
disposal  through  the  creation  of a metropolitan  agency  responsible  for  garbage
disposal. In 1981  prices,  the  cost  of the  solid  waste  component  was estimated
at  US$38.5  million,  representing  11  percent  of  the  total  project  cost  of  US$347.8
million.
8.2  Solid  Waste  Conditions
The municipalities  that make up the RMR are responsible  for the
collection  and  disposal  of garbage. At the  time  of appraisal,  only  45 percent
of the garbage  produced  in the region  was collected.  Most of the  waste was
disposed  of in  open dumps,  in  streams  and rivers,  and in  drainage  channels.- 79 -
Although the lack of primary  collection  equipment  accounted  for part of the
problem,  inadequate  disposal  facilities  presented  the  major  problem.  The  central
municipalities  produced the most garbage  but had the least amount of land
available  for  disposal. Thus,  at appraisal,  the  regional  problem  of balancing
the  production  of garbage  with safe  and  efficient  disposal  had to  be resolved.
8.3  Solid  Waste  ComDonent
The  solid  waste  component  was  designed  to  augment  the  existing  fleet
of collection  vehicles and organize  disposal  on a metropolitan-wide  basis.
Accordingly,  the  project  finances  the  purchase  of 280  additional  vehicles  so  as
to  achieve  100  percent  primary  and  secondary  collection.  Neighborhood  collection
stations  with containers  for  depositing  refuse  are included,  particularly  for
inaccessible  low-income  areas.  Equipment  for street, land, and stormdrain
cleaning  also are included.  In addition,  garages  and maintenance  shops are
provided  in  the  five  major  municipalities,  as  are  two  transfer  stations  in  Olinda
and Recife South.  Lastly, two  large-scale  sanitary landfills would be
constructed  and put into operation  during the life of the project.  Using
technology  already  in operation  in Sao  Paulo,  both sites  would  be equipped  to
produce  bio-gas (methane)  that would be transmitted  to adjacent  industries.
According  to the  appraisal  report,  80  percent  of the  benefits  of this  component
would  be directed  towards  the  urban  poor.
Cost recovery  information  in the appraisal  report indicates  that
garbage  collection  taxes  do not  cover  the  costs  of operation. Nonetheless,  it
is  expected  that  the  production  of  gas  would  generate  revenues  adequate  to  cover
100  percent  of the  cost  of sanitary  landfills  and  the  gas  production  plant.
One  of  the  primrary  objectives  of the  component  is  to  eliminate  a  gap
in the  region's  institutional  structure  through  the  creation  of a responsible
agency  to  manage  garbage  disposal  in the  metropolitan  region. The feasibility
study  for  the  component  indicated  that  the  best  solution  would  be the  creation
of  an  autonomous  company. Therefore,  FIDEM  31  (which  prepared  the  project)  would
operate  the  region's  disposal  system  in  its  initial  two-year  phase,  and  then  hand
over  operations  to  a new  company. In the  meantime,  the  project  made  provisions
for  hiring  a management  consulting  firm to recommend  a detailed  structure  for
the  new company.
8.4  Implemcntation
Due  largely  to  political  differences  between  the  Goverror  of  Recife
and  opposition  mayors  as well as environmental  concerns  raised  by a prominent
environmental  group in  Sao  Paulo,  the large-scale  landfill  facilities  with gas
recovery  were  not  implemented  as  planned. The  environmental  group  held  a  public
Foundation  for the  Development  of the  Metropolitan  Region  of Recife.- 80 -
forum  to  condemn  the  project  because  of  the  perceived  threats  to  the  Matta  Grossa
Forest  and  the  potential  for  leachate  to  enter  a nearby  river. According  to  one
project  officer.  however,  these  concerns  were unfounded,  particularly  since  a
number  of municipalities  were dumping their  raw sewage  into the same river.
Moreover,  the  same  environmental  group  posed  no  objections  to  an  earlier  project
that  was  environmentally  unsound.  With  respect  to  the  North  landfill  site,  other
local  concerns  related  to the  need  for  a  separate  access  road  and  moniLoring  of
stormwater  runoff  and the underlying  aquifer.  Objections  from neighborhood
residents  as well as the need to relocate  ov..r  120 squatters  complicated  the
acquisition  of the  South  sanitary  landfill.
Due  to  the  various  problems  surrounding  project  implementation,  the
12  affected  municipalities  adopted  a  revised  metropolitan  program  that  designated
strategic  locations  for sanitary  landfills,  composting  plants, and transfer
stations  which  the  municipalities  would  operate  cooperatively.  Accordingly,  the
project financed  subsequent  construction  of three sanitary landfills,  six
composting  plants,  and one disposal  facility  to handle  hospital  waste.  The
facilities  are  now  operated  by the  Metropolitan  Solid  Waste  Sanitary  Department,
also created  under the  project.  (One  of the transfer  stations  as well a. the
original  North  landfill  also  were  constructed  but  never  operated.)
This  project  demonstrated  the  effectiveness  of  municipalities  working
together  to  rolve  metropolitan-wide  solid  waste  problems  in  a  coordinated  manner.
As a  result of  the solid waste component, representatives  of the twelve
municipalities  met  every  week  to  solve  their  common  solid  waste  problems  (e.g.,
land needs for transfer stations).  Thls component also showed that substantial
savings  can  be achieved  through  the  use of low-cost  primary  collection  methods
(i.e.,  locally-manufactured  donkey  carts). According  to one project  officer,
labor  costs  for  primary  collection  in some  areas  was reduced  by as much as 95
percent.  Although  the Recife  Project  was originally  scheduled  to close on
December  31, 1988,  the  Bank  has  extended  the  loan  for  another  year.- 81 -
ANNEX  9
SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT PILn  PROJECT, MEXICO
(LN 2669-ME)
9.1  Proiect  Background/Obiectives
A  joint  Bank-Mexican  sector  study,  undertaken  in  late  1983,  concluded
that  the  solid  waste  subsector  posed  serious  problems  and  recommended  assistance
for  its  development.  In  February  1984,  the  Government  requested  Bank  assistance
to  help  prepare  a first  project  to  develop  the  subsector.  The  resulting  project
was  appraised  in  July-August  1985.  In  March  1986,  the  Bank approved  a US$25.0
million  loan  to BANOBRAS  (National  Bank for  Public  Works  and  Services).
The objectives  of the  Solid  Waste  Management  Pilot  Proiect  are  to:
(i)  assist  the  Government  to  more  clearly  define  solid  waste  subsector  objectives
and policies  and to develop  national and local institutional  capability  to
improve  solid  waste  management;  (ii)  improve  collection  and disposal  services
through  pilot  sub-projects;  (iii)  test  and  evaluate  alternatives  for  promoting
cost  savings,  providing  training,  and  channelling  funds  in the  subsector;  (iv)
develop  a  basis for  cost recovery  for  solid  waste services;  and (v)  provide  a
basis  for  preparing  full-scale  solid  waste  management  improvement  projects. In
December  1985  prices, the total  cost af the proiect  was estimated  at US$50.0
million  equivalent  (including  taxes  and  contingencies).
9.2  Solid  Waste  Conditions
At the  time  of  project  appraisal,  solid  waste  collection,  transfer,
and  final  disposal  were  inadequate  in  virtually  every  city. Collection  service,
often erratic  and inconsistent,  was ,.vailable  only to 70 percent  of the  urban
population, and generally provided with  limited and/or aging facilities,
deteriora_ing  equlpment,  and untrained personnel.  Adequate final disposal
techniques :ere  applied to only five percent of the total volume of wastes
collected.  In 90 percent  of Mexico's  cities,  another  problem  concerr.3d  the
increasing  amounts  of industrial  and toxic  wastes.  For example,  the  electro-
mechanical  industry  generated  large amounts  of PCBs.  These and other toxic
substances  were  being  stored,  dumped,  or discarded  in  unknown  locations  around
the  country.
While the  Secretariat  of Urban  Development  and Ecology  (SEDUE)  is
responsible  for  establishing  regulations  and  norms  for  the  solid  waste  subsector,
municipalities  are  responsible  for  the  collection  and  disposal  of  municipal  solid
wastes. Responsibility  for  collection,  transport,  storage,  treatment,  and  final
disposal  of toxic  and industrial  wastes  rests  with the  generating  industries,
SEDUE,  and in some  cases,  the  municipalities.  At the  municipal  level,  various
arrangements  are  employed  to  handle  waste  management. In  many municipalities,
one department  is responsible  for collection,  transport,  disposal,  and fleet
management  and  repair. Other  municipalities  have  a separate  department  of- 82 -
transport to handle management,  maintenance,  and repair of all municipal.
vehicles.  In others,  a municipal  "empresa"  (company)  handles  all aspects  of
waste  management,  including  fleet  management.  Contract  and/or  private  collection
is employed in a few municipalities,  usually to cover specific zones and
institutions  (hotels,  hospitals,  restaurants  etc.). At the  time  of appraisal,
there  were  virtually  no  inter-municipal  cooperative  arrangements  or  organizations
to  promote  and  manage  shared  facilities  and  equipment.
Poor operational  performance  has been another  problem  confronting
solid  waste  services  throughout  Mexico. Due  to  a lack  of planning  and  funds  to
regularly re-stock spare parts, about 25 percent of  the most organized
municipalities'  operative  fleet  are  out  of service  at  any  given  time. Although
solid  waste management  is estimated  to consume  up to one third  of municipal
budgets,  there  are  no systems  to record  and compile  the  costs  of solid  waste
operations.  There are no data on employees  per ton of waste collected  or
disposed  of.  As the appraisal  report  notes,  without  proper  cost data, cost
efficiency  is not even an issue  of concern,  much less  a goal to be achieved.
Further,  few  (if  any)  cleaning  agencies  attempt  to  minimize  raw  refuse  or  provide
separate  areas  for  hazardous  wastes. Route  planning  for  waste  collection  and
disposal  and  proper  vehicle  operation  are  particularly  weak.
9.3  Solid  Waste  ComRonent
Designed  to  address  the  above  issues,  this  free-standing  solid  waste
project  consists  of two major components. The Dilot component  finances  the
development,  testing,  and  evaluation  of replicable  techniques  for  the  delivery
of  services  in  about  eight  medium-sized  municipalities  and  one  metropolitan  area.
The component includes  civil works, equipment  and materials,  training,  and
technical  assistance  to:  improve  repair  and  maintenance  facilities;  establish
a  metropolitan  waste management  enterprise  in Monterrey; develop low-cost
collection  systems  for  markets  and  marginal  zones;  construct  transfer  stations,
materials  recovery  facilities,  sanitary  landfills,  and  industrial  waste  disposal
sites/cemeteries; improve  institutional, financial,  and  organizational
arrangements;  and  develop  public  education  campaigns. The total  cost of this
component  was estimated  at  US$40.09  million.
The  national  component,  which  would  be  executed  at  the  federal  level,
includes  technical  assistance,  consulting  services,  studies,  and  equipment  to:
(i)  define  subsector  policies  and options  for  effective  and  efficient  delivery
of services  and  to reduce the dependence  on  the Government budget; (ii)
strengthen  institutions;  (iii)  develop  plans  to  address  subsector  constraints;
(iv) undertake  plan preparation  and pre-f-asibility  studies in 26 selected
cities;  and (v)  prepare  follow-on  solid  waste  management  projects. The total
cost  of the  national  component  was estimated  at  US$9.09  million.- 83
The  project  was initially  designed  to  be implemented  over a four-
year  period. The  implementation  period  was  subsequently  increased  to  eight  years
based  on experience  with  water  supply  projects  in the  Region.
9.4  ImDlementation
By the  start  of  project  implementation,  all  of the  original  cities,
except two  (Monterrey  and Acapulco),  withdrew from the project due  to a
combination  of factors: loss  of political  momentum  and  lack  of interest  at the
local  level;  changes  in  local  government  administration,  inadequate  information
on start-up  procedures  by the project  coordinating  unit; lack of counterpart
funds for the pilot and national  components;  need for better institutional
coordination  at the  state  and  municipal  levels;  inadequate  preparedness  within
the  project's  technical  coordinating  unit (SEDUE)  and  within  BANOBRAS  (National
Bank  for  Public  Works  and Services),  the  borrower;  and  allegedly  high interest
rates  charged  under  the  project. As a  result  of  actions  agreed  upon  by the  Bank
by the end of the first supervision  mission,  however,  two areas (Puebla  and
Merida)  expressed  continued  interest  in  the  project.  In  addition,  SEDUE  proposed
two  more cities  (Guadalajara  and  Mexicali)  to replace  others  that  dropped  out.
As of June 1988,  SEDUE's  commitment  to promoting  the Solid  Waste
Management  Pilot  Pro4ect  had  not  been  strong,  due  primarily  to  the  weak  project
unit.  Only  one city (Monterrey)  signed  a subloan  agreement  with BANOBRAS. As
part  of  this  sub-project,  Monterrey  developed  a  public  decentralized  company  at
the state  level  to dispose  of the  solid  wastes  of a population  of about three
million  in eight  municipalities  within  the  Monterrey  metropolitan  area in the
State  of Nuevo  Leon. The  company,  known  as  SIMEPRODE,  has  a Board  of Directors
whose president  is the State  Governor  and members  are representatives  of the
eight municipal  mayors, the labor union, the chamber of commerce,  and the
industrial  association.  SIMEPRODE  will operate four transfer  stations,  24
transfer  trailers,  and  a sanitary  landfill. Although  each  municipality  will  be
responsible  for  collecting  and  delivering  the  waste  to  SIMEPRODE  instal'lations,
SIMEPRODE  will establish  a program  for  one  municipality  to  collect  solid  wastes
in  low-income  peri-urban  zones. The  company  also  will  sign  technical  assistance
agreements  with the municipalities  and advise  on such matters as equipment
selection  and  micro-routing. SIMEPRODE  will not  handle  hazardous  wastes  which
will go to a privately  owned  and  operated  confinement  site.
At  the time of this writing, SIMEPRODE's  facilities  have been
constructed  and  are  expected  to  be operational  by September  1989. The  cost  for
establishing  SIMEPRODE  during  the  period  1987-1988  was  about  US$10  million,  with
43 percent  financed  through  the World Bank loan, 32 percent through  federal
grants,  and  25  percent  through  state  and  municipal  sources.  Operational  revenues
are  expected  to  come  from  tipping  fees  paid  by  all  municipal  and  private  vehicles
delivering  waste.  (The  municipalities  will  pay the  fees  out  of the  portion  of
property  tax  revenues  earmarked  for  solid  waste  services.) The  amount  of these
fees  will  he determined  after  the  first  year  of state-funded  operations.84 -
In  addition  to  the  progress  made  under  the  Monterrey  sub-loan,  there
has been further  improvement  in the  project's  implementation. The cities  of
Acapulco,  Durango,  Merida,  and Tampico  were included  in the pilot component;
feasibility  studies  were  contracted  for  ten  cities,  and  there  has  been  improved
coordination  within  SEDUE  and  between  SEDUE  and  BANOBRAS.  Further,  ai 1 April  1989
supervision  mission reported  that the Technical  Coordinating  Unit had been
strengthened  with  staff  and  sufficient  budget  funds;  th-  main  factors  accounting
for  the  improvement  in  project  execution, In  additioni, a  supervision  mission
that  visited  the subprojects  in Durango,  Acapulco,  and  Tampico  found  no major
technical  or  engineering  problems;  the  sites  for  the  proposed  sanitary  landfills
were inspected  and  found  to  be satisfactory.
With respect  to the  national  component,  progress  has been  made in
carrying out the pre-feasibility  studies.  The generic studies to define
solutions  and  options  for  solving  fundamental  solid  waste  management  problems,
however,  have not been undertaken.  To date, the costs for the project  are
estimated  at  US$35.2  million,  which  leaves  about  US$14.8  million  for  implementing
the  remainder  of the  project.- 85  -
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